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I recall only too well the impact of the Practical Leadership Tests we suffered 
as young officers at Dartmouth. We thought then that leadership was all about 
self-projection, generating a sense of urgency and taking care of the team. But 
we soon learned that real leadership came into play when things went wrong. 
How many times do we hear today that failure is the result of a lack of leader-
ship? Often perhaps, but that may be a simplistic conclusion and there are two 
truisms worth bearing in mind: no plan survives first contact with the enemy; 
and everything in war is simple but the simplest things are often the most dif-
ficult to achieve. 
This collection of essays sprang out of a conference held at the National 
Museum of the Royal Navy in 2011 and provides an illuminating insight into 
naval leadership during a period of significant historical turbulence. Those in 
command at sea at that time enjoyed very limited communications and intel-
ligence that often extended not much further than the visual horizon. Leaders 
had to rely on their own raw initiative and judgement in a very different way 
from today’s commanders in this globally networked world. 
But while in practical terms leadership may be exercised rather differently 
today, the insights offered in these essays point to enduring themes and a better 
understanding of a complex subject.
I am delighted that this collection is dedicated to the memory of Professor 
Colin White, sadly departed but an old friend and an inspiring naval historian. 
He would have approved! 
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PART ONE
Naval Leadership:  
A Voyage of Discovery

INTRODUCTION
Naval Leadership in the Age of Reform 
and Revolution, 1700–1850
Richard Harding* and Agustín Guimerá†
*University of Westminster
†Instituto de Historia, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 
Madrid
In 1995 Rear Admiral James Goldrick called for historians of modern navies to 
analyse ‘much more comprehensively the multitude of technological, financial 
and operational issues involved in decision-making for naval development’. In 
doing so he called for these historians to replicate the technical mastery of the 
subject that he felt ‘has hitherto largely been confined to students of the age of 
sail’.1 While this reflected the relative interest in the context of naval decision-
making displayed by historians of different periods, there was one aspect in 
which the level of mastery was possibly reversed – that of naval leadership. 
Today, leadership is one of the most contested aspects of organisational 
behaviour and analysis. It is a subject of intense study for psychologists, soci-
ologists, anthropologists, political scientists and, to a lesser degree, historians. 
The academic discussions concerning definitions, sources of leadership power, 
its distribution and its meaning resonate far beyond these disciplines into cul-
tural studies, other social discourses and the wider public domains of policy, 
politics, business and entertainment.2
How to cite this book chapter: 
Harding, R and Guimerá, A. 2017. Introduction: Naval Leadership in the Age of 
Reform and Revolution, 1700–1850. In: Harding, R and Guimerá, A (eds.). Naval 
Leadership in the Atlantic World. Pp. 3–7. London: University of Westminster 
Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16997/book2.a. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
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Whether it is ethics, organisational efficiency and effectiveness, interna-
tional relations or general social relations, the word ‘leadership’ is seldom far 
from the centre of the debate. Better, more effective, more authentic leader-
ship is almost always presented as at least part of the answer to the problems 
posed. For individuals, personal development often has the sub-text of becom-
ing leaders in one shape or another. Lack of leadership is presented as the 
contemporary problem, becoming a leader is the driving ambition for right-
minded people and good leadership is the panacea. The process by which this 
term has become so embedded in Western social relations is far from being 
understood. Even the first steps towards this understanding are faltering in as 
much as the definition of leadership mutates in different contexts and socie-
ties. Like so many other terms that underpin modern social discourses, the 
meaning of leadership and its practice runs a gamut of interpretation, from 
those who insist it is a special form of activity that can only be understood by 
highly trained or encultured specialists to those who see its performance as 
little more than everyday activity in particular circumstances.3
Military organisations are far from immune from this contemporary con-
cern. Indeed, the reverse might be true – they are particularly enthralled with 
understanding the concept. The quality of leadership lies at the heart of their 
perceptions of success and failure, organisational design and the real, lived 
experience of the members of those forces. Challenges from the battlefield to 
the budget settlements have implications for the practice and theory of leader-
ship. Thus, for the general public and military organisations there is no lack of 
advice or publications on the theme. 
Historians have contributed their share to the outpouring of work on leader-
ship, and naval historians have never lagged behind. In 2005, the bicentenary of 
the Battle of Trafalgar was commemorated in Britain in a public manner which 
no individual battle (except, perhaps, the Battle of Britain in 1940) has known 
in the last fifty years. Central to this was the figure of Horatio Lord Nelson 
(1758–1805), the great hero-leader who died at the moment of his greatest 
victory, which, in the public’s imagination at least, saved Britain from immi-
nent invasion by the French Emperor Napoleon. The bicentenary provided the 
occasion to burst many myths, including that of imminent invasion. Equally 
important was the chance to review the leadership of the nations and fleets 
that were involved in the battle. The essays, books and conference proceedings 
that emerged from that commemoration did a great deal to cause historians 
to rethink the idea of leadership in the early nineteenth-century navies. What 
became obvious was that far from the last word having been said on naval lead-
ership, there were many aspects of the phenomenon that had been glossed over, 
encrusted with nationalist myth or lost in the passage of time. 
One result of this was the convening of an international conference at the 
National Museum of the Royal Navy, Portsmouth, in December 2011. It 
brought together speakers from Spain, France and Britain to discuss naval 
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leadership in the period from 1700 to 1850. They explored the subject from the 
level of national policy to tactical command. This collection of essays emerged 
from that first exchange of views. They are not the proceedings of the confer-
ence. Some essays have been modified as a result of discussions and subsequent 
research, and another has been added as a result of lacunae that were identified 
at the conference. However, they do represent the balance of views, writing and 
interests that were evident at that gathering. They provide insights into how 
navies operated in a period of long-term, high-intensity global conflict. They 
show how important it was for navies to be integrated into the political con-
text of their host societies. The reputation of naval officers, their contacts with 
political elites and how navies are deployed are subjects covered by Surreaux, 
Chaline, Harding and Scheybeler. At sea the admirals were usually isolated 
from these domestic pressures (although as the study of d’Orvilliers shows, 
traditional social relations were not left behind at the shoreline). These offic-
ers commanded great power in the form of the fleets they led. Their decisions 
could have huge consequences for the societies to which they owed allegiance. 
Their performances were judged by contemporaries and became part of the 
historical narrative of nations. The essays on Mazarredo, Suffren, Barceló, Sala-
zar and Napier all pose different questions as to how this behaviour has been 
interpreted and integrated into the traditional national narratives. Here we see 
very different approaches to command in relation to subordinates, relations 
with the political masters and, crucially, in the face of the enemy. 
Taken as a whole, what do these essays tell us? The essays focus on a period 
of major change. During the eighteenth century, navies became one of the 
main vehicles of geopolitical and economic strategy for European states 
extending their influence on a global scale. The range, robustness and impact 
of navies across the world expanded tremendously. Navies were very much at 
the forefront of the technological and organisational shifts that accompanied 
this phase of European expansionism. In July 1789 one of the defining events 
of European history occurred with the outbreak of the French Revolution. By 
1792 the French naval officer corps had all but crumbled in the wake of the 
revolutionary upheavals and Europe was plunged into 23 years of intense, 
almost non-stop warfare. During this time the impact of the revolution was 
felt not just in Europe but in South America and the Caribbean as well. The 
independence and reform movements led to bloody civil wars in which 
navies played important, even decisive, parts. Some of these essays shed light 
on how states reacted to the demands of maritime and naval power before 
1789. Others look at how naval commanders performed in the long wars that 
succeeded 1792. What they all show is that although there was a common 
understanding of how wars at sea should be fought, there were distinct dif-
ferences between states and commanders as they had to respond to different 
conditions. There are clear comparisons at one level, but the contrasts are just 
as informative. 
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What they also confirm is that the concern for leadership has been with us 
for centuries. The twenty-first century is not breaking new ground. The prac-
tice of leadership may be different and some of the reasons for this emerge 
from the essays, but the problems faced by societies and nations have a great 
deal in common and navies as tools for solving those problems are also much 
the same. The ‘modern’ naval problem of inter-state rivalry, which is again rais-
ing its head across the world, dominated the state decision-making processes 
for navies in the eighteenth century. The ‘post-modern’ naval problems of our 
world, from economic security, piracy and smuggling, to maintaining good 
order on the maritime commons and managing alliances, had their counter-
parts in those eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century navies in an age of 
mercantilism.4 These essays take us away from the well-known world of the 
great sea battles of annihilation that are the culmination of great power rivalry 
to the death, and which dominated naval thinking from the 1880s to the end of 
the Cold War, to the variety of naval duties and operations that occur in those 
long periods of naval confrontation, which range from diplomatic flag or sabre 
waving to police actions, and upwards to low-intensity, regional conflict. There 
are many more dimensions to the problem of naval leadership which need to 
be explored. History never repeats itself and leadership is not a universal tech-
nique or method of social control. The world is constantly changing, and as 
Western navies face growing regional and global challenges with fewer plat-
forms and a greater need to work in partnership, they have, at the same time, 
to respond to national public perceptions of what navies do and how they do 
it. An understanding of how leaders behaved and how leadership was exercised 
is an important step in forming a better understanding of the role leadership 
plays in the life of navies. 
This collection started as a response to the questions and debates that had 
been stimulated during the bicentenary commemorations of Trafalgar. Central 
to that year of activities was Professor Colin White. Colin dedicated much of 
his life to the study of Nelson and he became a great enthusiast for spreading 
the word about Nelson and the naval history of his times to the wider public. 
Apart from the energy he displayed in organising and being part of a whole 
range of commemorative events, he produced a new edition of Nelson’s cor-
respondence and a monograph reflecting on Nelson as an admiral.5 Although 
a great admirer of Nelson, he did not neglect the contributions of others to the 
great war at sea during these years. From the common seaman to the prob-
lems faced by other navies, Colin was quick to point out they all needed to be 
understood. One of his characteristics was the welcome he gave to scholars of 
all nations to discuss and debate naval leadership of the period. His early death 
after becoming Director of the Royal Navy Museum Portsmouth (the precursor 
of the National Museum of the Royal Navy) was a sad loss to the subject. He 
would have been an enthusiastic contributor to these essays had he lived and it 
seems fitting that these essays are dedicated to his memory.
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A number of debts of gratitude have been incurred during this project. First, 
the sponsors of the original conference made it possible. These are the National 
Museum of the Royal Navy, the Society for Nautical Research, the 1805 Club, 
La Sorbonne et Musée national de la Marine, Paris, the Ministerio de Ciencia 
e Innovación, Madrid, the Consejo Superior de Investigacionnes Cienificas, 
Madrid, and the Gunroom, HMSSurprise.org. We are also grateful to all the 
contributors for developing their papers. Finally, we are very grateful for the 
patience of Andrew Lockett of the University of Westminster Press, who helped 
us bring it all together.

CHAPTER ONE




Given the apparent ubiquity of interest in leadership today it is curious that 
the study of leadership has not featured more strongly as an explicit feature in 
naval history. This is not to suggest that it is entirely absent. In fact, we know 
a remarkable amount both about leaders and what leadership was expected 
to be. Throughout the ages, history has provided examples for emulation or 
warnings to avoid. Indeed, modern naval history emerged from a determina-
tion to teach naval officers and statesmen the information and the principles it 
was thought would guide them as they assumed leadership roles. History was 
the discipline for the aspirant leader – and this explicit function is one factor 
that has led to the greater focus on leadership in modern navies than their sail-
ing predecessors. After the First World War, other disciplines, such as psychol-
ogy, economics and political science, with their ambitions, or claims, to pro-
vide scientific predictability, began to assume the dominant role in leadership 
development, and historians, more acutely aware of the dangers of teleology 
and sensibly unwilling to delve into ‘psycho-history’, were generally disinclined 
to compete with their social science colleagues on this ground.6 Nevertheless, 
history remained an essential part of the cultural capital of naval officers and 
the biographical or autobiographical publications of senior officers provided 
How to cite this book chapter: 
Harding, R. 2017. The Royal Navy, History and the Study of Leadership. In: Harding, R 
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a  constant institutional link to the past. Operational history from the point 
of view of the commander is a standard narrative approach. Similarly, institu-
tional and political histories delineated by the reigns of monarchs, or the spans 
of particular office-holders, are also standard narrative tropes. In many ways, 
‘history from the top’ is a history of leadership.
Naval history is hugely popular and there are many implicit lessons for lead-
ership in the stream of operational histories, memoirs and social studies that 
emerge every year. Leadership can be studied from many directions. ‘Who are 
the leaders?’ is a relatively well-researched question that is yielding excellent 
results. Naval history has benefited from the development of social and ethno-
graphic approaches to organisations. We now have a better understanding of 
the social and political contexts, demographics and career trajectories of vari-
ous naval officer corps.7 We still need to know much more, across chronological 
spans and, particularly, we need to know about the officers of other navies. If 
the assumption is that leaders make a difference to organisations, we need to 
know how those leaders differed in different navies and at different times. 
One of the significant contributions of the ‘new naval history’ of the second 
half of the twentieth century is that it has deepened our appreciation of the 
complex administrative, logistical systems needed for successful operations 
at sea. We also now have a better view of the totality of navies as institutions 
– how they have evolved to exercise an expanding sea power with ever more 
complex, interlinked and expensive weaponry. This has helped us appreciate 
the diffusion of leadership throughout systems that enable effective operations. 
Thus, what leaders do and what defines successful leadership has evolved. The 
social and institutional norms for recognising high-performing naval leaders 
in the eighteenth century were intimately tied up with successful action at sea. 
Administrative leadership was seen as important, but entirely secondary to 
the officer at sea. These norms seem to have continued largely unaltered over 
two centuries, despite the growing bureaucratic and industrial contribution 
to operational success.8 There are good reasons for this, as the concept of the 
‘heroic’ leader was simultaneously blossoming with the growth of popular cul-
ture and media.9 Nevertheless, the processes involved in assessing this evolving 
organisational leadership requirement and the popular understanding of the 
leader in the Royal Navy and other navies remain to be fully investigated. 
While historians have done a great deal to explore the complexity of naval 
organisations and establish the social structure of officers corps, there has been 
less sustained engagement with the idea of leadership as an historical phenom-
enon. In some ways, naval historians, whose discipline emerged out of the 
demands for instructing leaders, are now less able to articulate an understand-
ing of naval leadership than their social science colleagues. From the middle of 
the nineteenth century until midway through the twentieth, civilian organisa-
tions learned a great deal about leadership from military organisations. Today, 
the reverse is more likely to be true. Given the huge changes in the challenges 
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faced by navies and the advances in leadership research, it is curious that lead-
ership has not commanded more attention within navies and among naval his-
torians. For example, we can now look at the late eighteenth-century Royal 
Navy as an institution that was qualitatively distinct from its rivals in terms 
of tactical proficiency, administrative capability, depth of supporting infra-
structure and the strength of its linkage to domestic political culture. We can 
suppose that these made an operational difference, but we have not given the 
social function of leadership that much attention. Leadership seems to be an 
uncontentious phenomenon. After the resolution of the seventeenth-century 
friction between the relative merits of ‘gentlemen’ or ‘tarpaulin’ commanders, 
there seems to be a view that the naval officer corps evolved organically and 
incrementally, learning to adapt to growing tasks and burdens under the pres-
sures of frequent wars until it reached its apogee in Nelson and his ‘Band of 
Brothers’.10 The years of peace and the decades of limited challenge to the Royal 
Navy left it in a weakened state. Reward, promotion, routines and procedures 
were no longer mediated by operational fleet action and the performance of 
the navy in the First World War reflected this.11 Within the navy there was a 
clear discomfort about the perceived inadequacy in its performance during the 
war. Very soon, attention was paid to the higher education of the senior officer 
corps, but it took until the early 1930s for significant changes in initial leader-
ship development to take place.12 The Second World War did not throw up 
naval leaders with the profile of a Beatty in an earlier generation, or of military 
commanders like Montgomery. After the war, the experience of operations was 
integrated into the corporate memory of the officer corps, and the capability 
of the corps rose in conjunction with more scientific approaches to selection 
and promotion. Since 1990, in the absence of cold or hot war pressures, these 
scientific approaches, rigorous training and education (including some histori-
cal studies) are now the baseline for understanding the capability of the navy’s 
officer corps. Overall, naval leadership has not produced the historical interest 
that has developed for army leadership, whether it is the revisionist conclusions 
about military command in the First World War or the relative performance of 
senior officers in the Second.13
This leaves a number of important questions open. For example, when so 
much of the material and operational context of the Royal Navy changed 
between 1689 and 1914, was naval leadership unchanging? Has naval leader-
ship changed in response to the social changes of the twentieth century and if 
so, how and why, and what impact has it had on the navy? How did contempo-
raries understand leadership and what attributes did they ascribe to successful 
leaders? If operational experience in war is such an important determinant of 
the capability of the officer corps, why did the Royal Navy not excel in the 
American War of Independence, when the officers in command during this 
war learned their trade during the most decisive and successful naval war of 
the century, under the eye of senior officers who had many years of operational 
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experience?14 In which aspects of leadership did the navy excel and which were 
an Achilles heel? Does naval leadership differ from other types of leadership, 
particularly the leading of armies or other government organisations? Probably 
most important, was the leadership of the Royal Navy different from that in 
other navies at any point; if so, did it have an impact on the outcome of opera-
tions and why? 
These are big questions, requiring a systematic approach to analysis and can-
not be answered in the space of a single essay. However, I hope that looking at 
one aspect of leadership may make a useful contribution in linking the navy to 
the nation. As has been outlined above, leadership can be examined in terms 
of what leaders did, how they were expected to behave, what success or failure 
they experienced or what characteristics they are supposed to have possessed. 
Most studies of naval leaders are viewed from the perspective of the leader, 
through the medium of biographical or operational studies. Less common are 
studies that examine a leader in the social context of leadership. Yet all leader-
ship is a social process that occurs within a complex environment that includes 
individuals who are leaders, followers, opponents and bystanders, all of whom 
are influenced by a wide range of stimuli. While the naval command decisions 
are in the hands of the leader, the interpretation and subsequent action are 
in the hands of the followers and the results are determined by the interac-
tion between those actions and a wide range of variables in the environment. 
Furthermore, the evaluation of the quality of naval leadership is determined 
not by the leader but by others: the crew of a ship, the Admiralty, the mon-
arch, Parliament, the public and even the wider global audience. Each of these 
may differ from the commander in their judgement of the action and there is 
no certainty that those judgements will be consistent. From the middle of the 
seventeenth century at the very latest, English (and then British) society was 
connected to the leadership of the navy. National support for the navy, and thus 
its naval leadership, expressed through Parliament, press and entertainments, 
was essential to its financial and social existence. This leads us to an important 
question that needs some sort of answer: given that British society changed so 
much over the period 1680–2000, and the importance of external social and 
political judgements of naval performance, why have naval historians paid so 
little attention to the changes in thinking about leadership over the past half 
century? Only the sketchiest of answers can be suggested here, but the follow-
ing is offered as a starting point. 
At one level the answer is fairly obvious. The success of the Royal Navy over 
nearly 300 years suggests that whoever was leading that force was doing a good 
job. It was failure that prompted reflection on leadership performance, not suc-
cess, and there was no need for theory development by contemporaries. For 
subsequent historians there was such a plethora of evidence showing how the 
Royal Navy materially and operationally outstripped its competitors that seek-
ing additional causality in leadership – unless it was obviously exceptional 
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(such as with Hawke or Nelson) – was unnecessary. There was a seemingly 
natural, virtuous symbiosis in which quality of leadership was something that 
emerged from the successful application of seapower, which was, in turn, rein-
forced by the quality of the leaders it bred. 
However, beneath this there was another assumption: that leadership capa-
bility was an innate personal attribute that could be developed by imitating 
the great and good, but it was essentially God-given and, increasingly in the 
 nineteenth century, the product of a gentlemanly upbringing. Christian con-
cepts of providential interventions in response to human moral behaviours 
provided a strong philosophical basis for believing that failure was the result of 
moral weakness just as success reflected a virtuous character.15 The Enlighten-
ment and Romantic focus on the human rather than the divine did not weaken 
this relationship between individual morality and success. Science contributed 
to a better understanding of the natural environment and thus better design 
and operations in maritime affairs.16 However, the individual’s efforts were still 
the major determinant of good fortune. The virtues of hard work and thrift 
mixed with evangelical ethics provided the basis for explaining the rise of 
humankind and more particularly the British. It was no part of the naval train-
ing and education process to explore this linkage in depth, but to provide the 
opportunities for officers to demonstrate these virtues in leadership tasks. Even 
when the search for the underlying principles of naval war was embedded in 
naval higher education, the quest did not extend to leadership.17 Higher edu-
cation focused on expanding the rational capability of the mind rather than 
moral development. Strategic judgement could be inculcated through the sci-
entific study of history and war, allied to more technical disciplines to aid deci-
sion-making.18 By the end of the nineteenth century, intellectual strength and 
knowledge developed by formal naval education, allied with moral strength 
fostered by an initial gentlemanly education, the professional example of past 
naval heroes and the practical experience of leading men in battle, provided the 
ideal environment for developing successful naval leadership. It was a formula 
that seemed intuitively right to a generation of naval officers who served in one 
or both of the world wars and it has barely been seriously questioned in his-
torical studies.19 The assumptions could easily be read back into the eighteenth 
century.20 There is, therefore, a long tradition of consensus that naval leadership 
is a personal attribute and is highly developed by the organisational culture, its 
education, systems and practices so that the best get through to the higher lead-
ership of the force. It is an institutional belief that is shared by other navies.21 
While this consensus holds firm, there have been developments in other aca-
demic fields. Historians have always plundered the intellectual fruits of other 
disciplines in order to help them develop insights into their own subjects. With 
leadership studies the plundering has generally been in the reverse. The two 
world wars provided plenty of examples for those studying leadership to popu-
late their case studies. Military case studies continue to provide a selling point 
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for the more popular end of the market. The result is not always satisfactory – a 
misunderstood situation applied to an irrelevant theory does no one any good. 
Nevertheless, there has been a substantial amount of theory development 
within leadership studies over the last 50 years which might enrich our his-
torical understanding. For example, motivation theories have produced some 
interesting reflections on prize taking in the eighteenth-century Royal Navy.22
Where the lack of attention to leadership is most apparent is in the analy-
ses of comparative naval power. In many histories, the differences in leader-
ship are taken for granted, indeed embedded in a founding ideology. For over 
250 years, a national myth of British difference, based on Britons’ relationship 
with the sea, was slowly created and entrenched in British thinking.23 The idea 
that Britain bred natural seamen and sea officers became a standard element 
in explaining the rise of British naval power.24 The difference between seamen 
such as Hawkins, Frobisher and Drake and their Spanish adversaries, who 
were primarily soldiers, forms an important part in the story of the Span-
ish Armada of 1588. Similarly, the contrast between the experience of officers 
in the Royal Navy and those of the more obviously aristocratic-led navies of 
Bourbon France and Spain is important to the traditional story of the Brit-
ish rise to naval hegemony by 1815. The fact that these differences existed 
has been well established, and there is an intuitive sense that such social dif-
ferences could have been significant, but the impact of these differences on 
the performance of navies over spans of time has not been extensively stud-
ied. Individual situations in which the impact of the quality of leadership 
is clear can be found, most obviously after the collapse of the French naval 
officer corps in 1790, but there are very few such clear-cut examples. Fur-
thermore, there are other occasions when any assumption of superior leader-
ship is less tenable. The leadership differences between the Dutch and British 
naval officer corps in the seventeenth century are less clear. United States and 
 British officer corps have been extensively studied, but the operational impact 
of differences over 200 years are not transparent. The different trajectories of 
leadership development for the officer corps of most European navies over 
the nineteenth century are still seriously under-researched. Historically, the 
leadership assumptions in the Japanese and Chinese navies have not received 
much scholarly attention. 
Long-term success, an intuitively coherent ideology of seapower and the 
entrenched belief in the moral foundations of leadership, therefore, may be 
three reasons why naval leadership has not been of much interest to historians 
of the British public. Another factor might be the nature of networks that sup-
port the Royal Navy. The navy, like any military force, exists within a network 
of contexts which impinge on its operational performance and the choices 
made by the leaders of this organisation. Broadly, one can see two immediate 
and two deeper, long-term elements of this network. The most immediate is the 
operational environment. Navies exist to fight or deter conflict. The operational 
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context is usually explicit and immediate with platforms, weapons and training 
directed to defeating the expected enemy. The second immediate element is the 
contemporary, domestic, political context. How the political system interprets 
naval power, what value it places on the costs and benefits produced by navies 
will have a direct impact on tangible factors, such as budgets and rewards, as 
well as intangible factors like definitions of success. 
However, beneath these two immediate elements, there are others: the insti-
tutional and social. All organisations, including navies, are the product of accu-
mulated experience. The Royal Navy is very aware of this experience and is 
aware of the experiences of other navies, both contemporary and historical. 
This creates an institutional environment within which the daily operational 
capability evolves. It produces the norms of behaviour, the structure within 
which doctrine is created and the deeper assumptions regarding the use of 
navies and naval power. 
The Royal Navy is one of the best-researched organisations in British history. 
This reflects not just the extent of the sources that are available to historians, 
but the strength of the navy as an institution in British society. It has been con-
sciously involved in research for over a century and the fruits of that research 
have an enthusiastic audience. By writing the history, or dominating its writing, 
the navy contributes powerfully to what is considered to be good leadership. 
Naval history from a naval officer’s point of view was an important feature of 
early twentieth-century historiography. The result of this is that the navy has 
an important role in determining where leadership success and failure lie. A 
good example of history being written from a naval perspective is the work 
of Sir Herbert Richmond, a fine scholar with a strong and clear operational 
viewpoint that enabled him to discriminate between good and bad naval lead-
ers, but distorted his judgement with regard to the civilian role in leadership 
decisions.25 One of the important features of new naval history has been to put 
the navy into the wider social framework to explain the logistical, political and 
economic dimensions of naval operations, but the systematic exploration of 
naval leadership has yet to be undertaken. 
Beyond this, there is the influence of wider society. The operational, institu-
tional and political systems interact within society. The wider social and cul-
tural norms help shape them, place parameters around decision-making and 
provide priorities or stimuli for trajectories of action. The new naval history is 
a manifestation of a wider public, in this case academic, participation in naval 
history. However, the public are not just the producers of naval history, they 
are a principal consumer. Naval history is written for the public more than it 
is for professionals. In the public mind the leader as hero is still the dominant 
model of naval leadership. While twenty-first-century navies are fully aware of 
the complexity of leadership in defence organisations, they are also aware of 
the role heroes play in public perceptions of the force and the need to present 
history and the navy in a heroic mould remains important.26
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Together, the operational, political, institutional and social contexts are con-
stantly evolving, providing the background for public interest in the navy, naval 
history and leadership. Throughout the last 120 years, naval history has become 
richer and more varied, but has not led to a major focus upon naval leadership. 
Instead, leadership tends to emerge in relation to other features of naval history. 
The rapid operational changes after 1914 have attracted more attention than 
others. One of the truisms that emerges from this differential change process 
is that military organisations are always preparing to fight the last war. Leaders 
are the product of their experiences and training, and when the experience or 
training proves to be inappropriate for new operational situations catastrophe 
can result – the step change in technology or operational arts is one of the stock 
features of military history from the invention of gunpowder to Blitzkrieg. 
Consequently, the leaders of the Royal Navy and the decisions they made, fac-
ing steam power in the second half of the nineteenth century, long-range gun-
nery, new realities of competition, the submarine and air warfare in the next 
50 years, have attracted a good deal of historical attention.27 From these studies 
there are good examples of both individuals and the naval institutional systems 
that have influenced leadership and decision-making. Much less attention has 
been paid to the years after 1945. It does not offer the drama of change, or 
operational stress. Yet the whole period from 1918 to the present day is a par-
ticularly important field of study as it is marked by the rise of the profession 
of leadership development in Western society. Navies have not been immune 
from its influence, and understanding how institutions such as the Royal Navy 
have adapted and developed their understanding of leadership practice is a 
vital element in understanding their operational assumptions. 
The lack of interest in naval leadership in the twentieth century is in marked 
contrast to that related to the British army. Perhaps, despite all the changes 
between 1890 and 1939, the navy was able to deal with the challenges it faced 
with its institutional framework and philosophy undamaged. The same was 
not true for the British army, which had barely recovered from the experience 
of the Russian War (1854–6) when the shock of the Boer Wars (1880-1 and 
1899–1902), the First World War and the adjustments to a peace in which its 
purpose was unclear, raised a succession of leadership questions to which the 
answers were ambiguous at the time and remain contested to the present day.28 
It was also a period when the very nature of leadership and management in 
modern British society was being questioned and debated.29 During the whole 
period, the Royal Navy remained a powerful institution. It had not won another 
Trafalgar, but it had won the war at sea and there were few existential doubters. 
Nevertheless, there remains a need to explore the leadership assumptions of 
the Royal Navy against the debates and changes that were going on elsewhere.
The lack of analysis is even more true for earlier centuries. The period 1815 
to 1890 was a time of major technological changes that entailed social and 
institutional adjustment against a background of extensive operational  activity 
The Royal Navy, History and the Study of Leadership 17
but  little military threat. The navy has been placed firmly in the context of 
the administrative changes of the time. It was a period in which the ‘expert’ – 
 technical or bureaucratic – became far more influential in the decision-making 
processes of governmental bodies. So far not much attention has been paid to 
this and a thorough modern, comprehensive analysis of the leadership assump-
tions, values, training and rewards of officer corps has still to be written.30 
The period between 1739 and 1815 was one of major operational and  military 
threat. The Royal Navy emerged victorious and without parallel in the world. 
Our understanding of the logistical and administrative effort that underpinned 
this naval triumph is now quite extensive and the diffuse nature of the leader-
ship required for this massive, complex exercise of naval power is better under-
stood. However, there has been far less critical attention paid to the exercise of 
operational leadership. Possibly the dominance of Nelson as leader and per-
sonification of an ideal has done much to shape assumptions about leadership 
and leaders. It was a period in which the Royal Navy was consolidating as an 
institution – not just an organisation. By 1815 it was an institution with a politi-
cal presence in the wider social environment, a culture of its own, respected 
internally and externally, on a journey of centralised control through which 
leaders and leadership could be controlled and shaped. It was not always like 
this and the process by which this happened, particularly in the first half of 
the century, is still in need of substantial research. What impact the changing 
intellectual environment, commonly known as the Enlightenment, had on the 
leadership of the navy is currently unknown. Once again, we know rather more 
about how this influenced armies than we do about the Royal Navy.31 
The purpose of this paper has been to lay out some possibilities for the future 
study of naval leadership – primarily in the national context of the Royal Navy. 
Leadership has always been an implicit element in naval histories and there is 
now much excellent work about the social and intellectual origins of the officer 
corps and the performance of individual officers. However, given the chrono-
logical opportunities and importance of leadership as a variable in operational 
success or failure, there is a need for a more systematic study. The assumptions 
about virtuous symbiosis of naval leadership and seapower, between combat 
experience and leadership or between national connections and naval leader-
ship all need to be explored in more detail – all the more so as the exercise of 
seapower becomes more tenuous, the opportunities for operational experience 
diminish and the national connection with the navy becomes more opaque. 
It is a subject that is in need of serious attention and a vital element of this is 
to understand comparative naval leadership. Although this paper has focused 
on the nation and the navy, we will only really begin to understand how naval 
leadership works when we can see it operating across nations and time spans. 
It is an exciting agenda. 

PART TWO




Leadership Networks and the 




It is difficult to conceive of the history of naval warfare being researched, dis-
cussed or taught without the idea of leadership emerging at some point in the 
process. Surviving on the sea, let alone fighting in ships, demands consistent 
collaborative action among those who undertake it. For a ship to move and 
fight, it requires  individuals to apply their efforts in precise conjunction with 
their colleagues, and for this to happen the effort has to be coordinated and 
directed by someone recognised in that role. The importance of the leadership 
role or roles in this confined and hazardous environment has been enshrined 
in the rules conferring legal status and responsibilities since the Middle Ages.32 
These laws recognised the limits of authority, the need to consult others and 
the consequences of negligence or incompetence as well as defining the power 
of the master. They were distinct from the rules concerning the command of 
soldiers on the ships. However, in the 200 years between the 1490s and 1700, as 
the ship at war transformed from what was essentially a transport for soldiers 
into a formidable gun platform to be fought with in its own right, the separate 
leadership roles of the ‘master’ (commanding the seamen and navigation) and 
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the ‘captain’ (commanding the soldiers and the fighting function) had to merge 
and, in the process, became a matter of serious concern. Although the primacy 
of the combat role and thus the captain has been recognised since the Mid-
dle Ages, ensuring land officers had adequate navigational and ship-handling 
skills was beset by operational, social and cultural obstacles which were never 
entirely resolved in Europe during the eighteenth century.33
The evolution of this professional competence of naval officers is a complex 
story and this paper only concerns itself with one aspect of this – the lead-
ership exercised by flag officers in the Royal Navy before 1789. Much of our 
understanding of naval leadership has been shaped by the popular and pro-
fessional naval histories that were published between 1890 and 1914. In these 
years, naval history was written with an explicit didactic purpose of educating 
the public, servicemen and statesmen about the importance of naval power 
and the means to exercise it. It was particularly the history of the naval wars 
against France, from 1793 to 1815, that formed the core of this history. These 
wars brought about the oceanic Pax Britannica of the next 70 years. During the 
nineteenth century navies changed dramatically, but the ideal of leadership that 
was abstracted from the campaigns of the French wars remained the model. 
The ideal naval officer for navies everywhere was Horatio Nelson (1758–1805). 
Nelson was a remarkable, outstanding leader and commander. His dedication 
to duty, his bravery and success in battle left little to be desired or explained. 
‘The Nelson Touch’ was a semi-mystical sensitivity to what it was possible to 
achieve with one’s own squadron against the enemy that succeeding genera-
tions of officers were expected to emulate. Nelson encapsulated leadership of 
the heroic kind that became the frame of reference for naval officers and the 
measure against which historians would judge them. 
The consequence of this is that in most naval histories, the question of lead-
ership is unproblematic. The benchmark is clear and the officers under exami-
nation are at some point on a continuum between good and bad that could 
be determined by their operational performance compared to Nelson or the 
way in which their command reflected the Nelsonic attributes. In more recent 
naval histories the nature and context of that leadership is more nuanced. 
Historians are more sensitive to the demands of leading naval forces in the 
complex, changing, multi-dimensional battle spaces of the period post-1939. 
While this sensitivity to near-contemporary environmental complexity is 
considered important, the same cannot be said of the naval history that pre-
cedes the wars of 1793–1815. There is the temptation to infer that before the 
demands of industrialised warfare, there was a golden age of naval leader-
ship in which everything was clearly defined. Nelson and his contemporaries 
eventually produced a dominance at sea that was unprecedented, but they 
did not live in a world of certainty in which command and leadership were 
uncomplicated. However, their tremendous success, and particularly the clar-
ity with which Nelsonic attributes were subsequently distilled and  presented 
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by  historians as causal factors of that naval dominance, has deflected from 
serious consideration of how leadership worked in the period before the 
French Revolution. 
There are a number of questions concerning leadership that have not yet been 
fully absorbed into the realm of historical analysis. Scholars in other disciplines 
have been trying to understand leadership for decades. Leadership has been 
seen as a set of tasks or functions that are carried out more or less effectively. 
It has also been seen as a set of personal attributes which leaders possess in 
different proportions and quantities. It is not possible to construct experi-
ments in which the absence or presence of a leader (with known attributes and 
functional capability) is the only variable, and attempts to establish historically 
the precise contribution of either the leadership functions or qualities to the 
outcome of any specific operational activity have proved impossible. Similarly, 
attempts to identify a successful outcome and then infer the leader’s contribu-
tion to this success are plagued by distortions of reporting, lack of information 
and a multiplicity of other variables. For example, it is commonly understood 
that it is the followers who achieve the result for the leader, but they are not 
passive automata responding to the leader’s will. What the followers inject into 
any operation is unpredictable and often neglected. The immediate operational 
context will influence the leader and the willingness of the followers to be led, 
but this is often relegated to a factor that is assumed to be under the control 
of the leader. This post-facto attribution of leadership qualities to the victori-
ous commander makes the quality of leadership dependent upon the outcome 
rather than vice versa. 
With these debates surrounding the study of leaders and leadership, and the 
centrality of the subject to naval history, it is surprising how little attention 
naval historians have paid to the question of leadership at all levels.34 This paper 
aims to lay out a few thoughts for bringing a closer study of leadership into 
the study of command in the eighteenth century. Informing this discussion 
is another set of debates underutilised in the realm of naval history, that of 
network analysis and decision theory. Since the 1960s, historians of technology 
and international relations have been working on influencing networks in deci-
sion-making. From developing nuclear weaponry to managing international 
crises, analysing the different role of influencers has informed historical judge-
ments.35 These works hold additional interest for historians of naval leadership. 
As Spinadi’s study of the development of the Polaris missile suggests, Admiral 
Arleigh Burke’s ability to convince the networks of decision-makers about his 
definition of success for the project was as important to the eventual develop-
ment of the family of Fleet Ballistic Missiles as the engineering achievement 
itself. While network analysis is established in the study of post-1945 naval his-
tory, it is not commonly applied to earlier history. There seems to be no reason 
why this should be so, and the following is an attempt to shed some light on the 
historical context facing British admirals in the eighteenth century. 
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A very simple network of influence on naval power is set out below.36 A 
network consists of a connected group of people. They exist within a context 
that unites or distinguishes them from others, and many networks may overlay 
one another in the social environment under investigation. We are interested 
in the exercise of naval power and for our purposes it is possible to identify 
at least three significant networks that are critical to its generation in Britain 
during the eighteenth century. It is assumed that naval power rests on the abil-
ity to convert maritime, financial and fiscal resources into naval assets. These 
resources may exist in a society, but their conversion to naval assets is a social 
and political process that requires at least these three primary networks to be 
working effectively – the political/social network, the professional naval net-
work and the administrative network. Individuals overlap by being in all three 
of these networks, but it is the concerted action of the networks as a whole that 
enables the effective channelling of resources into naval power. Just from this 
very crude framework, one can imagine the possible channels and potential 
blockages. The political/social network that linked Court, Parliament and the 
wider political community was the context in which the political battle for the 
financial and fiscal resources was fought and generally won. The administra-
tive network provided the direction and structures within which ships, stores 
and manpower were brought together. They also had to link to the political/
social network of contractors for all kinds of stores, manpower and even the 
building of the ships themselves for much of the period. The professional naval 
network had to take these weapons and employ them to effect in battle or on 
campaign. Together they generate the quantity and quality of fighting ships 
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Fig.1: A simple network of influence on naval power.
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that are available at any given time and place (the gross quantity and quality 
of naval force). 
However, this is, at best, only half of the situation. Similar networks were at 
work generating the enemy’s naval forces and its gross naval force. Relative, or 
net, seapower can be said to emerge from the opposition of these naval powers. 
Warfare is a dynamic environment in which the networks are in a state of flux, 
stimulated by and stimulating the progress of a campaign. Seen in this way, it 
becomes clearer how complex the issue of leadership and followership can be. 
Leaders and followers interact constantly at different levels within their own 
networks and they influence other networks. Their effectiveness alters relatively 
and absolutely as a result of these interactions. 
The idea of the single controlling will bringing about victory or causing defeat 
becomes less compelling when viewed from this perspective. Only very rarely 
would an individual be so dominant across all the contributing networks as to 
become the sole author of the result. However, to conclude that the leader is 
irrelevant is equally unconvincing when one looks at these networks in opera-
tion. Below is a simple leadership network within which Nelson operated dur-
ing his years of greatest triumph, 1798–1805. 
In this illustration the squadron commander, Nelson, sits at the centre of a 
series of networks, all of which he influenced and had influence on him. In 
1805 he was strongly connected and supported by his professional community, 
represented here by Lord St Vincent. Similarly, he was well connected to the 
civil administration of the navy, represented by Lord Barham, the First Lord of 
the Admiralty. Nelson was also connected (and supported by his professional 
standing) with his captains and the crews of his ships in his squadron. By 1805 
Nelson was also strongly connected to the social and political networks (repre-
sented here by the Prime Minister William Pitt). However, these networks were 
not static: they varied and the strength of the ties between them varied continu-
ously as a result of changes within them (new leaders, new priorities, new tasks 
etc.) and as a result of other networks of factors that influenced the connections. 
For example, the connections that bound Nelson to his professional  community 
and the civil administration were strongly influenced by traditions of command, 
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Fig. 2: Net effective naval power.
26 Naval Leadership in the Atlantic World
control, communication and intelligence. These were relatively stable during 
1804–5. However, in 1798–9, Nelson’s behaviour in the Mediterranean, possibly 
as a result of the wound he received at the Battle of the Nile, caused changes in 
the supporting networks that fed back into the political and social network as 
well. Over his lifetime, Nelson’s relations with this network were more volatile, 
but Nelson himself did a great deal to influence opinion positively. The actors 
within these networks not only formed opinions of people, but also of the oper-
ational problems and how they could be resolved (the perceived operational 
problem). Sometimes perceptions might be shared, but on other occasions they 
could vary widely. Furthermore, depending on the quality of intelligence and 
communications, the real operational problem might have been entirely differ-
ent, presenting serious disconnection between the leadership expectations of 
the actors in various networks and the leadership actions of the commander. 
Nelson played a crucial role in shaping these perceptions. He was closest to 
the immediate operational problem and the way he articulated it to others fed 
back into their perceptions of his operational problems. Part of Nelson’s public 
appeal was his aggression and certainty, which played into shaping how other 
actors expected a commander in Nelson’s position to behave. 
This very simple network is enough to illustrate how important networks 
are in perceptions of leadership. If Nelson is replaced by Sir Robert Calder, the 
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Fig. 3: Leadership network: squadron 1805.
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Combined Squadron in foggy weather about 100 miles west of Cape Finisterre 
on 22 July 1805. Calder met them with an inferior force, captured two of their 
ships and forced the Combined Fleet away from Brest, to Vigo and then to 
 Ferrol, where the fateful decision to head south to Cádiz was made. Yet the 
political expectations were for a decisive victory and, judging from Calder’s 
subsequent reprimand at a court martial, the professional service expecta-
tions were the same. Calder’s action was a major factor in finally thwarting 
 Napoleon’s invasion plans, but by not clinging to the Combined Fleet after the 
first day of action, he did not precisely answer expectations in London and 
his career never recovered.37 Calder’s leadership was found wanting within the 
critical networks, despite the tactical and strategic success he achieved. 
Calder’s experience illustrates how judgements about leadership are heavily 
influenced by the networks that exist at any given point. In earlier years, with 
different actors in key positions, the response to Calder’s action would probably 
have been different. It also highlights how leadership has to be judged within 
the context of its own networks and times. This being so, how then are we to 
assess the leadership of British admirals before 1789? 
First, it is clear that we cannot treat the leadership of these admirals as an 
undifferentiated whole. Over the eighteenth century, the networks that sup-
ported them, and through which contemporary definitions of successful lead-
ership emerged, were constantly changing. Perceptions of problems changed 
over time as the actors in the networks changed, or changed their relationships 
with other actors. Of the three networks we have discussed, the political, with 
the influence of public opinion, was probably the most volatile. The social con-
cept of leadership changed more slowly, but over the century there was a dis-
tinct shift. In the second half of the century, the general Enlightenment shift of 
focus from Mankind’s relationship with Providence to the study of Man as the 
main mover of events was important. By the last quarter of the century, there 
was a rising public interest in biography and autobiography, and particularly 
an interest in the heroic. Nelson and his contemporaries were serving in an 
environment that was looking for heroes/heroic leaders and, because of the 
revolutionary threat, believed it needed them. 
Thus, if the social, cultural and political context of Nelson’s predecessors 
was rather different, we must suppose that contemporary definitions of suc-
cess and good leadership might also have been different and we need to 
establish what these were. Admirals were not trying to meet the standards 
imposed by later generations of historians, or even consciously struggling 
to create what was later to be a Nelsonic ideal, but to meet the expectations 
of their own contemporaries. While victory is an obvious and relatively sta-
ble concept, what constitutes victory is more ambiguous. Despite a gener-
alised feeling that the Royal Navy should be able to achieve whatever was 
desired, expectations of operations as diverse as the expeditions to the Bal-
tic (1715–9 and 1726), the Mediterranean and the Atlantic coast of Spain 
(1718–9), the West Indies (1726) and Lisbon (1736) were not universal 
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among the  decision-makers and other actors at the time. The disjunction 
between expectations, or between expectations and reality, was a core ele-
ment in the political disputes of the century, which appear most obviously 
during the major wars. The rest of this paper seeks to illustrate just one of 
these points – the dynamic nature of the leadership networks – by reference 
to a short period in the eighteenth century, 1740–6. 
The early 1740s was a period of intense public expectation and crushing disap-
pointment. In 1739 Britain had entered a war with Spain confidently expecting 
that the Royal Navy would rapidly force Spain to a humiliating peace.38 This would 
be done by severing the trans-oceanic trade link to Spain’s American empire, 
along which the vital supplies of silver flowed from Mexico and Peru into the 
treasuries of the Spanish crown. Furthermore, the Royal Navy would devastate 
Spanish trade in Europe and the Americas and even land an expeditionary force 
to take and hold some part of the Spanish empire to be held as a perpetual threat 
to Spanish trade in the future. Seven years later Spanish trade had been severely 
mauled, but this had not forced Spain to come to terms. Britain was at war with 
France and Spain by this time. The navy had failed to deliver conquests in the 
Caribbean. It had failed to win a decisive victory over the Franco-Spanish fleets. 
It had failed to maintain control of the Channel, as a French squadron penetrated 
as far as Dungeness in support of an invasion force in Flanders, before being 
forced to retreat in the face of winter storms. To contemporaries and to later gen-
erations the cause of this failure was clear and simple – bad leadership within the 
civil administration, the political leadership and within the naval officers corps. 
The First Lord of the Admiralty between 1741 and 1744, the Earl of Winchel-
sea, has borne much of the blame, but the naval officers and the administrators 
within the Admiralty have not escaped censure. 
That the results were bad is unquestionable. However, the role of leadership 
in the failure has received little real analysis. For contemporaries and histori-
ans, the centrality of leadership failure was demonstrated by a change of for-
tunes that began in 1747 and reached a glorious climax in 1762. By this latter 
date the Royal Navy had effectively destroyed the French and Spanish navies, 
stifled their trade and conquered vast parts of their overseas empires. The rea-
son was the new leadership that Admiral George Anson brought to the service 
after his return from his remarkable circumnavigation in 1744. He entered the 
Admiralty in 1746 and retained a sea-going command. Guided and inspired by 
his professionalism the navy regained its edge. Two battles (First and Second 
Finisterre) were fought and won in May and October 1747. By the time the 
peace was finally signed, the Royal Navy had regained the initiative. During the 
peace and for most of the subsequent war with France, Anson remained at the 
Admiralty, reforming and leading. By this time he was serving with the great 
William Pitt, whose strategic grasp of naval power was unparalleled as he led 
Britain to the spectacular victories of 1759–62. Little more needed to be said – 
heroic leadership had made the critical difference. 
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Whereas the role of Pitt, Anson and others is certainly important, this expla-
nation ignores why their leadership worked better than their predecessors’. 
Seen as a changing social network, the reasons for the collapse of effective lead-
ership in the early 1740s and its reconstruction in the second half of the decade 
become clearer. 
Above is a simple leadership network as it looked in the spring of 1741. 
The three squadron commanders were Sir John Norris (Channel), Nicholas 
 Haddock (Mediterranean) and Edward Vernon (West Indies). The adminis-
tration was headed by Sir Charles Wager. The professional head of the navy, 
the Admiral of the Fleet, was Sir John Norris. While there was some profes-
sional jealousy between Norris and Wager, they had worked well together since 
1739. As a whole, the professional and administrative systems of the navy were 
working efficiently. The connections of this naval leadership with the political 
and social leadership of the nation were equally strong. The ministry of Sir 
Robert Walpole was on good terms with King George II and although political 
jealousies existed between Walpole and the Secretary of State for the Southern 
Department, the Duke of Newcastle, these had been largely submerged after 
the outbreak of war. Newcastle and the King were strongly in line with public 
opinion in their support for the war, although Walpole had far more reserva-
tions and his enthusiasm for the war was a weakness that could be exploited 





























Fig. 4: Leadership network: 1741.
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and the perceived operational problems, were similar among these three net-
works – the war would be fought at sea, and it would be short and  victorious. 
However, between 1739 and 1744, the war did not progress according to 
those expectations. Operations in the West Indies failed to achieve the decisive 
results predicted. From the summer of 1740, France was acting in conjunction 
with Spain and by the early part of 1741, France and Spain were acting together 
against Austria. British naval power was being stretched to cover far more than 
had been anticipated in 1739. By the end of February 1744, Britain was formally 
at war with France as well as Spain, and the Brest squadron had penetrated up 
the Channel to support an invasion force assembling in the Low Countries. 
Although the war did not cause Walpole’s fall from power in February 1742, his 
well-known lack of enthusiasm for it became part of the rhetoric that accompa-
nied his resignation and the reconstruction of the new ministry. By this time, 
Sir Charles Wager had resigned from the Admiralty, his own confidence in the 
war having been shattered. Walpole left office despite the wishes of the King, 
who was not reconciled to his new ministry, headed by the Duke of Newcastle. 
The new First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Winchelsea, gained neither 
the support of the professional part of the service, nor the surviving part of 
Walpole’s old ministry. Sir John Norris resigned from active service. Vernon 
was recalled from the Caribbean after the failure of a major expedition to that 
region. Haddock in the Mediterranean suffered a nervous breakdown and was 
eventually replaced by Thomas Mathews in a process that in itself caused some 
rancour within the squadron. The new ministry was itself soon riven by politi-
cal differences, in which the conduct of war became a central feature by 1743. 
The King and his new Secretary of State for the Northern Department, the Earl 
of Carteret, had become more convinced that the war could be won in Europe 
than by overseas expeditions. 
Thus, by the early part of 1744, there was plenty of evidence of failure, but 
precisely what role leadership failure played in this is very difficult to estab-
lish. For the most part, it has been enough to condemn the politicians and the 
political part of the administration as being uniquely incompetent. The senior 
professional leadership of the Royal Navy is seen in a similar manner – doing 
their best, but hampered by inept politicians, they lacked the nerve or weight 
to force a more effective strategy upon the decision-makers. Seen from the 
perspectives of leadership networks, the comprehensive nature of the problem 
becomes readily apparent. 
There are now almost no solid lines, indicating confidence and communi-
cation, between the networks. The professional leadership of the navy, repre-
sented by Vernon and Norris, is detached from the administrative leadership 
at the Admiralty. They have their views on the perceived operational problem, 
which are not shared by Winchelsea and the Admiralty Board. This Board has 
not retained the confidence of either Mathews or Lestock in the Mediterranean, 
who, were, themselves, not working well together. The political leadership was 
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divided. The King had confidence in Carteret, who had some confidence in 
Winchelsea, but Newcastle had confidence in neither and the King distrusted 
Newcastle and his colleagues. Public opinion was increasingly suspicious of the 
ministry, the Royal Navy and its administration. Newcastle remained acutely 
aware of this, but this did not mean that he either had the confidence of the 
public at large or that he could influence their views on the perceived opera-
tional problem. In sum, the leadership networks were fragmented within them-
selves and from each other. 
The traditional account from this point is that a new leader in the heroic 
mould, George Anson, emerged and put right what was wrong. Anson had not 
been tarnished by the events of 1740–4. In June 1744 he returned from a cir-
cumnavigation, loaded with the wealth of a captured Spanish galleon. The pub-
lic response after so much disappointment was jubilant. He was promoted to 
flag rank almost immediately, but he just as quickly resigned when an appoint-
ment he had made while on his voyage was not confirmed by the Admiralty. 
Anson joined the Admiralty Board in December 1744 when a new board was 
formed under the Duke of Bedford and finally took his flag in April 1745. 
Anson was active at the Admiralty and at sea. His contribution to stimulating 
reform was second to none at the time. His cruises in the Western Approaches 
in 1745 and 1746 were not as successful as was hoped, but in May 1747 he inter-
cepted two outward-bound French convoys with their small covering escort 
north-west of Cape Finisterre. By 7 pm he had captured six French warships 
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Fig. 5: Fractured leadership network: 1744.
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to British cruising squadrons and on 14 October, another French escort force 
suffered heavily when six of their number were captured after a vigorous chase 
action conducted by a force under Edward Hawke. Largely as a result of these 
actions during 1747 the Royal Navy ended the war with far greater public and 
political confidence that it had enjoyed since 1740. 
Although Anson deserves all the credit he is given for his actions at sea, within 
his profession and at the Admiralty, the explanation for how and why one man 
was able to achieve all this has been rather neglected. By placing Anson into the 
changing leadership networks of his time, it is possible to see how his talents 
were appreciated and supported. 
The diagram below illustrates the leadership network as it existed early in 
1747. Anson is clearly visible in very significant roles, but other changes have 
also taken place. First and foremost, the political fragmentation that had fol-
lowed Walpole’s fall in 1742 had been resolved during 1746. The struggle for 
dominance between Newcastle and Carteret had concluded in the former’s 
favour. Since December 1744 the head of the Admiralty had been the Duke of 
Bedford, the leader of one of the ‘New Allies’ whose parliamentary influence 
was critical in the eventual defeat of Carteret. Bedford had come to the Admi-
ralty convinced that Britain could win a war against the united Bourbon mon-
archies of France and Spain by the judicious application of seapower. Newcastle 
held this view, although strongly modified by his concern for Britain’s Dutch 
allies. By 1747 the King was becoming convinced of this, and more at ease with 
Newcastle as his leading minister. There was, therefore, a shared perception of 
the operational problem. Public opinion was less homogenous and more dis-
trustful, but generally sympathetic to the claims for maritime war. One of the 
most influential figures outside of the formal leadership systems was Edward 
Vernon, who had been dismissed in April 1746 after a series of clashes with 
the Admiralty. However, his opposition did not extend to the concept of the 
maritime war, of which he had been one of the most vocal exponents since the 
early 1730s. 
Anson was therefore operating in a context in which leadership was far less 
contested and the networks were mutually reinforcing. Anson was, in practice, 
the professional head of the navy by this point. His potential competitors for 
this role had fallen away as they had been swept up in the crises of 1740–6. 
Most were in retirement or engaged in distant operations in the West Indies 
or the Mediterranean. Those officers that surrounded Anson were largely his 
protégés or junior to him. Only Vernon could have contested his leadership, 
but Vernon was broken by his quarrels with the Admiralty by this time. Anson’s 
professional leadership was reinforced by his sea commands, which bore fruit 
in 1747. In turn this reinforced his standing in the eyes of the public. Anson 
was also linked to the political network. As a staunch Staffordshire Whig fam-
ily in a predominantly Tory county, the Ansons were an important bridge 
between the parties at a time when Tory support was needed by the Broad 
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Bottom Administration. In sum, the resistance to Anson’s leadership within the 
profession, the administration and the political networks was, by the standards 
of his immediate predecessors, remarkably small. The consistency with which 
all these networks perceived the operational problem of the Royal Navy was 
strong. The internal unity of the networks was strong and there was diminished 
inter-network friction.
The leadership context within which Anson reached the top of his profession 
was far more benign for him than it had been for many years for his predeces-
sors. The frictions that might have destroyed his attempts to reform or com-
mand were greatly reduced. This does not diminish Anson. His skill as a navi-
gator, a squadron commander, an administrator and a politician all played a 
part in the way he was able to work within those networks to achieve his objec-


























Fig. 6: Emerging leadership network: early 1747.
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also fortunate that he was leading at a time when the strength of the Franco- 
Spanish naval force was beginning to wane, worn down by the attrition of years 
of war conducted against it by Anson’s predecessors. At the same time, British 
naval resources in home waters had been gradually growing, giving Anson a far 
greater margin of superiority than the Royal Navy had experienced since 1740. 
All of these contextual factors could be described simply as ‘luck’, but to do 
so does not do justice to any of the leaders. The context is the arena within 
which leadership is carried out. Naval leaders and followers and those whom 
they fight are all parts of dynamic networks of individuals that are interacting. 
 British admirals were part of these networks with the capacity to influence and 
be influenced by them. Anson brought great skills, capabilities and contacts to 
a situation that was, independently of him, becoming more amenable to his 
objectives. Anson continued to use all those advantages very effectively and is 
now rightly regarded as one of the most important leaders that the Royal Navy 
ever had. Other officers, notably Edward Vernon, also had outstanding talents 
as well as failings, at a time that was marginally before Anson’s, but starkly dif-
ferent in the way the leadership networks were configured and working. Ver-
non, Norris and most of their contemporaries could not influence the context 
in the way that was to open itself up to Anson. 
For most people, the facts of naval success or failure are clear in the historical 
record. Nelson, Anson and Edward Hawke stand out as benchmarks against 
which other eighteenth-century British admirals are judged. This paper has 
tried to argue that such judgements about eighteenth-century naval leadership 
are deficient. They are based on the idea that the demands of naval leadership 
and the definitions of success were generally unchanging during the century. 
This is simply untrue – they were changing all the time. This does not reduce 
the leader to being a passive recipient of luck, but it does change his tasks, his 
options, his prospects, and his resources. Each brought talents to the perceived 
and actual operational problems. Some leaders were able to meet the challenges 
spectacularly well, others were not, but they were not necessarily all facing the 
same challenges, nor can success or failure be attributed unconditionally to 
the individual leader. Far more work needs to be carried out on these officers, 
particularly those of the first half of the century, before we understand how 
they saw their tasks, how they related to the networks within which they oper-
ated, how the external contexts impinged on their options, how dynamic that 
context was and how they perceived leadership at flag rank. Only then will we 
be able to engage with the broader questions of whether there is a discernible 
trajectory of leadership approaches and behaviours. 
CHAPTER THREE
The Reputation of Louis XV’s  
Vice-Admirals of France
Simon Surreaux
Centre Roland Mousnier 
The kingdom of France had only two admirals during the eighteenth century: 
the Comte de Toulouse (1678–1737) and his son, the Duke of Penthièvre (1725–
93). The former was the illegitimate son of Louis XIV and the Marchioness of 
Montespan.39 The Earl of Toulouse took part in only one military campaign, 
in 1704. During this campaign he was present at the Battle of Vélez-Málaga 
(24 August 1704), with the Vice-Admiral d’Estrées (1660–1737), fought against 
the British fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir George Rooke (1650–1709). After 
that battle, he never went to sea again. However, he ‘had a real influence on the 
advancements and selections of officers’.40 From 1669, the date of the establish-
ment of the Secretary of State for the Navy, to 1777, when two other posts were 
set up, the Admiral was assisted by two Vice-Admirals of France.41 These two 
general officers were entrusted with the fleet of the Ponant, for the Atlantic 
Ocean, and the fleet of the Levant, for the Mediterranean Sea. From 1715 to 
1774, France had 18 vice-admirals and it is these men who are the subject of 
this paper.
Some naval officers of the reign of Louis XIV, such as Duquesne, Jean 
Bart, Duguay-Trouin and Tourville, are famous for their battles or for their 
How to cite this book chapter: 
Surreaux, S. 2017. The Reputation of Louis XV’s Vice-Admirals of France. In: Hard-
ing, R and Guimerá, A (eds.). Naval Leadership in the Atlantic World. Pp. 35–47. 
London: University of Westminster Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16997/book2.d. 
License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
36 Naval Leadership in the Atlantic World
 leadership. The same is true of some officers of the reign of Louis XVI: for 
example, Suffren, d’Orvilliers, de Grasse, La Pérouse and Kerguelen -Trémarec. 
However, the historiography of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is 
overwhelmingly negative with regard to most of Louis XV’s vice-admirals, or 
has even forgotten them completely. Their rehabilitation happened only with 
Michel Vergé-Franceschi’s thesis, in 1987, and Étienne Taillemite’s Dictionnaire 
des marins français in 2002.42 Professor Vergé-Franceschi demonstrated the 
importance of family ties in the rise of general officers in La Royale, the French 
Royal Navy. He researched their careers, chiefly in the ‘titles office’ of the Biblio-
thèque Nationale de France. By reading the prosopographical and biographical 
data in each of these works, two facts became clear. First, with a few exceptions, 
the reputation of these men is almost unknown. Second, their ability to com-
mand and to lead maritime campaigns, and thus their leadership, has not been 
systematically analysed.
But why should we take an interest in ‘reputation’, which is a sketchy and rather 
subjective notion, as a means of examining their leadership? This  chapter tries 
to go beyond the usual studies in leadership, in which the focus is on tactics, 
strategies or the numbers of opposing forces. Leadership is assessed by such 
facts, but equally important are the memories of the battles and campaigns 
evoked: that is, the reputation of the commanders involved. Furetière, in 1690, 
defined the word ‘reputation’ as: ‘the good opinion the people have of persons, 
or things’, and he went on: ‘a captain just needs a victory to have a reputation of 
courage, and a rout to have ill repute’.43 The first edition of the Dictionnaire de 
l’Académie française, in 1694, described ‘reputation’ as fame, esteem, in the pub-
lic opinion.44 ‘Réputer’ derives from Latin ‘reputare’, which means ‘to appraise’, 
and, until the sixteenth century, ‘reputatio’ meant appraising. Breaking with the 
verb, the noun acquired the meaning pointed out by Furetière and the French 
Academy. In 1982, Littré perfected the definition, specifying that reputation is 
‘the opinion that people have about someone’.45 During the eighteenth century, 
the word had a favourable connotation, which differs from Littré’s definition, 
in which people’s opinion can be either favourable or critical. To assess a repu-
tation implies an evaluation of the opinions of many protagonists such as the 
State (the dispenser of favours and promotion), naval officers and seamen (who 
contributed to their chief ’s reputation), other contemporaries, and succeeding 
generations (who absorbed recollections of the vice-admiral, and built these in 
a body of historical scholarship). 
This chapter uses two sources in this search for reputation: the letters patent 
of provision, or provisions, of the Vice-Admiral of France, and evidence left by 
contemporaries regarding the ability of these officers to command. The letters 
patent of provision, which confirmed the appointment of an officer, listed the 
career of the officer concerned. They give the viewpoint of the State and of 
the  royal institutions about the quality of these men who have been raised 
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to the office of vice-admiral. Other contemporary witnesses provide different 
lights on the subject.
After several months’ research in the records from the Archives Nationales’ 
deposits and from the Bibliothèque Nationale, the resultant data is slim. After 
having scrupulously analysed all the probate inventories of 18 vice-admirals, 
attempting to find some traces of their deeds in the papers recorded after 
their deaths, only seven copies of the letters confirming their appointments 
were located. The historian cannot know exactly where else such documents 
may have been preserved. There are many likely places. There is some evi-
dence suggesting that these letters were stored in the Great Chancellery.46 
However, not one has been found in that archive. Either they have been pre-
served elsewhere or they have vanished. Only one letter patent was found 
in the series Courts of Accounts of the Parliament of Paris, where it had been 
reconstituted in the Memorials (series P).47 The archives of the French Admi-
ralty were examined,48 as well as the personal records of each vice-admiral in 
the series Marine of the Archives Nationales of France.49 Only seven letters of 
appointment were located, permitting us to see the State’s view of the reputa-
tion of these vice-admirals. Four of them had been promoted to the rank and 
dignity of field-marshal, which increased the available sources as it is possi-
ble to trace their maritime careers from these letters of appointment as well.
How do these letters of appointment and the remarks of contemporaries 
help us understand the reputations of the vice-admirals at a time when La 
Royale was no longer the force it had been under Louis XIV? The letters 
patent of provision provide a view of the careers of the new vice-admirals 
and an important insight into the key factors that made up the reputations 
of these men. 
I – The letters of provision to the Vice-Admiralty of France
To become a Vice-Admiral of France at a time when there were only two of 
these posts implies that these men were highly regarded by the monarchy. 
The appointment was a reward for meritorious service. Thus their lead-
ership or their capacity to command was already recognised in their past 
success. 
Letters of provision give us a clear view of the promotion criteria to the vice-
admiralty and to the marshalship. Before they were issued by the War Office 
or by the Secretary of State of the Navy, the new Vice-Admiral or Marshal of 
France sent a memorandum regarding his services so that the secretaries could 
accurately re-transcribe his career into the letters. Most of these surviving 
letters have been kept as reconstituted copies on parchment or vellum in the 
registries of the Memorial of the Accounts Chamber, series P, at the Archives 
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Themes/Expressions NB Names of 
vice-admirals
Promotions
A distinction Merit, deserve, 
‘to adjust rewards 
according to merit’, 
‘a so well-deserved 
reward’, ‘distinguished 
merit’, ‘distinguished 
himself ’, ‘distinguished 
himself through 
several glorious feats’, 
‘distinguished services’, 
‘lot of distinction’, 
‘served with so much 
distinction’
8 d’Estrées, Château 
-Renault;  Coëtlogon; 
Salaberry de 
 Benneville; Court de 





‘Best choice’, ‘in better 
hands than his the 
command of our 
naval armies/our 
maritime strength’
5 Salaberry de 
 Benneville; Court de 










Qualities of a 
war leader
‘Experienced 
in warcraft and 
 navigation’, ‘proven 
experience in 
 navigation’, ‘acquired 
experience and 
capacity’
5 d’Estrées; Salaberry de 
Benneville; Court de 






5 Salaberry de 
 Benneville; Court de 







‘Courage’ 2 Coëtlogon; Court de 
La Bruyère
1730; 1750
‘Good conduct’ 5 Salaberry de 
 Benneville; Court de 
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Themes/Expressions NB Names of 
vice-admirals
Promotions
‘Prudence’, ‘vigilance’ 5 Salaberry de 
 Benneville; Court de 





 legitimately gained’, 
‘so much cleverness’
1 Court de La Bruyère 1750
‘Valour’ 7 d’Estrées; 
 Château-Renault; 
 Salaberry de 
 Benneville; Court de 





Zeal 5 Château-Renault; 
Coëtlogon; Salaberry 






the King and 
King’s grate-
fulness
Mentioned wounds 2 Cresnay; Conflans 1755; 1758
‘Affection to our 
service’
5 Château-Renault; 
 Salaberry de 
 Benneville; Court de 




Faithfulness to the 




rightly placed in him’’, 
‘extreme confidence 
that we always placed 
in him’















‘Ancestors’, ‘ancestor’ 1 Château-Renault 1703
Reminder of the 
character of father or 
of a marshal or vice-
admiral’s relatives
2 d’Estrées; d’Antin 1684; 1731
Fig. 1: Analysis of the reputation of vice-admirals through promotion criteria 
to vice-admiralty or marshalship in their letters of provision.
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Nationales and in paper form in the individual files of the vice-admirals in the 
Archives Nationales.
As official acts, they are all written in the same form.50 Eight copies of letters 
of provision to the vice-admiralty and four copies of the letters of provision 
to vice-admirals appointed as marshals were found.51 The standardised nature 
of the letters might suggest a document that was a matter of form rather than 
an accurate assessment of an individual officer’s career. Nevertheless, search-
ing for terms and expressions, or even connotations and facts not mentioned 
in other examples, may help distinguish between the more or less consistent 
promotion criteria. These criteria express the reputation and the leadership 
abilities of vice-admirals. Figure 1 aims to establish the promotion criteria as 
they appeared in the letters. These terms or expressions enable us to assess the 
profile of a ‘good’ Vice-Admiral of France. Letters of provision include four 
types of useful information for an historical analysis of the sources of distinc-
tion: data related to reward, data related to qualities and skills as war leader, 
data related to service and commitment to the King, and expressions qualifying 
the social origins, tradition and family memories of the newly promoted, as 
though, in the last case, the blood flowing in his veins confirmed the accuracy 
of the monarch’s decision.
Vice-admiralty: A distinction
Out of a total of 12 letters of provision (vice-admirals and marshals together), 
eight feature specific terms related to the ‘merit’ of the character. From the 
Latin meritum, ‘merit’ derives from merere and means ‘earn’, ‘get as a prize or 
a reward’. In common Latin, the word has been associated with the meaning 
of ‘value’. In ancient French, the word had more meanings than are in modern 
use. Though in the first texts it means ‘salary, punishment or reward’, modern 
use was established in the seventeenth century when merit was associated with 
‘skills, wholly respectable moral and intellectual qualities’. More specifically, it 
refers to talent, seamanship (1668 ‘gens de mérite’).52 According to Furetière, 
merit falls within ‘the putting together of several virtues or good qualities, in 
any person, which attracts consideration and admiration on him’.53 But merit 
can also be associated with ‘the price, the value of actions and things compared 
with their good or bad content’.54 Therefore, vice-admiralty is considered in 
most cases as the prize for the military actions of those promoted. This crite-
rion of distinction seems essential during the reign of Louis XIV.
Reward is found next to merit. Five patent letters claim that the granting of 
vice-admiralty was not an honour but a reward. ‘To reward’ means ‘recognize 
the merit of someone through a favour’ (Montaigne, 1580) and refers to a for-
tunate consequence which constitutes a gratification (1671).55 Furetière defines 
the reward as ‘the price, the salary, the gift to someone or the advantage he is 
granted in return of services done or for a good action’.56 Merit and reward 
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therefore seemed intertwined, which imposes the conclusion that only merit 
should have secured promotions to vice-admiralty.
Qualities of the naval war leader
The qualities that made up a naval leader, such as being an accomplished sea-
man and distinguished among other general officers, also came into considera-
tion. Valour (in seven cases) was often accompanied by experience and leader-
ship qualities (five cases). In equal numbers, prudence, good conduct and zeal 
(five cases) were often added, while courage (two cases) was also considered. 
The term of zeal, however vague (‘ardour, affection, passion in something’), 
may have referred to the aptitude to command troops and to serve the King 
faithfully by complying with orders.
Behind the word ‘courage’ lies a reference to the heart. As a matter of fact, 
‘courage’ features in a very general sense in ancient and middle French. Until 
the seventeenth century, it particularly defined the strength of soul, moral vir-
tue in any field and, more specifically, the qualities of an elite nature, which were 
synonymous with ‘heart’, in a figurative sense.57 A courageous vice-admiral was 
therefore a man different from his fellows because of the nature and strength of 
his soul. The corollary of these moral virtues is prudence, which is, according to 
Furetière, ‘the first of the cardinal virtues which teaches one to manage one’s life 
and customs and to guide one’s actions according to right reasoning. Prudence’s 
main function is to assess what has been done, what has to be done and what 
must be avoided’.58 Courage is intertwined with prudence and also with valour, 
defined by Furetière as ‘a firmness of soul which makes one look on the perils 
of war with cold blood, that is with fervour for real glory’.59 Then comes zeal, 
defined as ‘ardour, affection, passion in something’.60
The case of Dubois de La Motte (1683–1764) epitomises these criteria. He 
entered the Garde de la Marine in 1698 and was a lieutenant from 1709 to 1727. 
Sieur Duguay-Trouin (1673–1736) recommended him to the Secretary of State of 
the Navy, the Comte de Maurepas. Duguay-Trouin wanted to see him promoted 
to captain, stating: ‘this officer is not only able skilfully to command any ship, but 
also several of them at the same time’. This opened the possibility that he might, 
in future, become a good squadron leader. Duguay-Trouin praised ‘his valour’, 
‘his prudence’ his ‘sang froid in action’.61 In 1746–7, Dubois de La Motte com-
manded the ship Le Magnanime (74) on a voyage to the West Indies and back. 
He emerged from this campaign with great credit. He then protected a convoy of 
40 merchant ships with the frigate L’Etoile. He was chased by four British ships 
and came under fire from a couple of them. At three o’clock the next morning, the 
British gave up; Dubois had not lost a single ship from his convoy. On 1 August 
1747, Maurepas noted for the King’s attention that ‘M. Dubois de la Motte gave 
the utmost care for the security of the fleets he led to and from Santo-Domingo, 
and he distinguished himself in the two fights he waged on this occasion’.62 The 
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Chambers of Commerce were satisfied with Dubois de la Motte’s actions. Michel 
Vergé-Franceschi describes him as an ‘excellent, energetic and daring tactician’; 
‘he reminds us of the privateer under Louis XIV [Duguay-Trouin], his fellow 
countryman, for whom he was often the appreciated subordinate’.63
So the four main qualities of the naval leader are courage, prudence, valour and 
zeal. On the other hand, outstanding courage and seamanship do not seem to 
have been essential to reach vice-admiralty. Only Claude-Élisée de Court de La 
Bruyère (1666–1752) was identified as a courageous clever man of good repu-
tation. Aged 78, he led the French squadron in the fight at Cap Sicié (Battle of 
Toulon) on 22 February 1744. In Le Terrible (74), he commanded a squadron of 
13 ships whose objective was to assist a Spanish squadron of 14 ships under Admi-
ral Juan José Navarro (1687–1772) to get out of Toulon Harbour, in the face of a 
 British squadron of 30 ships under Vice-Admiral Thomas Mathews. In the action 
that followed, the Franco-Spanish squadron succeeded in breaking through the 
British force and away towards Spain.64 Thus it seems from the official notifica-
tions that, excluding courage and reputation, the main leadership skills could be 
summed up by these four words: experience, prudence, valour and zeal.
From King’s service to the recognition of family merits
Battle wounds were the proof of the gift of one’s body to the king and to the 
nation. If a vice-admiral had fought and shed his blood, it was a distinctive 
criterion in the letters of provision. However, it was not crucial since only two 
vice-admirals’ letters mention their wounds. Nevertheless, mentioning these 
wounds was significant, especially for Félix de Poilvilain de Cresnay (1693–
1756), vice-admiral for six months before his death, who almost lost a hand 
at the Battle of Dettingen on 27 June 1743, while he commanded the guards 
company of the Admiral’s boat.65
Then come affection (five cases), trust (two cases) and faithfulness (one 
case) to the King and to the crown. These terms reveal the close link between 
those promoted and the monarch. Such qualities referred to the personal, 
almost privileged, relationship between the King and men judged suitable to 
be granted the power of Vice-Admiral of France, as they were to command 
warships and troops in the name of the monarch. Finally, there was social ori-
gin, tradition and the family history of the vice-admirals. Five individuals pro-
moted to be Vice-Admiral of France are noted for their birth, their ancestors 
and their families.
To sum up, being promoted to the dignity of Vice-Admiral of France in the 
course of the eighteenth century was, therefore, considered as a reward for 
 military merit. Each new vice-admiral possessed at least one of the qualities 
derived from the four main themes considered here. He was distinguished 
through his own eminent qualities, his dignity, as a deserved reward, and as 
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recognition of his family’s and his own proven services to the crown. We now 
turn to how the leadership reputation of these men was assessed, through one 
case where it was stained by defeat: that of marshal and vice-admiral Hubert de 
Brienne, Comte de Conflans (1690–1777), whose reputation was to be severely 
damaged by a single, but devastating, defeat.
II – A tarnished reputation and questioned leadership? Hubert 
de Conflans and the Battle of Quiberon Bay
Defeat in naval operations is undoubtedly the worst possible fate for a naval 
officer and disgrace logically followed from it. However, several vice-admi-
rals were not disgraced despite their failures. During the Seven Years’ War 
(1756–63), Vice-Admiral the Comte d’Aché de Serquigny (1701–80) was sent 
to India to support the French East India Company forces against the British 
along the Coromandel Coast. He was criticised for his failure to support an 
attack upon Madras or to support the defence of Pondicherry, both of which 
ended in defeat for the French. Nevertheless, with the support of the Secretary 
of State for the Navy, Nicolas Berryer, Comte de La Ferrière, he escaped pros-
ecution, leaving his reputation and leadership untarnished – unlike the army 
commander at Pondicherry, Lally-Tollendal, who was executed for the disgrace 
in 1766.66
By comparison with Marshals of France, few naval officers were recalled after 
a failure. Although not a marshal at the time, the Prince de Soubise (1715–87) 
kept his position after the disastrous Battle of Rossbach on 5 November 1757, 
as did the Marquis de Contades (1704–95) after his defeat at the Battle of Min-
den on 1 August 1759.67 However, François Duc de Villeroy (1644–1730) and 
Louis La Feuillade (1673–1724) both lost their military careers during the War 
of the Spanish Succession, although Villeroy went on to occupy a high position 
of state under the Regency. La Feuillade never served again after his defeat at 
Turin in 1706. Similarly, the Comte de Broglie (1671–1745) suffered military 
and political disgrace after his defeat in Bavaria in 1741. Both La Feuillade and 
de Broglie were exiled despite the fact that they had done nothing particu-
larly blameworthy in leading their armies in very difficult circumstances. In 
the navy, only Conflans was recalled and never employed again at sea after his 
defeat at the Battle of Quiberon Bay (21 November 1759).
i. Conflans: A skilful general officer in a forsaken navy
Hubert de Conflans was described in the corps as a ‘good officer, skilful at 
doing his job, brave but slightly quick-tempered and excessively proud of his 
birth; pretends to descend from the Kings of Jerusalem’.68 He joined the Gardes 
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Marine in 1706, was sub-lieutenant in 1712, ship lieutenant in 1727 and com-
mander of the company of the Gardes Marine in Brest from 1741 to 1746. He 
was kept busy with the concerns of the Chambers of Commerce of Nantes and 
La Rochelle, and with the poor coastguards in Brest. ‘Humane, ready to teach 
and clever, Conflans tried, to the extent of his resources, to improve the qual-
ity of the navy’.69 As a war leader, commanding the ship Le Content (62) from 
1740 onwards, he seized the Northumberland (70) in 1744. In 1746 he com-
manded Le Terrible (74) and safely escorted a convoy of 90 ships between Santo 
Domingo and Europe. On 29 October 1746 he met a British force and seized 
the Severn (50). On Christmas Day 1746, Maurepas, then Secretary of State for 
the Navy, presented to the King an account of the conduct of Conflans in his 
different assignments:
‘He carried out his task with as much conduct as valour. He led and 
brought back to safe harbour numerous fleets which provided great 
wealth within the State. He successfully waged several campaigns’.70
In 1752, he was the eldest lieutenant general in the navy. At the top of his mili-
tary career, as Vice-Admiral of Ponant in March 1756, Conflans proved a skil-
ful general officer and he was deemed the best to fight the Royal Navy. He was 
therefore granted his marshal’s baton in March 1758, much to Vice-Admiral 
Barrailh’s displeasure.71 For the first time in 55 years, a vice-admiral was pro-
moted to the position of marshal. (The previous cases had been d’Estrées and 
Château-Renault in 1703.) The title was aimed at providing Conflans with 
additional authority. He was to ‘command the Brest fleet, made up of 28 line 
ships, the smallest of which still features 64 cannons, and are considered as 
magnificent ships’. 72 Luynes noted:
‘He is an officer of great reputation in the navy [...]. It was fair that the 
King gave the navy a Marshal of France, as there had not been any since 
the late Marshal d’Estrées. Such a well-composed corps, which has dis-
tinguished itself for a long time, is more than ever necessary in the pre-
sent circumstances’.73
He was assigned the difficult task of preparing the ships in order to invade Eng-
land at a time when the French navy was not functioning well. 
ii. The Battle of Quiberon Bay: A failure of leadership?
Conflans understood the importance of the navy. On 27 September 1757, he 
wrote to the Duke of Aiguillon, commander-in-chief in Brittany: ‘the interest 
of the navy shall not be overlooked for a single moment, otherwise the fate 
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and the advantages of the Kingdom might be at stake’.74 This statement alone 
should, according to Vergé-Franceschi, ‘rehabilitate this general officer accused 
of incapacity after the Cardinals disaster’.75
In 1759 Conflans flew his flag in the Soleil-Royal (80). His squadron was ‘in 
poor conditions, hastily armed with dilapidated artillery. The crew was made 
up of landsmen who were at sea for the first time, lacking elementary training, 
which may account for many wrong moves’.76 A total of 21 ships left Brest on 
14  November 1759 to embark troops in the area of Vannes in southern Brit-
tany. Conflans tried to avoid a battle but was caught by Admiral Sir Edward 
Hawke with his 32 ships on 21 November, near the Bay of Quiberon, in the area 
of  Belle-Île-en-Mer. He performed ‘skilful manoeuvres but, badly seconded by 
some of his subordinates, he was unable to prevent his squadron scattering 
during a violent storm’.77 Hawke took advantage of the disorganised flight and 
Conflans lost five ships. Two were seized, three were wrecked and seven took 
refuge in the Vilaine until early January 1760. 
The loss of Quebec in September 1759, and – in practice – of Canada, the 
defeat at Minden in August and this failure contributed to make the year 1759 
an ‘annus horribilis’. The way Conflans’s fleet was defeated worsened the impact 
of this defeat. Conflans ran his flagship, the Soleil-Royal, aground and it was 
burnt near Croisic. Some 2,500 French seamen perished while 300 to 400 Eng-
lish seamen were killed.78 Hawke lost two line ships and one was seized, but the 
French navy could no longer face the Royal Navy in battle.79
Conflans was not long in coming to Court to justify himself. Barbier wrote 
that in December 1759, ‘the Marquess80 of Conflans came recently to Versailles 
to clear himself of the defeat and to accuse the Marquess of Beauffremont’.81 He 
reproached Versailles for having assigned him an impossible task. He accused 
his ship commanders. He quarrelled with Beauffremont, one of his subordi-
nates in the Bay of Quiberon, thus continuing to bring discredit upon the navy 
after the rout. While he received no official blame, Conflans was no longer wel-
come at Versailles. Lord Anson’s brother-in-law wrote about him that ‘for his 
behaviour, Mr de Conflans would deserve his marshal’s baton to be broken on 
his shoulders’.82
In 1760, no squadron was equipped. Small divisions of ships were sent out to 
perform specific missions designed to divert attention, to counterbalance the 
defeat on the sea and to inspire troops with a renewed confidence. A few days 
after Conflans’s journey to Versailles, on 20 December 1759, the King appointed 
Victor François, Comte de Broglie (1718–1804) as a Marshal of France.83 Con-
flans never served on the sea again. Even if, at the end of the day, this defeat 
contributed to the restoration of the navy by Choiseul and Castries, no naval 
officer was ever again appointed to the position of Marshal of France. Conflans 
retired to his estates and was forgotten until he died in Paris in January 1777, 
in accommodation he rented on Rue Saint Dominique. The Bay of Quiberon 
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Fig. 2: Louis XV’s vice-admirals (1715–74).
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defeat, his behaviour and the overall circumstances of the kingdom in 1759–60 
put an end to his career. This man, after having reached the highest military 
position in a couple of years (1756–8), saw his social status and his reputation 
destroyed by a single defeat.
Conflans was the only Marshal of France to have experienced such an end.84 
Military incompetence was a necessary but insufficient criterion to explain his 
disgrace, since no rule seems to have existed in this matter. Thus, according to 
Vergé-Franceschi, Conflans might be considered to have been ‘a very severely 
judged officer.’85
Conclusion
If the French navy during the reign of Louis XV was weaker than under 
Louis XIV and Seignelay or Louis XVI and Castries, the general officers who 
commanded this navy were nevertheless skilful men. They deserved their titles 
of vice-admirals even if they did owe it in part to a seniority rule and they were 
often appointed late in their lives. The recognition of their leadership by the 
King in their letters of provision was based on recurring qualities: experience, 
valour, zeal and prudence. During this period, a good naval officer was a pru-
dent seaman who was anxious to preserve his ship and his men at a time when 
only a small budget was allocated to the navy.86 The Seven Years’ War and the 
defeat at the Battle of Quiberon Bay resulted in important changes in attitudes 








Ever since his death during his greatest victory in 1805, Horatio Nelson has 
been the international benchmark for naval leadership. Even Napoleon on St 
Helena lamented that if Suffren had lived on ‘I would have made him our Nel-
son and our affairs would have taken a different turn. Instead I spent all my 
time looking for such a sailor and never found one.’87
Could a Nelson have flourished in a Napoleonic system that subordinated 
maritime affairs to the will of a soldier with little understanding of such mat-
ters, and whose admirals lacked the support of a powerful Admiralty contain-
ing expert professional naval advisers, provided with sufficient funds to secure 
the best materials for building and maintaining a navy, and with experienced 
officers and trained seamen inspired by a tradition of naval success? The fleets 
of the great European naval powers were operating to different systems and 
with different requirements, best displayed in the composition of their fleets. 
The British designed sturdy, bluff-bowed warships capable of both keeping to 
the seas for long periods and fighting. For the latter they included in their fleets 
far more three-decked warships whose size and guns could dominate a bat-
tle. The French on the other hand built a mission-orientated navy to carry or 
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escort troops and supplies to French possessions overseas, and hence put more 
emphasis on sharp-lined, lighter-framed, speedy ships to reach their destina-
tion rapidly, but at the expense of their durability in storms and battles; in the 
mid-eighteenth century they excluded three-deckers since their emphasis was 
on the mission rather than winning battles. The Spanish meanwhile had large, 
solidly built ships, including three-deckers, to defend their imperial trade, 
which financed Spanish power. The two Bourbon powers built for defence 
rather than attack. The first orders to the main French fleet to seek out and 
destroy the main British fleet were given to d’Orvilliers in 1779, when he was 
to be joined by the Spanish fleet as the preliminary to the invasion of Britain. 
Neither the French nor Spanish fleets were powerful enough in themselves to 
defeat the British, and the usual French invasion plan was for a surprise attack 
before the British were prepared, or to create a diversion which would lure the 
British fleet out of area and leave the way clear for the intended invasion force – 
as was Napoleon’s plan in 1804–5.88
The Nelsonian model was not universally applicable. Naval leadership has to 
be judged in relation to circumstances – on the ability of an admiral to make 
the best possible use of the resources he had available so as to accomplish the 
stated ends of national policy – and both the means and the ends differed from 
country to country.
There were also differing views on how to prepare officers for naval lead-
ership. The British and the Dutch had gone the way of the apprenticeship 
system. Aspirants joined ships as captain’s servant (volunteer first class from 
the 1790s) at the ages of 12–16 to learn their trade from a captain at sea. The 
French from 1682, followed by Spain and the Baltic powers, sent their aspirants 
to naval academies between the ages of 16 and 20 where as gardes de marine 
they receive a heavily theoretical education in mathematics, hydrography, naval 
architecture, and English and Spanish, and time was also allotted to fencing and 
dancing: they were educated as gentlemen as the main attribute of an officer’s 
authority, and their sea time was short.89 The British also created a naval acad-
emy at Portsmouth in 1733, but its 40 places were seldom full, as most preferred 
the practical opportunities to learn from the example and under the eye of a 
serving officer who might patronise their advancement, and their path to lieu-
tenant specified six years’ sea time including two as a midshipman.90 The main 
need of all navies was for lieutenants – 67% of commissioned sea officers in the 
British navy in 1790, 61% of the French (1789) – for which practical sea experi-
ence equipped them better than scientific theory. The British apprenticeship 
system brought them to command more quickly and enabled those who rose 
through the ranks to do so at a considerably lower age than their continental 
counterparts, with all the consequent advantages of experience and the bold-
ness and robustness of younger men (see Figs 1 and 2).
Successful British admirals such as Jervis and Collingwood advised would-be 
officers to read history, and there was an abundance of books on naval history 
and biography to provide inspiration and give them a common doctrine. We 
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know that mid-century admirals Sir Peter Warren and Sir Edward Hawke read 
works such as Josiah Burchett’s A Complete History of the Most Remarkable 
Transactions at Sea (1720) and Thomas Lediard’s The Naval History of England 
(1735), and, as John Hill explained in the preface of his Naval History of Britain 
from the Earliest Periods (1756), ‘The use of history is, by recording actions of 
the dead, to set examples before the living… Our former successful enterprises 
will afford sufficient instances of what future commanders should pursue; and 
the fate of our enemies will teach them what they should avoid.’91 James Ralfe’s 
Naval Biography of Great Britain (1828) avowed the same didactic purpose, 
following on from a series of naval biographies – above all John Campbell’s 
Lives of the Admirals and Other Eminent British Seamen, whose four volumes 
of 1740–2 were expanded by continuators to eight volumes by 1817. Ralfe also 
repeated the national view of the importance of the navy, constantly expressed 
in all of these books and in the Navy Acts of Parliament of 1660 and 1749, that 
‘upon the navy has depended the prosperity and independence of the Country; 
and upon the navy this kingdom must always chiefly rely for the preservation 
Hawke Boscawen de la Clue Conflans
Born 1705 1726 1696 1690
Joined 15 12 18 16
Lieutenant 24 20 34 37
Captain 28 30 45 43
Rear Adm 42 35 59 59
Vice-Adm 45 43 67 62
Admiral 52 46 68 (Marshal)
Died 1781 1761 1764 1777
Fig. 1: Age at advancement of leading admirals of the Seven Years’ War.
Rodney Howe De Guichen De Grasse
Born 1717 1726 1712 1722
Joined 15 14 18 19
Lieutenant 22 19 34 32
Captain 25 20 44 40
Rear Adm 42 44 64 56
Vice-Adm 45 50 67 59
Admiral 61 66 n/a n/a
Died 1792 1799 1790 1788
Fig. 2: Age at advancement of leading admirals of the American War.
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of its safety and glory.’92 No other officer corps had such a clearly expressed view 
of its purpose nor so much literature showing how it had been achieved by its 
predecessors.
While these works substituted for leadership manuals for officers, the nearest 
job description of the qualities demanded of an admiral is in William Falconer’s 
1769 Universal Dictionary of the Marine. After pointing out that a fleet is una-
voidably exposed to a variety of perplexing situations in a precarious element, 
and that a train of dangerous incidents necessarily arises from a sudden change of 
climate, infection or unwholesome provisions which threaten as much to destroy 
the health, order and discipline of his crews as tempestuous weather or danger-
ous navigation threaten the condition of his ships, he advised that an admiral:
‘…ought to have sufficient experience to anticipate all the probable 
events that may happen to his fleet during an expedition or cruise, 
and by consequence provide against them. His skill should be able to 
counter-act the various disasters which a fleet may suffer from different 
causes. His vigilance and presence of mind are necessary to seize every 
available opportunity that his situation may offer to prosecute his prin-
cipal design; to extricate himself from any difficulty or distress, to check 
unfortunate events at the beginning, and retard the progress of any great 
calamity. He should be endued with resolution and fortitude to animate 
his officers by force of his example, and promote a sense of emulation in 
those who are under his command, as well as to improve any advantage, 
as to frustrate or defeat the efforts of ill-fortune.’93
Nelson would have agreed. When once asked what he thought was the key 
to his success, he replied: ‘being fifteen minutes beforehand’, and Martin van 
Creveld puts it succinctly in Command in War (1985) that ‘90% (at least) of 
good command consists of things that never happen’.94
Where could ill-fortune come from? Where could things go wrong beyond an 
admiral’s control? Some things are clear: the number and quality of the ships and 
men provided; the quantity and quality of his naval stores and provisions and 
the facility of resupply; the availability of adequate repair facilities; the amount 
and accuracy of available intelligence; the unity and coherence of the naval 
administration; the unity of the officer corps within the fleet – there were nota-
ble feuds within the British navy (Mathews/Lestock in 1743–7, Keppel/Palliser 
1779–80, Jervis/Alexander Hood 1779–1800), but these were as nothing com-
pared with the divisions in the French fleet, whose personnel were parochially 
divided between the three major naval arsenals, three naval academies, the reds 
(the uniform of the academy-trained officers) and blues (the uniform of offic-
ers recruited from the merchant navy), or between officers whose noble origins 
lay in the military or the state bureaucracy. Their Minister of Marine Berryer 
summed up his experience in 1758–9 – ‘in the navy they all hate each other’.95
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Many of these factors were to a large extent known before operations and 
might be taken into account, but another remained lurking to happen at any 
time – the inherent tendency of fleet cohesion to degenerate from ‘top down-
wards’ to ‘bottom upwards’ controlling forces, that Sam Willis has explained 
so well in Fighting at Sea in the Eighteenth Century (2008), and which resulted 
from the inability or unwillingness of captains to keep station and act to a com-
mon plan. Cohesion depended on catering for the speed of the slowest ship; 
the variability of speed between and within different classes of ship; their dif-
ferent speed requirements and crew capacities for tacking or wearing ship; ship 
seamanship in the face of unpredictable wind, weather and sea conditions; fleet 
seamanship in keeping to a common speed and direction and avoiding colli-
sions; differing weather conditions along a line of battle which might extend as 
far as ten miles; the different extent of battle damages and the capacity to repair 
them (which brought the Battle of Ushant to a halt in 1778); and the ability of 
captains to see and interpret signals, as well as their ability or willingness to 
obey them. In all this there was the danger that the worst captain or ship could 
end up controlling the actions of the best admiral or fleet.96
Over time, the adoption of copper bottoms and the reduction in the number 
of ship types within the line of battle helped reduce some of these problems, and 
the performance of ships and captains could be tested and ameliorated through 
training cruises (e.g. those by the French in 1772–3), and by the conscientious-
ness of good commanders who exercised their fleets in manoeuvres while voy-
aging to operational zones. (Anson and Hood had reputations for this, while 
Villeneuve was blamed for not doing so in the voyage of the combined fleets to 
Martinique and back in the Trafalgar campaign.) Fleet seamanship was built up 
over time and with constant sea experience – something that enabled the Brit-
ish, who kept their ships at sea far longer, to improve fleet performance while 
the fleet performance of the French, who didn’t, went down in each war, as they 
were unable to keep up the supply of skilled and trained officers and seamen to 
replace earlier losses.97 The prize for bad seamanship must go to the Chevalier 
de Gras Préville, captain of the 74-gun Zélé, who managed 14 collisions in 13 
months in 1781–2, four of them between leaving Martinique and the defeat at 
the Saintes four days later, the last with the flagship of his commander-in-chief, 
the Comte de Grasse (whose own collisions in the training squadron in 1772 
had led his admiral to comment that ‘there is something lacking in his judge-
ment by eye’)!98 
The revealing leadership diaries of Captain Graham Moore comment in 1799 
that ‘There is something in the nature of the seaman’s profession which many 
men of superior endowments never acquire and which many comparatively 
dull men frequently excel in. This is what the French call gros manoeuvre and 
what very few of the French navy officers of the old regime knew anything at all 
about. They affected indeed to despise it, which men often do when they find 
those whom they deem their inferiors more perfect in an art than themselves. 
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The superior skill, however, in practical seamanship is one of the causes of the 
unrivalled eminence which the British navy has attained.’99
Those admirals who anticipated and tried to deal with the ‘bottom-upwards’ 
erosion of their command tended to do so in one of two ways, summed up by 
Captain Mahan when he wrote that ‘Each man has a special gift, and to succeed 
must needs act in accordance with it. There are those who lead and those who 
drive. Hawke belonged to the one class. Rodney to the other.’100 Rodney tried to 
fight it. He ordered rather than explained, and enforced his orders by intimida-
tion: ‘My eyes on them had more dread than the enemy’s fire, and they knew 
it would be more fatal,’ he boasted after one battle.101 He achieved noteworthy 
victories, but on at least two occasions (the Moonlight Battle and the first battle 
of Martinique) his failure to explain the situation to his captains thwarted him 
of the victories he hoped to achieve. Failure to communicate effectively facili-
tated ‘bottom-upwards’ situations.
The admirals most admired and loved were those who accepted the likely 
‘bottom-upward’ trend in action and sought to work with it, having explained 
their thinking and expectations in advance. We know of Hawke’s address to his 
captains in taking over the Mediterranean fleet from Byng in 1756, and of his 
willingness to give his captains their head in chase actions when opportunity 
offered. Likewise Howe calling his admirals and captains together before sail-
ing to relieve Gibraltar in 1782, explaining ‘his intention and manner of attack-
ing the enemy if we should find it necessary to engage them’, and of his addition 
to his signal book in 1794 for passing through the enemy line that ‘The different 
captains and commanders not being able to effect the specified intention … 
are at liberty to act as circumstances require.’102 On his arrival before Cádiz in 
1805, Nelson had two dinners, one with his admirals and senior captains and 
the other with junior captains, at which he explained his intended battle plan, 
and he followed it up by sending them all his plan in a memorandum in which 
he set out this management method clearly:
‘Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the line into 
line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances 
which must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity 
would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner 
as to make the business decisive…
‘Something must be left to chance, nothing is sure in a sea fight 
beyond all others. Shot will carry away the masts and yards of friends 
as well as foes…
‘…in case signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no cap-
tain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.’103
Commanders who could manage to contain the drift to ‘bottom-upwards’ lead-
ership were then in a position to use their fleets positively, and in the book 
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which the present writer co-authored with Ruddock Mackay, Hawke, Nelson 
and British Naval Leadership 1747–1805, we set out twelve criteria for leader-
ship excellence.104 However, it is worth focusing here on the one which was the 
essential prerequisite to all the others. Effective naval leadership required moral 
courage: to be prepared to risk failure to achieve positive results. Among many 
notable command decisions, at least six stand out in the eighteenth century as 
having been made in difficult circumstances, which might have ended in total 
disaster, but which were in their own ways the game-changers their national 
policies required.
Three of these come from the Seven Years’ War and signify the moment at 
which the British navy made the decisive step-change in its capacity for power-
projection that out-matched all of its rivals – establishing an expertise in oper-
ating on enemy coasts and waterways that made it a formidable ‘brown water’ 
as well as a ‘blue water’ navy. Two instances triumphantly demonstrated British 
long-distance amphibious warfare capacity and ensure it became the night-
mare of all powers with colonial empires. In 1759 Sir Charles Saunders took 20 
ships of the line, 20 other warships and 180 transports carrying 8,500 troops 
420 miles up the St Lawrence River to capture Quebec. Such an enterprise had 
been tried before, in 1711 when Admiral Hovenden Walker’s fleet of 11 war-
ships and 60 transports had been shattered and wrecked amidst the difficulties 
of the passage. The St Lawrence was tidal, with strong currents, strewn with 
hidden rocks and shoals, and frequently fog-bound between its rocky shores. 
It was a navigational nightmare, quite apart from French opposition with the 
guns of the fortress of Quebec, fireships and their removal of navigation buoys. 
Lacking charts, Saunders sent small boats ahead to sound and mark channels 
to reach Quebec, and when the attack faltered took his ships upstream, past the 
batteries of the fortress, to cut off its communications with upper Canada and 
support Wolfe in his final dangerous but successful landing.
Saunders’s moral courage, careful leadership and maintenance of good rela-
tions with the army (a leadership quality particularly necessary in British naval 
warfare) were replicated three years later by Sir George Pocock in the capture 
of Havana. In order to achieve surprise, instead of taking the long windward 
way round the island of Cuba, he took his 31 warships and 200 transports with 
11,000 men through the leeward passage and along the Old Bahama Passage 
on the north coast – a route unknown to British navigators and thought by 
the Spanish to be impossible for Pocock’s 20 ships of the line. The project was 
Anson’s, but it was left to Pocock to take the decision to risk his expedition by 
implementing it, again by sending boats ahead to take soundings and mark the 
passage by fires on boats and islands. The result was complete surprise and an 
unopposed landing.105
The third of this Seven Years’ War trio was Sir Edward Hawke who, in the 
same year as the capture of Quebec, undertook a continual close blockade of 
the main French fleet at Brest in order to prevent a planned invasion. As late as 
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1756 an Admiralty memorandum discounted this as a possibility. Charts of the 
French coast were lacking to the navy whereas the French knew their own coasts 
perfectly and could keep near the shore and in shoal water ‘where we dare not 
follow them’. The supply and maintenance problems of a fleet constantly at sea 
on the rocky French coast and the storms sweeping in from the Bay of Biscay 
also loomed large.106 Yet Hawke decided to attempt it, and his leadership pow-
ers on the coast and Anson’s organisation of the logistical backup from home 
enabled the blockade to continue for six months, until the French finally came 
out and Hawke caught up with them off Belle-Isle, from whence they sought 
safety in Quiberon Bay, not believing Hawke would follow them. But in the 
fading daylight of a late November afternoon and amidst a raging gale on a lee 
shore, and without pilots and mostly without charts of the coast, Hawke took 
the main British battlefleet into the cul-de-sac of Quiberon Bay, itself strewn 
with hidden rocks and shoal water, and achieved a crushing victory. ‘No British 
admiral ever ran such navigational risks or gained so dramatic a victory’, is the 
verdict of Nicholas Rodger.107 
France was nevertheless capable of showing that positive results could still 
be achieved in the face of such an aggressive foe. The Comte de Grasse may 
have been a collision-prone seaman and was disliked by his subordinates, but 
he had been picked out by the squadron commander d’Orvilliers during the 
1772 training manoeuvres as ‘An officer of first distinction, made to be a gen-
eral officer and capably direct the squadrons and fleets of the King’.108 In 1781 
he took a decision that decided the fate of a nation. When the imminent onset 
of the hurricane season led both the British and the French to withdraw their 
fleets from the Caribbean, Rodney sent just over half of his fleet to support the 
war in North America and took much of the rest home, escorting the rich West 
Indian convoys whose wealth helped sustain the war effort. He expected de 
Grasse to do likewise, but the latter decided to respond to an American call for 
aid against Lord Cornwallis’s army, which had invaded Virginia, by taking his 
entire fleet thither, leaving only one 64-gun ship to escort France’s equally valu-
able trade home. It was a decision that could have led to double disaster – if 
Rodney had taken all his fleet to America, and if the weakly escorted mer-
chantmen had been captured and French credit ruined. Fortunately, neither 
happened and de Grasse’s fleet closed the ring around Cornwallis’s army on the 
Yorktown peninsula, and his repulse of the outnumbered British fleet coming 
to its relief decided the fate of the land campaign and of American independ-
ence. ‘[A]n indifferent tactician but a commander whose strategic vision made 
possible the most important naval victory of the 18th century,’ is Jonathan Dull’s 
verdict.109
In May 1794 Louis Villaret-Joyeuse, newly appointed commander of the 
main French battlefleet – itself recently restored to discipline after mutinies, 
freshly mobilised in preparation for an attempted invasion, and lacking train-
ing in fleet manoeuvres – sailed from Brest in the knowledge that the British 
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Channel fleet was at sea, and with his orders to prevent it from intercepting a 
massive French convoy bringing North American grain and West Indian sugar 
to hard-pressed France. Failure might destabilise further the already unstable 
revolutionary republic; it might involve losses that would prevent its ulterior 
mission, and it might lead to the loss of his head! When he encountered Lord 
Howe’s fleet, he took the decision to fight and to use his fleet as bait to lure 
Howe away from the path of the incoming convoy. In three actions, on 28 and 
29 May and 1 June, he succeeded, in the last two leading with his flagship to the 
rescue of damaged ships threatened with capture. He lost seven of his 26 ships 
of the line, but saved the rest while so damaging Howe’s ships as to render them 
unable to get back in front of Brest to prevent the escape of either his damaged 
ships or the convoy.110
Lastly, and despite the cautions at the start of this essay, we do come back 
to Nelson and his performance in the Nile campaign in 1798. In his first 
major command, when the French fleet sailed from Toulon in June escorting 
 Napoleon’s army and vanished into the Mediterranean, he took the decision 
to take his fleet a thousand miles off station to look for it off Egypt – so fast 
as to get there ahead of them and return disappointed to Sicily, only to find 
his instinct had been right and to sail back again, this time to find the French 
fleet anchored in a strong defensive position in Aboukir Bay. To attack a fleet 
at anchor, when it had had time to prepare its defences and when he lacked 
charts of the anchorage, was a hazardous task, and in the American war had led 
to bloody repulses – of d’Estaing at St Lucia (1778), Byron at Grenada (1779) 
and de Grasse at St Kitts (1782), yet Nelson attacked at once and was rewarded 
with the most decisive battle of annihilation of the eighteenth century, one 
that seared the minds of the French naval leadership throughout the Napole-
onic Wars.111 Leadership showing great moral courage could produce massive 
results for whichever national policies were being pursued.

CHAPTER FIVE
Naval Leadership in a ‘Fleet in Being’: The 
Spanish Navy and ‘Armed Neutrality’ in 
the Mid-Eighteenth Century
Catherine Scheybeler
Multiple ideas for the strategic function of the Spanish navy were tried and 
tested in the course of the eighteenth century. ‘Armed neutrality’ was but one 
of them and in place for only a brief period, during the reign of Ferdinand VI 
(1746–59), but it marked a significant phase in the development of eighteenth-
century Spanish naval doctrine. Also, like many of the Spanish navy’s strategies 
at this time, it was defensive, devised at the heart of government by the King’s 
ministers and then communicated down to Spain’s naval bases and officers. The 
command structure developed for this transmission as well as the defensive 
nature of the strategy itself affected naval leadership and how it was exercised by 
Spain’s squadron commanders and ship captains. It is this  relationship – between 
the command structure, a defensive policy and naval leadership – which will be 
studied here in the context of Spain’s European squadrons at a time when a new 
idea for the function of the fleet was being introduced.
Ferdinand VI implemented ‘armed neutrality’ beginning from 1748 at the 
suggestion of his chief minister, Zenón de Somodevilla y Bengoechea,  Marqués 
de la Ensenada (1702–81), who, in turn, had devised the policy partly to 
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 convince a pacific Ferdinand to allow him free rein in expanding and modern-
ising the fleet.112 The arguments behind it were outlined in a series of memo-
randa where Ensenada reasoned, essentially, that the navy could be used as lev-
erage between Spain’s two greatest European rivals, Britain and France, without 
going to war.113 A sufficiently powerful Spanish fleet could threaten British 
superiority at sea when allied with the French and, therefore, the existence of 
such a force would oblige both France and Britain to seek a Spanish alliance. 
Its very existence, therefore, had a naval diplomatic value and it could act as 
a ‘fleet in being’.114 While remaining neutral, Spain could wield the power the 
navy would generate to protect its interests, to roll back the trading concessions 
both powers had accumulated and, Ensenada even suggested, to have Gibraltar 
and Minorca returned by Britain and Bellaguardia by France.115 This was an 
idea that was not original to Ensenada – others had promoted similar ideas in 
the past and would continue to do so after – but this specific policy was actively 
pursued from the 1748 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle to the signing of the Family 
Pact in 1761 during the reign of Charles III (1759–88).
While during these years Ensenada carried out his naval reform programme, 
the manner in which the fleet was structured remained largely unchanged from 
when his predecessor, José Patiño (1666–1736), had created the three Naval 
Departments of Ferrol, Cádiz and Cartagena in 1726.116 Each Naval Depart-
ment deployed its own small squadron of two or three ships of the line for 
routine cruising, adding extra ships in times of crisis and arming additional 
squadrons for particular missions when necessary. In principle, tasks were 
also divided by Department. Cartagena was responsible for the protection of 
the Mediterranean and at the forefront of the fight against Barbary privateers. 
Cádiz supervised convoying trade and the monarchy’s resources to and from 
Spain’s trans-Atlantic empire, and Ferrol protected the Atlantic coast as far as 
the Azores and the Canary Islands. In practice, this organisation was much 
more elastic.
The operations of the Mediterranean squadron commanded by Jefe de 
Escuadra Pedro Mesía de la Cerda (1700–83) from May 1750 to January 1752 
exemplify this. They also show the significance of the navy in the monarchy’s 
lines of communication. In addition to routine cruising and organisational 
requirements such as turning over crews, collecting pay and repairing ships, 
Mesía de la Cerda’s squadron of two ships of the line also completed the fol-
lowing tasks:
1. Convoying a group of register ships into the Atlantic.117
2. Convoying 15 troop transports to Ceuta.118
3. Carrying troops from Cartagena to Barcelona and Mallorca.119
4. Collecting four newly-purchased xebecs at Mallorca and testing their sail-
ing qualities on the return to Cartagena.120
5. Convoying Spanish shipping from Cartagena to Cádiz.121
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6. Ferrying the Bishop of Mallorca from Barcelona to Palma.122
7. Transporting and exchanging 60,000 vellon reals for vellon provincial in 
Mallorca.123
8. Transporting the Royal Regiment of Artillery from Barcelona to Cádiz.124
Squadron deployment was arranged centrally at Court by the naval minister – 
the Marqués de la Ensenada until July 1754 and Julián de Arriaga y Ribera 
(1700–76) thereafter: the former was a bureaucrat who had risen through the 
ranks of naval administration and the latter a former naval officer.125 Orders 
were then transmitted from Court to a Department’s Comandante General, 
who would draw up formal instructions for a squadron commander or ship 
captain. If the planned operation was particularly important or secret, sealed 
orders were transmitted direct from the naval minister to the squadron com-
mander as happened, for example, when the 60-gun América and the frigate 
Esmeralda were sent to convoy a group of wheat transports from Naples in 
1753.126 
At the Naval Departments, Comandantes Generales were in charge of sea-
going officers and men as well as naval operations.127 These positions were 
awarded to senior serving officers. At Cádiz, from 1750 to 1772, we find Juan 
José Navarro, Marqués de la Victoria (1687–1772) and, since his was the most 
senior Department, the post was combined with that of Director General de la 
Armada. At Ferrol, the Teniente General Francisco de Orozco (1699–1761) was 
Comandante General from 1755 to 1760 and, at Cartagena, the Teniente Gen-
eral Benito Antonio Spínola, Marqués Spínola (1687–1774) was in charge from 
1753 to 1761. These officers were expected to have a thorough understanding 
of naval affairs in their Departments and to be well acquainted with their sub-
ordinate officers. They were the principle bridge of communication between a 
Department’s naval officers and the Court.
This command structure was practical in light of the peninsula’s geopolitical 
requirements. Its proximity to the Barbary states, whose privateers intruded 
constantly into Spanish waters harassing its commerce and coasts, required the 
navy to respond rapidly. Financial and manpower constraints made it difficult 
to have a large coastal protection force and consequently the three arsenals 
had to coordinate to provide this when such a threat loomed. This could not 
be arranged at the arsenals themselves since the distance between them made 
communication difficult, so it proved best to do this centrally. Its effectiveness 
is demonstrated by Ensenada’s rearrangement of the fleet in the Spring of 1752 
following news from Lisbon that Barbary vessels had been sighted in the Atlan-
tic at precisely the time when the Fuerte, an azogue ship loaded with bullion 
from Cartagena de Indias, was expected in Cádiz.128 
At that time, the Dragón (60) and América (60) were en route from Cádiz 
to Ferrol where they were to be laid up in ordinary so that their crews could 
be transferred to the newly launched Asia (70) and Fernando (70). In Ferrol, 
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the frigate Galga and the packet boat Marte were ready to sail for Cartagena 
in the Mediterranean while the Asia and Fernando were still fitting out for 
a voyage across the Atlantic. In Cartagena, the Tigre (70) and Septentrión 
(70) and four xebecs (Galgo, Cazador, Liebre and Volante) were ready for 
sea. The Septentrión and the xebecs were going to be sent to America, leav-
ing the Tigre, the Reyna (70) (once her repairs were concluded) and another 
four xebecs (Ibicenco, Mallorquin, Valenciano and Catalan) to cruise in the 
Mediterranean. 
With Algerian privateers in the Atlantic, however, this arrangement provided 
insufficient protection for the Fuerte. Instead, Ensenada ordered the Tigre and 
Septentrión to cruise in the Atlantic until the end of May then return to Carta-
gena; the packet boat Marte and the frigate Galga were to remain in Ferrol until 
the Fernando and Asia could escort them to the Straits of Gibraltar, and the xebecs 
to remain in the Mediterranean and be joined by the Reyna once her repairs were 
complete. In this manner, the Fuerte, the packet boat Marte and the frigate Galga 
would be safe, cruising would continue in the Mediterranean and there would 
be sufficient time for fitting out the ships at Ferrol. The only inconvenience was 
that the Septentrión, Galga, Marte and four xebecs set to cruise in the West Indies 
that summer would be delayed from taking up their station until the end of June.
In order to maintain this system, however, the naval minister carefully 
monitored the seagoing fleet and its officers. Instructions were detailed and 
allowed for little deviation. The following, for example, were given to the Capi-
tán de Fragata Juan Francisco Garganta in command of the packet boat Marte 
and the frigate Galga for a routine voyage from Ferrol to Cartagena in the 
 Mediterranean:129
1. Once the vessels are ready for sea and the weather permits, the Marte and 
Galga will sail with the local pilots on board as far as the open sea.
2. Both vessels will follow a direct course to the Port of Cartagena without 
delay, the captains making the most precise observations on the good and 
bad qualities of both vessels. Once they anchor at Cartagena, they will 
make the most punctual and detailed report for the Court of what they 
have experienced and await the instructions that in consequence they will 
be issued.
3. They will inform the Comandante General in Cartagena Department of 
any news that is pertinent to him.
4. The packet boat and frigate will keep together during sailing, avoiding all 
separation, for which reason the commander will ensure that he issues 
clear and distinct signals so that no allegation of wrongdoing can be 
brought.
5. Should they encounter any foreign squadrons or ships belonging to allied 
princes in the course of the voyage, they will treat them with all possible 
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courtesy, maintaining the best correspondence and adhere to the Reales 
Ordenanzas in relation to greetings.
6. They will without fail board and search all ships from Hamburg and if they 
find any warlike goods or munitions they will confiscate these leaving the 
rest of the ships’ cargoes and the ships themselves at liberty.130
7. Should they by chance come across any Algerian frigates or xebecs, they 
will attack them until they are taken or sunk depending on what is fea-
sible. For this reason, both vessels will sail in a state ready to clear for 
action, ensuring that during the voyage the sailors and troops on board are 
trained in the use of the guns.
8. Should any blasphemers be found among the men and troops on board, 
these will be punished as instructed by the Reales Ordenanzas.
9. Should any vagrants be put on board either vessel, the captains will ensure 
that these men are not given any opportunity to desert and that they are 
trained in the profession of seamen. 
All of which was left to ‘the good conduct, prudence, zeal and courage of the 
commanders’. As can also be inferred from these instructions, the Spanish navy 
was governed by an additional code in the form of the Ordenanzas de Su Mag-
estad para el Govierno Militar, Político y Económico de Su Armada Naval pub-
lished in 1748.
These Ordenanzas, which condensed previous rulings into this two-volume 
work, dictated the formation of the fleet, its squadrons and ships, delineating 
each person’s duties on land and at sea, the judicial code and its processes, and 
the government of its Pilot, Marine, Artillery and Guardias Marinas Corps. 
And, as Ferdinand VI stated in the foreword, it was to be followed ‘infallibly’ 
and ‘without any deviation’.131 All senior officers were obliged to have copies and 
were required to educate their subordinates in them so that none was ignorant 
of the law. Sections four and five in Volume One covered the duties of squadron 
commanders and ship captains in 60- and 76-paragraph entries respectively.132 
These outlined how commanders were to behave in a wide range of scenarios, 
and any infraction could be tried by a Consejo de Guerra, the Spanish equiva-
lent of a court martial.
On occasions when anything out of the ordinary occurred, this was inves-
tigated by the Comandantes Generales and reported to the naval minister. 
When the África (70) lost sight of the frigate Aguila at sea during a storm in 
1754, for example, and the two ships returned to Cádiz days apart despite being 
instructed to sail together, the Marqués de la Victoria, as the Department’s 
Comandante, informed Ensenada that he had examined the journals of the 
officers on board both vessels and concluded that no one was to blame for the 
separation.133 Similarly, when the San Felipe (70) was damaged in a storm in 
February 1753, the Intendente at Ferrol wrote to Ensenada noting: 
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‘I had all the other officers’ and pilots’ journals given to me, they are all 
in agreement with each other and they do not differ in even the most 
minor detail from the account given by the ship’s commanding officer 
which I forward to Your Excellency without finding the least action 
worthy of reproach in the conduct of the captain or the officers’.134 
Joseph de Rojas y Beltran (1700–54), the captain of the unfortunate vessel, also 
felt the need to explain the accident in a letter written directly to Ensenada. He 
pleaded that it was ‘the first such accident he had experienced in a long and 
active career and it has broken my health’.135
The naval minister could also intervene directly with regard to the behaviour 
of naval officers. One such occasion was when Ensenada issued a warning to 
the commander of the Cádiz squadron, Capitán de Navío Alonso de la Rosa 
Labassor, Conde de Vegaflorida (1700–71), for putting into port too frequently 
‘with the somewhat feeble excuse of needing to carry out repairs’.136 In this situ-
ation, however, Vegaflorida could reply, rebutting Ensenada’s accusations and 
insisting that the repairs had been necessary.137
The control exercised over naval commanders from the Court also extended 
to fighting at sea. During the era of ‘armed neutrality’, Spain might have been 
at peace with its European rivals but it remained in a state of conflict with the 
Barbary states of Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers and Morocco throughout. In the course 
of the eighteenth century, several offensive attempts were made against these, 
such as the capture of Oran in 1732, the attack on Algiers in 1775 and its bom-
bardment in 1783. Even during Ferdinand’s reign, an amphibious attack was 
planned against Algiers in 1749 but was cancelled at the eleventh hour.138 Yet, 
on the whole, the Spanish navy adhered to a defensive strategy in this conflict, 
based on fending off intrusions. Commanders were thus regularly involved in 
small actions and skirmishes with Barbary privateers but their main priorities 
in these were to safeguard their own ships and resources as far as possible. This 
did not prevent there being many successes. In 1751, for example, the Capitán 
de Navío Pedro Stuart y Portugal (1720–89), in command of the Dragón (60), 
and Capitán de Navío Luis de Córdoba y Córdoba (1706–96), in command of 
the América (60), fought and destroyed the Algerian Danzig (60) and chased 
away the Castillo Nuevo (54) in a fierce action that lasted from 28 November 
to 2 December.139 In June 1758, the squadron of Isidoro Garcia de Postigo y del 
Prado (1703–67), consisting of the ships Soberano (68), Vencedor (68) and Héc-
tor (68), defeated and sank two Algerian ships of 60 and 40 guns.140 Both were 
notable successes in which the naval commanders acted with daring and cour-
age, but on both occasions the Spanish were challenging an enemy whom they 
outnumbered or outgunned. This was a stricture put upon them by the Court 
which insisted that commanders not challenge superior forces.
The forcefulness with which this was imposed can be understood from an 
exchange between Arriaga, as naval minister, and Teniente de Navío Joseph 
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Flon y Sesma, commander of the xebec squadron for 1755.141 Flon, as captain 
of the Aventurero (30) and in overall command of the xebecs Catalan, Gar-
zota, Ibicenco and Gávilan, defeated three Algerian vessels on 16 April 1755 – a 
notable victory. While being ordered back to sea following this action, Flon 
was instructed to be very careful and to keep close to coasts and anchorages 
where he could take refuge since he could not equal the five Algerian xebecs 
that were known to be near the Balearics. If he did encounter these, he could 
try to reinforce his squadron with vessels and men from Mallorca and, if he 
succeeded, then challenge them but otherwise he was to avoid an encounter. 
He could not deviate from his orders ‘even if he had reliable information that 
promised greater success’.142 Emboldened by his recent victory, Flon asked if his 
squadron could be reinforced with men and an additional vessel straight away 
so that he could attack the Algerian xebecs directly without having to seek rein-
forcements. When this was rejected, Flon repeated his request, explaining that 
Arriaga must know how ‘all manoeuvres to flee the enemy will further stimu-
late their daring and tarnish the person in command’.143 Arriaga only reiterated 
his original orders and added that Flon, being reassured that the King had ‘as 
much faith in your courage as in your conduct’, was to avoid exposing his forces 
unnecessarily and to keep in mind that ‘squadrons do not refuse to sail with 
four to six ships even when they are aware that there are squadrons of eight, ten 
or twelve ships at sea’.144 With this, Flon had no choice but to do as instructed.
This, then, was the command structure of the Spanish navy in European 
waters and the doctrine that the Court imposed on its naval officers through it. 
These officers were subject to a chain of command which, even in the case of 
their most mundane operations, began with the naval minister at Court, and 
through him the King, and provided specific instruction leaving little room for 
manoeuvre. Their activities were further controlled by a detailed code of con-
duct in the form of the Ordenanzas. The doctrine was mission-orientated, with 
great emphasis placed upon the navy’s role in the crown’s communications with 
its territories. At the same time, a defensive grand strategy existed in which the 
size of the fleet had diplomatic value and for which reason it was expected to 
act defensively like a ‘fleet in being’, so protective attitudes prevailed in rela-
tion to fighting at sea, and these stressed the safeguarding of resources. Naval 
leadership capabilities in squadron commanders and ship captains within this 
framework, however, remain significant.
With France and Britain at war from 1756, Spain pursued ‘armed neutrality’, as 
it had been conceived by the Marqués de la Ensenada to function within a state of 
European conflict, but intrinsic flaws began to emerge. Spanish neutrality and its 
navy were not such compelling diplomatic tools that Britain and France indulged 
Spanish interests against their own. Moreover, if France lost the war, which by 
1759 seemed likely, there was nothing to prevent Britain attacking Spain without 
the prospect of French intervention.145 As pertains to naval leadership, however, 
the navy was expected to enforce Spanish sovereignty and neutrality in its own 
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waters. For this reason, the peninsula’s squadrons were reinforced with addi-
tional ships, and commanders instructed to intervene to protect neutrality and 
trade from French or British interference. At the same time, though, they were 
to continue routine relations with warships from these countries, avoiding situa-
tions which could inadvertently bring Spain into the conflict.146
The difficulties with this soon became evident. In sailing the frigate Palas 
from Cartagena in the Mediterranean to Ferrol in November 1756, for example, 
Capitán de Navío Agustin de Idiázquez was stopped three times by British ships 
checking that his was not a French frigate. Doing so, and the manner in which 
it was done, was considered a violation of Spanish formalities and a challenge to 
Spain’s sovereignty in its own waters. As a result, Idiázquez asked Arriaga, the 
naval minister, for a ‘fixed instruction so that with its literal observation com-
manders can avoid acting wrongly and preserve the honour of the national flag’.147
Once at Ferrol, command of the Palas was transferred for patrolling between 
Cape Ortegal and Vigo to Vicente González-Valor de Bassecourt, Marqués 
González (1721–62), who would later become known for his heroic death at 
the siege of Havana. Francisco de Orozco, Comandante General at Ferrol, for-
warded the instructions he intended to give González to Arriaga, asking if they 
conformed to the current strategy. These Arriaga, in turn, passed to Ricardo 
Wall (1694–1777), Ferdinand’s minister for Foreign Affairs and then chief min-
ister in the Spanish government, asking if what they instructed ‘is in agreement 
with the current system’ because there was no ‘fixed rule’.148 Four days later, 
Arriaga wrote that the instructions were to be modified so that there was less 
chance of them causing a break with France and Britain. Rather than escort 
into its ports ships and goods that had potentially been illegally seized by priva-
teers or naval vessels of either nation, only Spanish ships flying Spanish colours 
at the time they were taken could be escorted to its ports and then, only if they 
had been taken by privateers. If the ships that seized the vessel were naval ships, 
then only a protest could be launched, and if the Palas was outnumbered by 
either naval ships or privateers then it was to do nothing.149
And yet, future instructions continued to press upon naval officers that they 
should make ‘the King’s flag and coasts be respected as they should be’ by Brit-
ain and France.150 This is what Andrés Reggio y Brachiforte (1692–1780) was 
ordered to do while in command of a grand squadron that was deployed in the 
Atlantic in 1758 partly to meet the incoming flota and partly as a show of force 
against the warring powers. When the Conde de Vegaflorida, his deputy, and 
in command of the division guarding the entrance to Cádiz Bay, complained 
that British warships were deliberately harassing shipping just beyond gunshot 
of him, thus making it against his instructions to react, he asked if something 
could be done. The answer from Court, however, was merely to follow his exist-
ing instructions.151
Thus while Ferdinand VI’s government was asking its naval commanders to 
enforce neutrality in Spanish waters, it was also leaving them hamstrung as 
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to how to do so. They, meanwhile, were conscious of this contradiction and 
repeatedly sought clarification. They did so working within the existing system 
that made specific instructions from Court necessary, especially when propos-
ing a more aggressive stance that could cause the loss of naval resources. Ulti-
mately it was the Court that had the decision-making capacity and it failed to 
respond to the strategic flaw that its naval officers had signalled, but the situa-
tion shows that these officers, nevertheless, needed to command Spain’s ships 
with an understanding of the strategy.
At a tactical level too, courage, the determination to fight (within the right 
context), seamanship and tactical creativity, as well as coordination and com-
munication between commanders, were vital naval leadership qualities, as 
demonstrated in the frequent skirmishes with North African privateers. One 
such instance is provided by the Cartagena xebec squadron, in an action that 
lasted from 29 September to 2 October 1753.152 Having gathered intelligence 
that enemy xebecs were harassing shipping near the Straits of Gibraltar, the 
Garzota (commanded by Martin de Ortega), Gávilan (Francisco de Vera) and 
Aventurero (Martin de Lastarria) sailed to the area and there discovered an 
Algerian vessel. In attempting to catch it, it became evident that it would out-
sail them, so Ortega, who was in overall command, signalled to continue the 
chase but simultaneously raised the Algerian standard and veered his vessel 
to act as a lure. This was understood by Vera and Lastarria who immediately 
followed suit. The plan succeeded as the vessel turned and realised its mistake 
only once it reached them before attempting to escape once more. The distance 
closed, the chase continued with fighting into the night but both the Aventurero 
and Gávilan fell behind to repair broken masts and lost sight of the Garzota, 
which in the end only rejoined the group on 3 October.
The following day the Gávilan and Aventurero resumed the pursuit but calm 
seas made it unlikely they would reach the xebec before it reached the North 
African coast so at about midday they turned for the rendezvous at Torre-
molinos. Then, on the afternoon of 1 October, two Algerian xebecs were seen 
sailing towards them. Thinking that they could entice these to attempt a board-
ing that night and then catch them off guard, Vera and Lastarria agreed on a 
ruse to send off their launches noticeably full of men making it appear that, 
intimidated by the Algerians, they were abandoning ship. The launches were, 
in fact, to return quietly after dark. Meanwhile those who remained on board 
the Gávilan and Aventurero were armed, at their stations and divided into four 
-hour watches to ensure the men got as much rest as possible. Unfortunately for 
these commanders, those on the Algerian xebecs were evidently not fooled and 
did not approach until the following morning.
During the fighting on 2 October, the Algerians attempted to board first the 
Gávilan followed by the Aventurero but they were fought off with each Span-
ish xebec coming to the other’s aid. Following a long gunnery and musketry 
battle, the severely damaged Algerian xebecs decided to abandon the fight in 
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the early afternoon but were followed by the Gávilan and Aventurero, the gun 
battle continuing throughout. During this phase of the action, Vera sent his 
launch to help tow the Aventurero and moderated his own sail knowing that 
the Aventurero was a slower sailor and their instructions required that they 
remain grouped. The skirmish continued for several hours after this but the 
chase was called off once the Gávilan had completely exhausted its ammuni-
tion. The Algerian xebecs escaped but were severely damaged.
Both commanders praised the courage of their officers and men, and made 
recommendations for the future in their official reports. Lastarria in the Aven-
turero advised that eight-pounder bow chasers would be more suitable than 
three-pounders and that he had had insufficient men, which had forced him 
to choose between firing the guns and handling the ship. Vera in the Gávilan 
commented that despite his men being very raw he felt confident that he could 
train them up soon but that he had been issued with the insufficient amount of 
only 20 rounds per gun. Actions such as these, though seemingly small-scale 
and insignificant, are representative of when fighting at sea was permissible and 
the manner in which it could be carried out.
Seamanship, in both its theoretical and practical application, was accorded 
great significance as a feature of naval leadership in the Spanish navy. Educa-
tion at the Academia de Guardias Marinas attempted to combine the British 
and French models in order to provide cadets with the academic knowledge to 
understand the workings of a sailing ship as well as give practical experience.153 
Greater emphasis was placed on the production of gentlemen officers illustra-
tive of Spain’s standing relative to the Enlightenment and the scientific revolu-
tion, but small detachments of students from the Academy were regularly sent 
as midshipmen on board Spain’s warships, and applicants to it were encouraged 
first to serve in the Order of St John’s galleys in Malta in order to prepare them 
for a life at sea.154 The skills they learnt were tested throughout their careers as 
they were required to report and explain to the Court the sailing properties of 
the ships on which they served. This was especially the case during times such 
as the 1750s when the fleet was being substantially expanded – 48 new ships 
of the line were added to it in the 13 years of Ferdinand VI’s reign – and a new 
system of naval construction was being introduced.155 In addition, the Span-
ish navy, like many other fleets, had chronic manning difficulties and these 
were further exacerbated by a recruitment system that meant men served only 
short periods at sea and crews were constantly changing.156 Complaints that the 
men were ‘useless, most of them being very youthful, raised in the rivers in the 
practice of fishing, ignorant of how to handle themselves on the deck of a ship, 
manoeuvre one or climb a spar’ were not uncommon and so, much pressure 
was put upon naval officers to instil seamanship skills in their crews.157 
There are at present few known accounts of life at sea for ordinary seamen in 
the eighteenth-century Spanish navy, making it difficult to judge naval leader-
ship from their perspective. Further research on the numerous petitions for 
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pensions or employment preserved at the National Archives in Simancas, along 
with their accompanying references from commanding officers, could go some 
way towards filling this gap.158 These petitions and references, however, served 
an official function and generally followed a specific format. Another source 
useful in understanding the leadership provided by officers to ordinary sea-
men is the previously mentioned Ordenanzas de Su Magestad para el Govierno 
Militar, Político y Económico de Su Armada Naval issued in 1748. Since these 
regulations provided a code of conduct for those serving in the Spanish navy, 
they show if not necessarily the reality then at least the ideal of naval leadership 
with which officers were required to provide their subordinates. From this it is 
possible to see that naval officers were expected to exercise many of the char-
acteristics that are today considered vital for good leadership. It was the naval 
commander’s duty to know the state of his ships and men, and to ensure that 
his subordinates knew what was expected of them. Officers had to ensure that 
the men were properly instructed and trained in their duties. And the men had 
a right to be governed justly and well, as dictated by the Ordenanzas in terms of 
daily routine, diet, discipline, etc. Any perceived violations of this code experi-
enced by the men could be reported by them to the Comandante General of a 
Department who would then investigate the officers involved.
Another feature of naval leadership which was pertinent to the Spanish navy 
was the significant role played by the concept of the naval hero. Spain was not 
involved in any large-scale fleet engagements during the 1750s and therefore 
there were few opportunities for heroics, though commanders in small actions, 
such as Stuart y Portugal, who was promoted to Jefe de Escuadra for his vic-
tory over the Danzig, were much extolled. On the other hand, the conflicts to 
either side of this period, the War of Jenkins’ Ear and the Seven Years’ War, pro-
vide notable examples. Perhaps the most famous is Blas de Lezo y Olavarrieta 
(1689–1741) for his heroic leadership in the defence of Cartagena de Indias in 
1741, which cost him his life while succeeding in repulsing the British attack. 
Also lauded for successfully withstanding the British was Juan José Navarro at 
the Battle of Toulon (Cape Sicié) in 1744, for which he was rewarded with the 
title Marqués de la Victoria, which, when translated into English as ‘Marquis 
of Victory’, becomes more revealing. In the Seven Years’ War, Luis Vicente de 
Velasco (1711–62) and the previously mentioned Marqués González fought 
unsuccessfully but died courageously defending Morro Castle at Havana in 
1762. Their valour was celebrated in various ways: medals were struck; their 
portraits were displayed at the Real Academia de San Fernando, and a state-
run literary competition to commemorate this was won by Nicolás Fernández 
de Moratín (1737–80). In his Egloga, Velasco and González fight courageously 
while desperately outnumbered, both knowingly giving up their lives in the 
process, so that the British would not be handed ‘victory cheap’.159
No mention is made in Moratín’s pastoral poem, however, of the inept Gut-
ierre de Hevia y Valdés, Marqués de Real Transporte (1720–72), under whose 
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command Velasco and González lost their lives. On this occasion Real Trans-
porte mishandled his command through his own personal failings: by making 
rudimentary tactical errors, consistently disregarding the opinions of his sub-
ordinate officers, and displaying a lack of personal courage. These failures saw 
him face a Consejo de Guerra on his return to Spain on seven counts of failing 
to follow the Ordenanzas de Marina, which resulted in the relatively light sen-
tence of suspension from the navy and banishment from Court for ten years.160 
This was reversed within the year and he was reinstated in the navy. The dif-
ficulty with attributing Real Transporte’s failings as solely personal, however, is 
that many of his mistakes were not only tolerated by the organisation in which 
he served but were even the product of it. Throughout his command at Havana, 
Real Transporte was convinced that with fewer forces than his opponents he 
could do nothing at sea; his decisions were motivated by the need to protect 
his forces and, despite the distance between Cuba and Spain, he still sought 
specific instructions from Madrid.161 All three of these factors would have been 
familiar to Spanish naval commanders operating in European waters, which 
Real Transporte had of course been from 1756 to 1761.
At the same time, however, this same organisation produced talented naval 
leaders such as Juan Francisco de Lángara y Huarte (1736–1806), Luis de Cór-
doba y Córdoba (1706–96) and José de Mazarredo y Salazar de Muñatones 
Cortázar (1745–1812). These officers could operate within the Spanish system 
to advantage, especially once the aim of expanding the navy to threaten British 
naval supremacy when combined with the French finally materialised during 
the American War of Independence (1775–83).
During Ferdinand’s reign and the years during which the policy of ‘armed 
neutrality’ was being pursued from 1748 to 1761, the navy was run in Euro-
pean waters through a highly-centralised command structure. Using this, the 
state imposed a defensive strategy which, by focusing on the protection of 
naval resources, further limited the independence of action that naval offic-
ers were allowed. The behaviour of squadron commanders and ship captains 
during these years reveals that these factors did have a conditioning effect on 
them. Conscious that acting without instruction or being responsible for loss 
or damage was viewed as suspect by the Crown and likely to make naval leaders 
liable, especially when perceived as the result of unnecessary risks, command-
ers tended to err on the side of caution on occasions when they did have the 
strength to achieve greater results. Despite this, though it seems self-evident, 
characteristics more frequently associated with good naval leadership in fleets 
employing more aggressive strategies and flexible command structures, such 
as strategic understanding, tactical skill, seamanship, personal leadership and 
courage, were required all the same in a fleet with a non-flexible command struc-
ture and defensive strategy.162 Perhaps this helps explain why the Spanish navy 
failed to punish and remove incompetent commanders like Real Transporte 
but still fostered those with greater naval leadership capability such as Lángara, 
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Córdoba and Mazarredo. Despite a number of recent  significant biographies 
of Spanish naval officers, there is still much that is uncertain. Who were the 
naval officers beyond the mere facts of where they were born, served and died? 
What were their personal opinions about leadership, the navy and the strate-
gies they followed? What leadership and patronage networks did they belong 
to? And how were they judged as leaders by those who served under them? If 
this information were available to place alongside our present understanding 
of the command structure and the strategies practised, it would be possible to 
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In 2003 Professor Nicholas Rodger noted that: ‘British flag officers’ styles of 
command might be located on a scale ranging from the most autocratic and 
centralized to the most confiding and delegating. Roughly corresponding to 
this was another scale, of training: those who put most effort into practising 
fleet manoeuvres seem very often to have been those who were most willing to 
allow captains to use their judgement in action.’163 The same could be said about 
French admirals of that time. On one side were the cases of the Comte de Grasse 
(1723–88) or the Bailli de Suffren (1729–88), who were hated by many of their 
officers, and on the other side there was Louis Guillouet, Comte d’Orvilliers 
(1710–92), whose departure from Brest in September 1779 offered the Grand 
Corps a unique opportunity to display their love and admiration for him.
Like Jellicoe after him, d’Orvilliers can be described as a man who could have 
lost a war in one afternoon had he not stood fast against Admiral  Keppel at 
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the Battle of Ushant on 27 July 1778. However, this is often neglected – even 
in France. Rather, it is his failure, in the following year, at the head of the 
 French-Spanish fleet in the Western Approaches, that attracts attention.164 The 
historiography, especially in France, has focused on the question of whether the 
plan for a landing on the south coast of Britain could really have succeeded. 
D’Orvilliers himself, who resigned soon after his return to Brest, has hardly been 
considered as an officer in the existing historiography.165 This is a pity because 
he displayed a genuinely personal leadership style, a very different one indeed 
from that of his fellow French flag officers. His personal and familial archives 
have been lost, so to understand his leadership style one needs to turn to his cor-
respondence with the Secrétaire d’État de la Marine, at the Archives Nationales 
in Paris. Three main issues can be probed on the basis of his letters: his teach-
ing skills, his concern about his fleet’s cohesion and efficiency and, last but not 
least, his dignity in command, even when he felt powerless against ministers, the 
unpredictable natural elements and an epidemic which led him to mourning 
and failure.
I – Teaching skills
D’Orvilliers stands out as an admiral blessed with exceptional teaching skills. 
He spent a long time in charge of the instruction of the Gardes de la Marine, 
whose three companies at Brest, Rochefort and Toulon were at the beginning 
of their naval careers in the Grand Corps, the French officer corps. He had to 
command successively a brigade, a detachment and the whole company, while 
he himself was promoted from junior officer to capitaine de vaisseau. The bulk 
of his career took place at Rochefort. The Western maritime province of Sain-
tonge happened to be the birthplace of his wife, Marie de Chesnel d’Escoyeux, 
daughter of a chef d’escadre. Although d’Orvilliers was born in Moulins, miles 
away from the coast, he was the son of a governor of French Guyana who 
had fought at Vélez-Málaga.166 He was a typical enfant du Corps, entering the 
Gardes de la Marine in 1728, where he received the type of instruction he 
was later to provide to the younger Gardes members, who like himself, were 
of the provincial nobility, with a corporate spirit based on family ties rather 
than wealth. 
These were dull times to enter the navy – no wars; no fast-track promotions. 
D’Orvilliers devoted his entire life to the Grand Corps. True, he took part in the 
Battle of Toulon, in 1744, but his main activity was the training of generations of 
young officers for the wars to come. It should be noted that Hubert de Conflans 
(1690–1777) did the same at Brest just before the beginning of the War of the 
Austrian Succession. Like Admiral La Galissonnière (1693–1756), commandant 
de la marine at Rochefort, d’Orvilliers came to the early conclusion that the best 
way of making good naval officers was to train them on sea rather than on land. 
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An important chance encounter was his meeting with the future vice- admiral, 
Jean-Baptiste Macnémara (1690–1756), like La Galissonnière, one of the most 
promising French flag officers at that time. From 1739, d’Orvilliers sailed many 
times under Macnémara’s command and was selected, in 1750 and 1754, for 
two of the first escadres d’évolutions. These were organised for naval training, 
not for young officers but for selected captains. In 1754, as he was 44 years old, 
he was promoted to the rank of capitaine de vaisseau and was highly rated as an 
‘excellent officer despite his little fortune’. His career now seems to have assumed 
a rather speedy course. On the eve and at the beginning of the Seven Years’ 
War (1756–63), d’Orvilliers was trained by good tacticians like Macnémara, 
Hilarion-Josselin Duguay (1692–1760) and Dubois de La Motte (1683–1764), 
especially in squadrons intended to reinforce and resupply French Canada. On 
these voyages, manoeuvres were more important than fighting. French Admi-
rals sailing for Quebec or Louisbourg were instructed to achieve something 
other than the defeat of the enemy. The main objective for a navy in an inferior 
position was to keep sea routes open without being destroyed. However, after 
1757, wear and tear, disease (d’Orvilliers was lucky enough to escape typhus 
in Dubois de La Motte’s squadron returning from Louisbourg) and the British 
blockade made that objective unattainable. 
D’Orvilliers didn’t take part in the crushing defeats of 1759. His reputation 
remained thus unstained. When the time came to rebuild the navy he was one of 
the up-and-coming men on which a minister could rely. On 1 October 1764 he 
was promoted to chef d’escadre, the first rank of flag officer. In 1772, he was chosen 
to command the first escadre d’évolutions, or training squadron, organized since 
the Peace of Paris in 1763.167 What he had achieved with junior officers of the 
Gardes de la Marine, he now had to achieve with more senior and experienced 
captains, and even with two other flag officers. The chef d’escadre, the Comte du 
Chaffault (1708–94), was two years older than him and offended that he had to 
obey a younger officer. The purpose of this training squadron of three warships, 
six frigates and three corvettes was to get officers and crews to practise a lot of 
manoeuvres together, obeying the orders and signals given to them. At this point, 
we should note that the Chevalier du Pavillon was present on board the new Alex-
andre (64), d’Orvilliers’ flagship. For little more than three months, the squadron 
was trained by d’Orvilliers cruising from Brest to the Cape Saint-Vincent. He 
supervised a considerable number of naval exercises involving his flag officers 
and captains: for example, how to stand in a bow and quarter line, to chase, to 
tack in succession, and so on. They were required to practise again and again 
until they got things right. D’Orvilliers, as a clear-headed and patient training 
officer, only worked with a small number of rather straightforward manoeuvres, 
but the more practised his captains were, the better trained officers they became. 
For d’Orvilliers there was another purpose to the training squadron: to single 
out deserving men for the next war against Britain. The admiral wrote a series 
of apostils; that is, teacher’s assessments of the captains and junior officers who 
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sailed under his command.168 Some did not deserve promotion. Others seemed 
to be beginning a promising career, like his own nephew Hugon de Givry, 
who ‘combines willpower and talents and promises to turn into a great officer’. 
Moreover, there were some officers who enjoyed a fast-track promotion, like 
the Chevalier du Pavillon: 
‘an officer who stands out as much for his wide-ranging command of the 
theory as his zeal and enthusiasm. With his remarkable eye for details, 
he belongs to the few who deserve, on the basis of a trial-and-error 
method, to be entrusted with a commanding position, rather than be 
relegated to some ancillary task’. 
Given their strong personalities, three of d’Orvilliers’s assistants clearly deserved 
praise and recognition. First was Du Chaffault. D’Orvilliers sought to treat him 
courteously in order to placate Du Chaffault’s resentment against him. These 
were his simple words: ‘Well above my approval; I hope to have deserved his.’ 
About the Comte de Grasse, he wrote: 
‘He is the captain who manoeuvred the best and although his frigate was 
of very low quality, he nevertheless made the best out of his manoeu-
vres, the most precise and brilliant possible. His frequent collisions 
during that campaign show room for improvement (...) but in fact the 
comte de Grasse is a highly distinguished captain who is fit to command 
the King’s squadrons and naval armies.’ 
The third officer was the Comte de la Motte-Picquet (1720–91), ‘the only one 
who can fight with M. De Grasse for the best way to keep his station and to 
manoeuvre precisely. He took all the advantage possible from a very bad ship. 
Flag officers would be perfectly guilty not to undertake the greatest enterprises 
with captains of such merit.’
That training squadron was for d’Orvilliers an exceptional moment, when 
he had under his command Du Chaffault, Latouche-Tréville, de Grasse, la 
Motte-Picquet and La Clochetterie. Six years later, the last in this list was the 
commander of the frigate La Belle Poule (26), which successfully fought off 
the  British Arethusa (32) on 17 June 1778 and precipitated the outbreak of war 
between France and Britain. 
In 1773, the King and his minister were satisfied with the training cruise. The 
same cannot be said of d’Orvilliers. Committed as he was to his Corps, he knew 
how badly reforms were needed to fend off criticism (especially regarding the 
training of officers). Nevertheless, at the beginning of Louis XVI’s reign, on 1 
March 1775, he was chosen by the King and the minister of the navy, Antoine-
Raymond-Gualbert-Gabriel de Sartine (1729–1801), to command the navy at 
Brest. Thus, he assumed the leadership of France’s main arsenal and of the fleet 
mounting guard in front of Britain.
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II – D’Orvilliers’s concern for his fleet’s cohesion and efficiency
When he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant général des armées nav-
ales in 1777, and the following year when he was given command of the 
great fleet concentrated at Brest, D’Orvilliers had reached the climax of his 
naval career. From that time on, he was addressed as Comte (Earl) in his 
official correspondence. He took on board his flagship his own son, the lieu-
tenant de vaisseau Louis Claude d’Orvilliers de Château-Chesnel, and two 
nephews, the enseignes de vaisseau Louis Gilbert d’Orvilliers and Claude 
Hugon de Givry. What he hoped for was to reap glory for his family and 
strengthen the reputation of the Corps. At the same time, another French 
fleet that had been sent before the war from Toulon to North America was 
under the command of the Comte d’Estaing (1729–94), a general who had 
been appointed lieutenant général des armées navales by the Court immedi-
ately after the end of the Seven Years’ War. D’Estaing’s fast-track promotion 
was resented by the Grand Corps as an interference directly attributable to 
favouritism. A haughty and vain demagogue, D’Estaing often behaved hor-
ribly. By contrast, d’Orvilliers was highly praised for being a competent and 
affable officer, who was born into and grew up in the Grand Corps. He clearly 
met his fellow officers’ expectations. He showed himself in the most favour-
able light. He behaved courteously but he was firmly aware of issues of prec-
edence and hierarchy. Maintaining his rank now was a top priority. As a 
lieutenant général d’armée navale, he kept his table on board his flagship La 
Bretagne with splendour and refinement, taking on board a thousand bottles 
of Margaux and Sauternes. 
Unlike Suffren a few years later, d’Orvilliers went out of his way to set up 
a council of war with his flag officers and captains. He read them the royal 
instructions stemming from the Secrétaire d’Etat de la Marine and explained 
to each of them what his expectations were. In the early stages of the war, 
these instructions were rather vague but, for the first time since the age of 
Louis  XIV, there was an offensive twist to them. The King and the nation 
expected d’Orvilliers to restore French maritime prestige. There was a general 
desire to avenge 1759. 
D’Orvilliers clearly thought that, under his firm command, the Grand Corps 
would be in a good position to efficiently fight against the Royal Navy. But, as 
the former head of the training squadron, he was perfectly aware of the short-
comings of his fleet and, shortly after their departure from Brest, he tried to 
carry out some manoeuvres. He flew his flag on the Bretagne, a vessel given 
to the King by the Brittany estates at the end of the previous war.169 His flag 
captain was Parscau du Plessix and the captain of the fleet the Chevalier du 
Pavillon.170 Both had fought at Quiberon Bay. D’Orvilliers himself was at the 
head of the White squadron, Du Chaffault at the head of the White and Blue. 
The command of the Blue squadron, however, was entrusted to the Duke of 
Chartres, which posed a problem. 
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Philippe (1747–93), Duke of Chartres and later of Orléans, was the King’s 
cousin.171 He is also known as Philippe Égalité, the prince who voted for 
Louis  XVI’s death sentence. At that time, however, the two branches of the 
Bourbon family were not yet at odds. The young prince of the blood was hop-
ing to inherit his father-in-law’s post of grand amiral de France and make his 
 reputation out of a career in the navy. His career had soared in recent years. 
He had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant général, a status that clearly 
reached beyond his true naval experience.172 In this capacity, he was flanked 
by the experienced La Motte-Picquet. The presence of a member of the royal 
family aspiring to glory could be worthwhile for the navy but it could also be 
a source of embarrassment for the Secrétaire d’Etat de la Marine as well as for 
d’Orvilliers. The duke didn’t challenge the admiral’s authority nor did he lack 
courage. Yet, at the battle at Ushant, on 27 July 1778, when the whole fleet had 
tacked, his blue squadron ended in the vanguard in the former place of Du 
Chaffault and therefore was in position to lead the movements.173 D’Orvilliers 
ordered him to wear and envelop the British rearguard in an attempt to destroy 
it, like Tourville had done at Beachy Head and as was recommended too by 
Bigot de Morogues in his treaty about Naval Tactics (1763). But the duke didn’t 
immediately carry out d’Orvilliers’s order and lost time before trying to do so. 
By then it was too late. The exact reason for such a delay still remains unclear. 
The duke’s entourage may have feared for his safety. Had Du Chaffault been in 
the duke’s shoes, the orders would have been executed without demur. Far from 
inflicting the decisive blow, the aristocrat among the flag officers had blunted 
the efficiency and cohesion of the fleet.174 There was nothing d’Orvilliers could 
do to prevent it.
While wanting a clear-cut victory, d’Orvilliers nevertheless scored a stra-
tegic and moral point. He did not lose the war in one afternoon and even 
inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, who was quite surprised, especially 
when d’Orvilliers placed his flagship, La Bretagne, alongside the Victory. How 
extensive the modernisation of the French navy had been was now clear to 
everyone. While in Britain the acrimonious repercussions of the battle led to 
the infamous Keppel-Palliser affair, d’Orvilliers managed to keep his squadron 
in the Channel, forcing the Royal Navy to keep many ships at home, unable 
to strengthen British forces in North American waters. If nothing more was 
achieved in the Western Approaches, the Battle of Ushant was celebrated in 
France because of its impact in terms of restored national pride.
The Spanish alliance was badly needed in the following campaign.175 A 
joint naval operation needed to be mounted. D’Orvilliers had by now become 
a leading naval officer in the eyes of the Court. He was held to be the best 
French flag officer for the job.176 He met all the necessary requirements: the 
fame he had acquired through his victory, the esteem he enjoyed among the 
Grand Corps officers and his touch for diplomacy.177 Under these conditions, 
his task was to sail to Spain, to link up with the Spanish navy under Admiral 
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Cordoba. The Franco-Spanish squadrons were then to make their way north 
to meet the Royal Navy. The difficulties d’Orvilliers had to cope with were con-
siderably greater than before. The French ambassador in Madrid had warned 
him: ‘I must warn you that Monsieur de Cordoba is a very old man, now in his 
mid-seventies. He is highly regarded in the Spanish navy but, as you may imag-
ine, he suffers from the sort of deficiencies a man of his venerable age has to 
endure.’178 It seems to have escaped the French ambassador’s attention that his 
addressee was no less than 69 years old. D’Orvilliers responded with the sort of 
sense of humour he was expected to have ‘towards that venerable old man all 
the attentions and care needed by his age and virtue’.179 With true diplomatic 
skills and unlimited patience, d’Orvilliers gained his allies’ confidence, espe-
cially that of Don Miguel de Gastón, whose help was invaluable in resupplying 
the French ships that were short of water and food.180 However, d’Orvilliers was 
quickly aware that his allies’ manoeuvring at sea was quite defective for want 
of training. A considerable amount of time was lost. There may be a case to 
be made that in 1779 the Bourbon cause needed a more daring admiral than 
d’Orvilliers but, to be fair, there was precious little chance of finding a French 
admiral with finer skills than him to command the combined fleet. In spite of 
divergent interests and a lack of preparation on both sides, d’Orvilliers went 
out of his way to explain to his allies what needed to be done, to take joint 
decisions and treat them well. There was little time left to enforce a true opera-
tional cohesion but he managed to lead the combined fleet up to the Western 
Approaches. Despite many hurdles, d’Orvilliers’s leadership style allowed him 
to score some major points at sea, but having to deal with Versailles Court 
politics was quite a different story. 
III – Powerless dignity
By nature, or because of his background and education, d’Orvilliers was not 
the sort of man to stick his neck out politically. While admired and praised by 
his subordinates, he was short of friends at Court to promote and defend his 
reputation. Even after Ushant, he remained a discrete and competent servant 
of the King and never became a general with the sort of skills you need to wage 
war on two fronts: one against the King’s enemies, another against the many 
intrigues of life at Court. 
Problems at Court cropped up shortly after Ushant. First, the duke of Char-
tres returned to Brest and then to Versailles and Paris where he was celebrated 
like a hero. After the whole fleet had returned to port, some dissenting accounts 
of the events circulated, instilling a doubt as to the reality of the duke’s alleged 
bravery. Whilst many Parisian lampoonists lambasted the duke’s misconduct, 
d’Orvilliers sought to smooth a few feathers, and cautiously avoided comment-
ing on the duke’s conduct. However, if Chartres had done nothing wrong, it 
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could be said that d’Orvilliers was not immune to criticism for not having 
followed up his tactical advantage. There was also some suspicion among 
d’Orvilliers’s subordinates. For example, La Motte-Picquet wrote the admi-
ral a letter in justification of the duke’s conduct. More serious was the covert 
yet growing enmity of the Orléans family and faction. Chartres never went to 
sea again. The following year, after the failure of the Channel campaign when 
d’Orvilliers had to hand in his resignation, the prevailing opinion among the 
Grand Corps was that he had suffered the consequences of Chartres’s wrath. In 
November 1778, when d’Orvilliers came to Versailles, he was hurt when the 
King himself bluntly asked him why he had failed to pursue his campaign after 
Ushant. A loyal servant of the Crown, he responded that he alone was to blame. 
But more trouble and disillusion was to crop up the year after; swimming 
against the tide of political, diplomatic and naval constraints proved impos-
sible. D’Orvilliers had to prepare the Brest fleet for a joint operation with the 
Spanish navy. In the first round of the secret talks, however, he was kept in the 
dark. Only the two Bourbon kings, their foreign ministers Vergennes and Flor-
idablanca, and the ambassadors, Montmorin in Madrid, Aranda in Versailles, 
took part in the discussions. The main details of the projected naval operations 
were worked out without prior consultation of the naval officers. 
Only after the Treaty of Aranjuez (12 April 1779) were d’Orvilliers and du 
Pavillon summoned to Versailles to hold talks with Vergennes and Sartine.181 
The two officers requested that the combined fleet be homogenously arranged, 
with separate French or Spanish squadrons, and an exclusively French van-
guard able to launch a swift attack on the enemy.
Diplomatic reasons made this option impracticable. The same applied to their 
request to find a better meeting place than Sisargas island, off the coast of Galicia. 
Contenting the Spanish ally was the requirement that came top of the agenda. 
The two officers succeeded only in postponing the departure from Brest from 
1 May to 1 June, the fleet being in no condition to sail before then. Lack of money 
and poor preparation led to the first of a string of fateful delays. It is a noticeable 
fact that, despite his naval experience, d’Orvilliers carried little weight. Nor was 
there anyone in the Secrétaire d’Etat de la Marine’s department at Versailles, not 
even the Chevalier de Fleurieu (albeit himself a naval officer), to oversee naval 
preparations in tandem with d’Orvilliers. The difference with the British Board 
of Admiralty is indeed striking. The available navy was clearly insufficient too. 
The success of the joint naval operation depended on d’Orvilliers but it took a 
long time before he became privy to the project. What’s more, he was shackled 
to royal instructions, which remained rather vague on key issues and exaggerat-
edly detailed in other areas. Worse, when he left Brest, his ships had received 
only two months’ worth of water and food supplies. Now, the slightest delay was 
likely to foil the project of a joint assault on the Isle of Wight. 
Waiting for the Spanish for a whole month near Sisargas (23 June–23 July) 
brought about a second fateful delay. Water and food supplies were running 
low. The French fleet was beset by an epidemic which greatly blunted its sail-
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ing and fighting abilities. Once the fleet was ready, unfavourable winds barred 
access to the Channel. Disease spread into the fleet. D’Orvilliers’s only son fell 
sick and died on 2 August. D’Orvilliers was deeply upset and never quite recov-
ered from this loss, but he staunchly persisted in carrying out the orders he had 
received. As he wrote to Sartine: ‘The Lord has taken away everything I own in 
this world but I have enough strength left to bring the campaign to a close.’182 
Six days later he made his last will, bequeathing to his nephew maths books and 
instruments, maritime maps, now useless noble titles, his croix de Saint Louis 
and family portraits.183 The death of his son seems to have taken its toll on him. 
In the following month (from early August to early September), he persisted 
in wanting to lead the combined fleet into the Channel. But he had to cope with 
overwhelming difficulties: the constant deterioration of his crew’s health, the 
lack of cohesion of the combined fleet and, worst of all, unfavourable winds. 
Nevertheless, in mid-August he anchored near Plymouth, arousing fear in 
Cornwall. He then received new instructions giving the fleet a new and dif-
ferent target: not the Isle of Wight any more but an attempted landing on the 
Cornish coast. He voiced his surprise to Sartine: ‘Full of respect and defer-
ence for my master’s and his council’s wisdom, I shall carry out the orders I 
received with the utmost possible zeal, but I feel I ought to provide you and the 
Crown with the following observations….’ These few words offer a nice sum-
mary of d’Orvilliers’s leadership style when, driven away from the Channel by 
the winds, he increasingly disagreed with the King and his ministers. All hopes 
of immediate victory had vanished; so had the hope of a good understanding 
with ministers who remained far remote from the reality of naval business. 
Nevertheless, abiding by his duty came as a consolation for d’Orvilliers. 
In early September, however, after having failed to catch Admiral Sir 
Charles Hardy’s Channel Squadron, d’Orvilliers decided not to resume the 
pursuit and returned to Brest to avoid exhausting his crews, greater difficul-
ties and perhaps defeat.184 Perfectly aware that he had reached the limits of his 
power of keeping the sea, he then wrote to Sartine: ‘Let me confess that this 
was mission impossible for my crew. I don’t see how anyone on earth could 
disagree with me.’ 
D’Orvilliers was compelled to serve as the scapegoat for a poorly prepared 
campaign, resigning and then going on to live the life of a recluse. Praised by 
public opinion a year earlier, he was turned into a laughing stock. Lampoonists 
in Paris ascribed his failure to his deep but now unfashionable religious faith. 
With no backing to be expected from the Court, he was defenceless. He with-
drew with dignity, issuing neither complaints nor indictments. He never saw 
the King and his ministers again. 
His departure from Brest in September 1779 was a unique event testifying to 
the extraordinary esteem in which he was held by the French navy. Scipion de 
Castries was later to describe it as a real triumph because of the way d’Orvilliers 
was escorted to the City gates by French and Spanish naval officers.185 Farewells 
were so moving that he felt unable to respond. More than 200 officers accom-
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panied him to Landerneau and some even to Morlaix. These farewells can be 
interpreted as a protest movement of the Grand Corps against the Court and 
ministers. And it was precisely to the officers of the corps de la marine that 
d’Orvilliers later wrote exhorting them to obey and serve with dedication and 
faithfulness, as they had done before. 
D’Orvilliers’s leadership style displays a very professional attitude made up 
of naval competence, esprit de corps and dedication. He can be compared with 
his fellow French flag officers of the American war. He was a fine tactician like 
Guichen or de Grasse but he lacked the wide experience of naval action of 
Du Chaffault and Guichen. He was firm, but neither intrepid nor particularly 
aggressive. Unlike de Grasse he had charisma and led his subordinates by being 
really able to impress them. However, this accomplished officer was unable to 
express himself very freely or effectively with ministers, even when he lost his 
grip on the situation in August 1779 and the failure was largely due to circum-
stances and decisions beyond his control.
Nor could he contest the monarchical order, the precedence of the Grand 
Corps, and naval tactics he had learnt and taught. But his faithfulness to the 
Crown left no room for doubt. During the impending tragedy at sea in summer 
1779, when naval and strategic failure was deepened by mourning for his son 
and the loss of any family future, d’Orvilliers reached his true greatness, just 
before he disappeared into retreat and silence.
Appendix: D’Orvilliers as seen by the Chevalier du Pavillon in a letter to the 
Secrétaire d’Etat de la Marine Sartine, 15 September 1779 (AN Marine B4 154).
«  Monseigneur, Mon général vient de me dire qu’il est désapprouvé 
de n’avoir pas poursuivi l’ennemi plus longtemps et de ne pas avoir 
ordonné la chasse sans égard à l’ordre prescrit entre les vaisseaux de la 
ligne de bataille; j’avoue,  Monseigneur, que ma surprise est extrême; 
comment pouvait-il se dispenser de courir sur une flotte signalées 
à plusieurs reprises par des personnes graves? Si elle se fut trouvée 
anglaise, on l’aurait bien mieux condamné; enfin,  Monseigneur, com-
ment mon Général pouvait-il négliger un seul instant de ressortir de la 
Manche puisqu’il était menacé de vents de sud-ouest, que l’événement 
a prouvé qu’il les aurait trouvés; qu’il manquait absolument d’eau, de 
vivres et même de matelots; vous devez sentir aujourd’hui, Monsei-
gneur, puisque vous connaissez l’état et les progrès de l’épidémie qui 
ravage tous les vaisseaux du Roi, que quelques jours de retard dans la 
sortie de la Manche aurait fait perdre au Roi ses vaisseaux et le reste de 
leurs matelots; ce fait n’est que trop prouvé; il l’est également aux yeux de 
toute l’armée que jamais son Général n’a été aussi grand, aussi supérieur 
à l’humanité et aux adversités que dans cette malheureuse campagne, 
laquelle n’a manqué que parce qu’on a mal choisi le point de réunion des 
vaisseaux des deux puissances; quant à la poursuite que l’on prétend à 
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Paris n’avoir pas été assez vive, parce qu’on n’a pas fait chasser sans ordre 
une armée ennemie de trente-neuf vaisseaux, il est aisé de répondre à 
cette méchanceté absurde:
1°) les vaisseaux français n’étaient pas ni à portée ni en état de combat-
tre seuls puisqu’ils étaient de vrais hôpitaux plutôt que des vaisseaux de 
guerre,
2°) les ordres du Roi étaient aussi contraires à de pareilles dispositions 
puisque les espagnols et les français sont entremêlés dans la ligne de 
bataille d’après mûr examen de la cour et quoi qu’il ait été proposé dès 
le principe de composer l’avant-garde de l’armée combinée entièrement 
de vaisseaux français.
Vous m’avez demandé mon sentiment, Monseigneur, sur tous ses 
objets; je vous les donne sans détour, et avec la même franchise, j’ai 
l’honneur de vous assurer que jamais le tableau de ce qui arrive à mon-
sieur d’Orvilliers ne s’effacera de ma mémoire; je tâcherai d’en faire 
mon profit pour être plus sage et moins ambitieux, car je ne pense 
pas qu’on puisse montrer plus de force d’âme et de zèle pour le service 
du Roi que ce digne général en a montré depuis la mort de son fils; 
j’ajouterai à tout ceci d’après vous-même, Monseigneur, que monsieur 
d’Orvilliers ne peut être remplacé dans ce moment ni pour la guerre ni 
pour le cabinet; comment donc est-il possible que de simples propos 
de quelques individus méprisables puissent nuire à un pareil homme. 
Je suis avec respect, Monseigneur, votre très humble et très obéissant 




My general has just told me that he has been censured for not hav-
ing  pursued the enemy  longer and not  having ordered  the pursuit 
without  reforming the line of battle. I confess, Monseigneur, that I 
am extremely surprised. How  could he  excuse himself from running 
towards a fleet that had been reported several times by reliable people? 
If it was found to be English, he would have been even more censured. 
Finally, Monseigneur, how could my general neglect for a single moment 
getting out of the Channel, as it was threatened by south-west winds. 
Events have proven that he was right. He had an absolute lack of water, 
food  and  even seamen. You must feel today, Monseigneur, since you 
know the state and the progress of the epidemic that devastates all the 
King’s ships, that a few days of delay  in  the Channel would have lost 
the King his ships and the rest of their sailors. This fact is only too obvi-
ous. It is also clear to the entire army that never was its general so great 
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and so superior in his humanity and his adversities than in this unfor-
tunate campaign, which only failed because of the poorly chosen ren-
dezvous for the  vessels  of the  two powers. As to the pursuit, which, 
it is alleged in Paris, was not carried out with the proper intensity, he 
could not chase an enemy fleet of 39 vessels in a disordered state. It is 
easy to respond to this wicked absurdity:
1°) The French vessels were not  in a state  to fight alone. They were 
really hospitals rather than ships of war,
2°) The King’s orders were also contrary to such an action because 
the Spanish and French ships were so intermixed in the line of battle. 
After mature consideration by the  Court, it had been established as 
a principle  that the van of the fleet should consist entirely of French 
vessels.
You asked me my feelings, Monsignor, on all these things. I have given 
you it without evasion and with frankness. I have the honour to tell you 
that the vision of what happened to Mon. d’Orvilliers will never be 
erased from my memory. I will make it my task to become wiser and less 
ambitious, because I do not think that we can show more strength of 
soul and zeal for the service of the King than this worthy General has 
shown since the death of his son. For you, I would add to all this that 
Mon. d’Orvilliers cannot be replaced at this time, not in the war nor in 
the cabinet. So how is it possible that a few despicable individuals could 
be an obstacle to such a man?
I am with respect, Monseigneur, your very humble and very obedient 
servant. 
Le chevalier du Pavillon
On board La Bretagne 
15 September 1779 
CHAPTER SEVEN




There was nothing about the young Suffren, when he joined the company of 
Gardes Marine in Toulon at the age of 14 in October 1743, that would have 
marked him out to become an innovator in naval tactics and strategy. He 
belonged to the high nobility of Provence, which provided at this time a quar-
ter of the officers of the royal navy, and he followed the usual training for future 
senior officers of the navy, receiving the classic instruction in the doctrine that 
prevailed at the time. However, very soon, an event ocurred that was favourable 
to his training; after a 30-year interval, hostilities between France and Great 
Britain broke out again. In January 1744, Pierre-André left the classrooms of 
the arsenal in Toulon to embark on the Solide (64) and only a few weeks later 
participated in the Battle of Toulon (22 February 1744 n.s.), during which the 
French squadron commanded by Court de La Bruyère, a 78-year-old admiral, 
made it possible for a Spanish squadron which had been sheltering in Toulon 
to break out of the port and head back to Cádiz in spite of the opposition of the 
British Admiral Mathews’ blockading squadron.
Except for six months on land with the naval guards at Brest, Suffren remained 
on board throughout the war, undergoing a thorough training ‘à l’anglaise’ (at 
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sea) with many enriching experiences. The last of them is his service on the 
Monarque (74), which, on 25 October 1747, took part in a heroic combat off 
the coast of Ouessant (the Second Battle of Cape Finisterre). In this battle, the 
eight vessels of the chef d’escadre, Des Herbiers de l’Etenduère, charged with 
protecting a huge convoy of ships towards the West Indies, were attacked by 
Rear Admiral Edward Hawke’s 14 vessels. The French admiral succeeded in 
saving the convoy at the price of a seven-hour battle during which six French 
vessels were captured after they had defended themselves heroically. Suffren, 
taken prisoner on the Monarque, had his first experience of captivity and espe-
cially the terrible humiliation of witnessing the victory of Hawke who sailed 
triumphantly up the Thames with the spoils of war. This cruel experience left 
a mark on him that lasted all his life and maintained his unrelenting hatred of 
the English. 
Suffren took advantage of the short period between 1748 and 1756 that sepa-
rated the War of the Austrian Succession from the Seven Years’ War to go to 
Malta to be trained as a Knight of Saint John of Jerusalem. During the whole 
of his adult life, Suffren performed, alternatively, his services in Malta and in 
the King’s navy. Taking both careers hand in hand, he cleverly leaned on each 
of them to ensure progress in both. Was Suffren’s style of commanding influ-
enced by this double affiliation? Yes, certainly, but not so much in the domain 
of naval operations, because by this time the heroic conflicts of the Christian 
states with Turks and the inhabitants of the Barbary Coast were over. However, 
there remained in this history a glorious tradition of attacking the enemy with 
energy, and a spirit of sacrifice without taking into account the risks. Much 
more surely, the admiral developed, during his sojourns in Malta, a constant 
interest in the physical and moral health of his crew members. In his role of a 
good Knight Hospitaller monk, he showed great solicitude for the sick and the 
wounded, and knew how to take concrete measures to improve the daily life of 
his crew. Ultimately, he owed his fame largely to this attitude. 
The Seven Years’ War (1756–63) brought Suffren new and enriching expe-
riences. In 1756, he participated in the French victory at Minorque (20 May 
1756), won by the chef d’escadre, the Marquis de La Gallisonnière, over the 
unfortunate Rear Admiral John Byng, who, for his failure to do his utmost in 
this battle, was judged by court martial, condemned to death and executed on 
14 March 1757.186 Nicholas Rodger believes that this general officer, who did 
not deserve such a punishment, was the victim of ‘the king’s anger, the fury 
of public opinion and the disgust of his naval colleagues’. On this occasion, 
Pierre-André was able to note the fact that combat on parallel lines is ineffec-
tual when the adversary (in this case the English), lying windward, is satisfied 
with a cannonade at long distance without forcing his adversary to close com-
bat. The Battle of Lagos, in August 1759, was far more dramatic. Suffren, now 
a lieutenant, was aboard the Ocean, the flagship of Admiral M. de la Clue. The 
admiral, after an opening battle when his squadron was dispersed, had taken 
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refuge with four of his vessels in Portuguese, and therefore neutral, waters in 
Lagos Bay. He was pursued by Admiral Edward Boscawen who, with contempt 
for international law, burned two of the vessels, which had surrendered, and 
captured the other two. Pierre-André was imprisoned once again. Some 20 
years later, he was still able to remember this cynical lesson in realism and he 
did not hesitate, in his turn, to infringe Portuguese neutrality at the Battle of 
Porto Praya (16 April 1781). 
During the long truce which separated the Seven Years’ War in 1763 from 
the outbreak of the American War of Independence in 1775, Pierre-André’s 
reputation began to grow both in the King’s navy and that of Malta. He was 
given many commands: two xebecs, two frigates and a Maltese galley. During 
these years between the wars, Pierre-André, as a captain, participated in the 
campaigns of training squadrons where he was able to perfect his manoeuvring 
and tactical art. When war was declared on Britain in 1778, he was appointed 
to the command of the Fantasque (64). 
During the American War of Independence, Suffren served at sea from 
the first day to the last. In command of the Fantasque, he was part of the first 
squadron sent to aid the American rebels under the orders of d’Estaing. This 
unusual admiral was from a family of the highest nobility. He had come from 
the army and had entered the navy with a high rank of flag officer. This unde-
served promotion, like his maritime incompetence, engendered the hostility of 
almost all the naval officers. However, he did not lack other great qualities such 
as courage, tenacity and a remarkable capacity to discern the talents of his sub-
ordinates. It did not take d’Estaing long to understand that Suffren, who had a 
relatively low rank in the naval hierarchy, was his best captain. D’Estaing put 
him in charge of the most delicate missions, giving him the authority to com-
mand bigger and bigger forces. Pierre-André took advantage of these opportu-
nities to improve his skills in managing the tactical formation of squadrons and 
did not hesitate, sometimes with scant ceremony, to criticise the way in which 
the squadron was being commanded. He distinguished himself on a number 
of occasions, notably at Newport by compelling five English frigates to scuttle 
(29 July 1778) and at the Battle of La Grenade (15 December 1778) where he 
took the first place in the French line, dauntlessly coming under the enemy fire 
of the whole English squadron. 
During this campaign, when many opportunities were lost by the French, 
Suffren sharpened his strategic and tactical conceptions and, little by little, 
reached the conclusion that one can obtain definite success on only two condi-
tions: engage in very close combat with the enemy and concentrate the greatest 
section of one’s own fighting force on a section of the enemy squadron. 
This conviction was a result not only of his own vast experience but also of 
his historical readings, and especially a study of the campaigns of the great 
Dutch Admiral Michiel de Ruyter (1607–76) for whom he felt profound admi-
ration. From de Ruyter and his own experiences Pierre-André understood that 
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close combat is fairly simple, at least if you have the advantage of a favourable 
wind, and so the possibility of getting as close as possible to one’s adversary was 
the key to victory. Great courage and authority are all one needs: great courage 
to place one’s vessel in an extremely dangerous position where it will receive 
at point-blank range the gunfire of the enemy; great authority to persuade the 
captains to do the same. It is much more difficult to arrive at a concentration 
of forces. For Pierre-André this implied renouncing fighting in one continuous 
line and spreading out one’s squadron in several autonomous divisions capa-
ble of individual, particular manoeuvres, while still respecting the principle of 
strict coordination. The Commander must therefore have captains capable of 
taking initiatives, well-informed of the manoeuvres that are envisaged and of 
the intentions of the admiral. These conditions would later be realised admi-
rably in the hearts of the famous Band of Brothers that served under Nelson. 
Alas, Suffren was never able to obtain a similar cohesion of minds and hearts 
among his officers. 
After his command of the Fantasque, Pierre-André was put in charge of a 
more powerful vessel, the Zélé (74). He distinguished himself in this warship 
by taking part in the capture of a huge British convoy off the Portuguese coasts 
(9 August 1780). It was only in March 1781 that he at last received a com-
mand worthy of his talents. A little squadron of five vessels, armed at Brest, was 
put in his charge with the mission of protecting the Dutch colony at the Cape, 
then under threat of an English attack; then to sail on to Mauritius and join 
the Indian Ocean squadron commanded by M. d’Orves. This rather mediocre 
admiral had the good idea of dying in February 1782, leaving the command to 
Suffren for his famous campaign of the Indies where the bailli finished up hav-
ing 15 vessels and holding on for two years against the English squadron under 
Admiral Hughes. Of this famous campaign, I will mention only two examples 
which illustrate marvellously the type of leadership practised by Suffren. 
It was at Porto La Praya, in the Portuguese isles of Cape Verde, on 16 April 
1781, in the extraordinary battle against Commodore Johnstone, that the pos-
session of the Cape of Good Hope was settled. The British officer who had been 
ordered to capture this colony had left Europe a few days before Suffren. The 
latter, who had no information about the position of his adversary, decided to 
make a stop at this neutral country in order to complete his provisions and to 
refresh the crew members. On approaching La Praya, the leading French ship 
noticed spars in the harbour, turned around and informed his commander. In 
a flash, Pierre-André made a decision. He placed the Héros (74) at the head of 
the line, ordered the other ships to get closer to one another and clear the ships 
for action while making a rush at the enemy. The English, lacking vigilance, 
were confined without order at the bottom of the bay; warships and transport 
vessels all mixed together. They were completely surprised. The Héros, followed 
by the Annibal (74), penetrated into the harbour, firing from both sides, and 
placed itself in a broadside position at a short distance from an enemy vessel. 
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The Annibal did the same and placed itself in front of its leader. But her guns 
remained practically silent. 
Captain Trémigon, who commanded the Annibal, thought there would be no 
fighting in neutral waters, and neglected to make his preparations for action. 
Seriously wounded from the beginning of the action, this unforgivable omis-
sion cost him his life. The third vessel of the line, the Artésien (64), succeeded 
in penetrating the heart of the enemy formation, but its commanding officer, 
the Chevalier de Cardaillac, was killed at the moment he ordered the anchor-
ing of his ship. The order was not executed and the vessel, pushed on by wind 
and currents, sailed out of the harbour. The last two vessels were also forced out 
without being able to participate effectively in the combat. Thus Suffren found 
himself in the middle of a furnace with just two ships, only one of which was 
fit for battle. Overwhelmed by attacks from all sides, the only solution he had 
was to cut all the cables in order to get out of a deadly trap. The Annibal, soon 
totally dismasted, imitated the manoeuvre of its commander and the two ves-
sels, helped by favourable wind and current, managed to extricate themselves 
and leave the harbour. With remarkable energy and sangfroid, Suffren gath-
ered his forces together and formed a tight line with his five ships, ordering the 
Sphinx to tow the dismasted Annibal. Now it was a matter of confronting on 
the high seas the English squadron that had got over its surprise and sailed out. 
But Johnstone hesitated to attack an adversary who seemed extremely capable 
and the pursuit of whom would take him far under the winds of Praya, where 
he had left some of his men and a convoy in great disorder. After a chase of six 
days, the British commander gave up all hope of combat and sailed back to the 
port. He had lost the race to the Cape and was not able to accomplish his mis-
sion. Suffren had led an extraordinary action, had not been understood by his 
captains and had suffered heavy losses without inflicting similar losses on his 
enemy. Even so, his audacity and ability to make decisions had paid off. John-
stone was definitely distanced and the Cape, where the Frenchman was able to 
land a strong garrison force, was saved. 
The Battle of Sadras (17 February 1782) will be my second example. Suffren, 
now at the head of 12 vessels – his squadron had been strengthened by six vessels 
lying at the Île-de-France and the capture of an English vessel – had arrived at 
the Coast of Coromandel. He knew that his adversary, Vice-Admiral Sir Edward 
Hughes, still had only nine ships of the line. He decided to get rid of Hughes as 
soon as possible. The meeting took place on 17 February 1782 off the coast of 
Sadras. Suffren had prepared for the battle with particular care, with the idea of a 
completely new technique. Instead of being content, as was the usual practice at 
the time, with sailing along the whole line of enemy vessels and doubling his rear 
guard with the three extra vessels, the ‘bailli’ (Dignitary of the Order of Malta) 
intended not to attack the three leading British vessels and, instead, overcome 
the following six by placing them between two lines of six French vessels. He 
himself, on board the Héros, the leading vessel, took good care to prevent the 
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three English vessels that were not being attacked, from tacking to come to the 
aid of their fellows. He had taken the trouble of explaining this manoeuvre in 
writing to Tromelin, the senior captain, asking him to take the initiative, when 
the time came, to assure the surrounding of the enemy line from behind. Alas, 
this brilliant idea, which would have permitted the concentration of the French 
forces on six enemy vessels, was not understood by the majority of the captains 
and was even sabotaged by Tromelin, who just repeated the signals of the com-
mander without executing them. Only two French vessels doubled the English 
line – the manoeuvre however permitted the crippling of the British ships Superb 
and Exeter which were almost captured. Hughes was able to escape without los-
ing ships but had to sail to Trincomalee to repair the badly damaged vessels. The 
area was left free for Suffren to land the French troops in Portonovo, not far from 
Pondicherry, in a zone controlled by their ally, the Nawab Heider Ali. 
The two examples mentioned obviously show the lack of communication 
between Suffren and his captains. Having an inflexible, ironic and abrupt char-
acter, he did not make any real effort to be understood by his subordinates. He 
even took a malicious pleasure in shocking them by wearing slovenly- looking 
clothes and using a language littered with Provençal swear-words, more fre-
quently heard on the lower deck than on the quarter-deck. Pierre-André’s 
orders, as soon as they diverged from routine, were badly understood and 
therefore badly executed. It is true that there were, under his orders, many cap-
tains whose professional level was mediocre and, even worse, who were very 
badly disposed towards him. So difficult was his character that he managed to 
discourage even those who had the best intentions. What is more, even when 
his tactical inspiration was brilliant, Suffren did not conduct the action with 
all the necessary rigour and precision. His ardour and impatience made him 
multiply orders and counter-orders, and flag signals, which were not always 
very clear. So there often followed a lot of confusion in the execution of the 
manoeuvres he had set in motion. 
In short, Suffren as a tactician is disappointing. His accomplishments fell 
short of his original ideas. He totally lacked a pedagogical sense and disliked 
gathering together his captains to explain his ideas of manoeuvring, to obtain 
comprehension and their commitment. He had no notion of the training that is 
indispensable if one wants to get out of routine and achieve the unusual. On the 
other hand, his ardour, his tenacity and his aggressive behaviour had wonder-
ful results and he ended up winning the respect of his captains and the sincere 
admiration of his adversaries. On 20 June 1783, in the course of his last battle, 
at Cuddalore, fighting with 15 vessels against 18, he manifested his superiority 
over Hughes, who was forced to give up his attempts to give aid to the attack-
ing British army and retired to Calcutta. One circumstance, perhaps unique in 
naval history, crowns Pierre-André’s glorious career. On 22  December 1783, 
the Héros, Suffren’s flagship, arrived at Table Bay in the Dutch Cape Colony, 
where Commodore Sir Richard King’s English squadron lay at anchor. The 
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British historian and Admiral, Ballard, related that a host of British officers 
went aboard the Héros ‘to greet personally a master of their profession’. Suffren 
deserves to be ranked among the very great seamen, between Ruyter and Nel-
son, whose destructive injunction to ‘annihilate the enemy’ he could well have 
made his own. But his intuitions, his courage and his obstinacy brought him 
only limited success, as his action was so cramped by negative characteristics 
which prevented him from assembling all the forces around himself. 

PART THREE
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On 14 July 1789, after months of economic distress and political tension, there 
was a popular rising in Paris to release prisoners in the Bastille, the fortress that 
overawed the eastern part of the city. There were few prisoners to be released, 
but it sparked a series of events that were to lead to seismic shifts in world his-
tory. The political, economic, cultural and military consequences of that rising 
are still very much with us today. By August 1792 the political shifts in France 
had brought about a republican government and later, in January 1793, the 
execution of the King, Louis XVI. The monarchical institutions of the army 
and navy which had been crumbling since 1790 were eventually shattered as 
revolutionary suspicion of the predominantly aristocratic officer corps led to 
the dismissal and mass migration of experienced officers. By the late summer 
of 1792 the simmering hostility of the other great monarchies of Europe turned 
into open war and by early 1793 France was faced by a coalition of Austria, 
Prussia, Spain, Great Britain and the United Provinces. Despite a victory at 
Valmy (September 1792), the position of France remained desperate.
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The great achievement of the revolutionary government was to fashion a new 
army and a new art of war out of the crisis. It achieved remarkable success, 
reorganising its armies and, critically, its officer corps, so that by the end of 
1794, France appeared the most powerful military state in Europe.187 The mobi-
lisation of the nation, driven on by an ideology of a free citizenship in arms 
and the energy of revolutionary government against the old feudal monarchies, 
provided manpower and resources that expanded the army to four times its 
1792 size. By mid-1796 internal revolt had been crushed and the First Coalition 
had effectively broken up. 
Within France’s armies, Napoleon Bonaparte was excelling at his trade and 
rising through the officer corps. His seizure of power by coup d’état to become 
First Consul in October 1799 and then the establishment of his empire at the 
end of 1804 fundamentally changed the political nature of the revolution and 
entrenched France as a dynamic military force. Although ultimately suffering 
complete defeat in 1814–5, the wars of the Napoleonic Empire caused mas-
sive change in thinking about warfare. From tactics, through operations, to the 
understanding of strategy, the conduct of warfare across Europe went through 
major changes. Military analysts at the time and later historians, seeking to 
systematise or codify these changes, have sometimes overstated the revolution-
ary nature of Napoleonic warfare, underestimating the developments that were 
occurring before 1789 and ignoring the continuities with those reforms, but 
there can be little doubt that the theory and practice of land warfare was dra-
matically altered by 1815.188 Looking back, with experience and hindsight it 
appeared to some that there was a distinct difference between the strategies 
employed by states before and after the Revolution. The two basic strategies 
that have been employed throughout history, depending on the circumstances, 
were most simply summed up by the German historian Hans Delbrück (1848–
1929). The first was a strategy of exhaustion, in which battle was only one of 
many means of wearing down the enemy’s capability to fight. The second was a 
strategy of annihilation in which the destruction of the enemy’s army, and thus 
battle, was the central objective. The lessons of the Napoleonic decisive battle 
that made it impossible for the enemy to resist long after defeat in the field were 
clear.189 The former suited the conditions of the eighteenth century, while the 
latter suited the conditions of Revolution and after. 
Some of these changes, particularly those associated with the mobilisation 
of populations in a national cause, did not survive the end of the Napoleonic 
threat to the traditional dynastic states. However, most of the organisational and 
technological shifts were more permanent and incorporated into the armies of 
Europe. One of the most interesting shifts was the change of focus from the 
reformers of the eighteenth century, who sought the underlying principles of 
war at a tactical level, to those who experienced the wars of 1792–1815 and 
saw the need to focus on the policy and strategic principles. The evolution was 
evident in the work of Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779–1869) and fully developed 
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in that of Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831). Jomini, who experienced the great 
Napoleonic campaigns first hand, located the operation of military genius in 
the destruction of the enemy’s armed force by seizing the initiative, maintaining 
mobility and concentration. Clausewitz’s works, which gained prominence in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, insisted that this war of annihilation 
had to fit within the policy framework of the state. With the decisive victories of 
Prussia over Austria and France in 1866 and 1870–1, and the evident contribu-
tion of a sophisticated General Staff, the higher direction of armies became the 
key element in military organisation in the last quarter of the century.190
How did this change in military thinking and operations apply to naval war-
fare and officership? Of the great naval powers, France suffered the greatest 
organisational dislocation during the Revolution. While Napoleon made moves 
to rebuild his navy, employing the resources across his European empire, they 
could never be concentrated or sustained for a long period. After Trafalgar in 
1805 the French imperial navy never recovered to offer more than spasmodic 
squadron operations.191 Other navies, the British Royal Navy excepted, suffered 
crushing defeats, economic starvation and domestic upheavals that seriously 
damaged their effectiveness. The most obvious difference between the experi-
ence of European armies and the navies was that while the forces of revolu-
tionary ideology and drive successfully rebuilt the French army and created 
a weapon of immense force under Napoleon, nothing like this occurred in 
the naval sphere. The mass mobilisation of the population and ideology could 
never compensate for the loss of experienced officers and administrators. The 
ruthless drive for administrative improvement was effective under the Com-
mittee of Public Safety (1792–94) in the short run, but not enough to recreate 
effective, sustainable naval forces, especially against the Royal Navy, which was 
operating at a level of unparalleled effectiveness.192 Naval expertise could not be 
created out of revolutionary or imperial enthusiasm. 
In many respects, the changes in the art of war on land identified during 
the revolutionary period had been taking place at sea for a while. The condi-
tions of war that had favoured a strategy of exhaustion on land were largely to 
do with the relative parity of force in offence and defence that had emerged 
in Europe with the effective fortification of key areas towards the end of the 
seventeenth century. Fortifications made decisive field encounters difficult to 
exploit with the size of armies available. Throughout the eighteenth century 
the development of professional armies, with engineering and artillery exper-
tise, was broadly balanced by the expansion of fortresses at key strategic points. 
The Revolution, which produced large popular armies, made the fortress less 
significant in both offence and defence and the strategy of annihilation became 
more important.193 
On the high seas there were no points d’appui like the fortress. However, from 
the mid-seventeenth century, the disciplined line of battle in combat acted 
like an impenetrable artillery line. Getting around it or breaking through it to 
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 annihilate the enemy was an ambition or fear of naval officers from the late sev-
enteenth century onwards. The problem was how to surround or break through 
in the face of a determined enemy. Really significant results were only achieved 
in chase actions, such as the two battles off Finisterre in May and October 
1747 or at Quiberon Bay in 1759, or when the enemy was at anchor (Battle of 
Chesme, July 1770 and the Nile, August 1798). Of course, there were differences 
between officers in the enthusiasm with which they pursued the annihilation of 
the enemy and differences in the expectations of their political masters as well. 
In Britain, the expectation of destroying the enemy was so strong that even a 
moderately creditable performance was sometimes inadequate to protect the 
officer from censure, as William, Lord Hotham and Sir Robert Calder found 
out in 1795 and 1805 respectively.194 On the other hand, for French and Spanish 
officers, who almost always faced a numerical and qualitatively superior enemy, 
the option of breaking the line seldom presented itself. Furthermore, for the 
most part they sailed under orders to achieve a particular operational objective, 
not to seek out and destroy their enemies. Thus, French and Spanish navies 
had to be more committed to a strategy of exhaustion. It did not prevent brave, 
resourceful and sophisticated operations on the part of their officers, but it did 
present them with a more challenging context and thus, different approaches to 
their duty and conduct. 
CHAPTER EIGHT
Leadership in the French Navy during the 
Revolution and Empire. The Optimist and 
the Pessimist: Louis-René de Latouche-




The Revolution of 1789 brought about a profound and lasting disorganisation 
of the French navy. Its officer corps, mostly consisting of nobles, was forced 
to take part in a massive emigration. Some of them, due to family traditions, 
considered their fidelity to the King more important than their fidelity to the 
Nation, but many, although open to new ideas, left the country just to save their 
lives. The awful atmosphere that existed on board ships made it impossible for 
them to exercise authority over their crews who had lost all confidence in the 
‘aristocrats’ whom they suspected of betrayal. Some rare noble officers man-
aged to stay in service for a while. However, by November 1793 they were all 
dismissed. After the Reign of Terror, which ended in 1794, successive govern-
ments started the reintegration of the old noble officer corps but this procedure 
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concerned only a limited number of individuals. To solve the problem of the 
huge lack of officers, all kinds of improvisations were necessary. Many officers 
of the merchant marine were enrolled and the best qualified petty officers in the 
navy promoted. But these measures had their limits, all the more so as the ele-
mentary training of young officers was no longer assured since the suppression 
of companies of Gardes Marine by the Revolution. One had to wait till 1810 to 
see the rebirth of schools for officers. Besides, the French squadrons, weakened 
by the defection of their best-trained officers and the complete disorganisation 
of naval dockyards, now found themselves hampered by the superiority of the 
Royal Navy against which it had battled on equal terms during the American 
War of Independence. Moreover, the handover by the Royalists of the port of 
Toulon to the Anglo-Spanish forces in 1793 had cost the French navy 13 vessels, 
that is to say, a loss exactly equal to that suffered at Trafalgar. All this explains 
why the Revolutionary and then the imperial navy was completely dominated 
by its ancient adversary and spent most of its time in harbours blocked by the 
British navy. 
Serious training and the opportunity of forming new, competent command-
ers was not possible. Very often, it is among the old sailors of Louis XVI’s navy, 
survivors of the Revolution, that one has to look for admirals capable of con-
ducting effective operations. Two examples concern us in this paper – one 
happy and successful, that of Louis-René de Latouche-Tréville, who has left a 
bright and unforgettable reputation in the French navy. The other, that of Pierre 
Charles de Villeneuve, a profoundly sad character, who is linked to the most 
tragic event known to the French navy. 
Latouche-Tréville (1745–1804) was from a family ennobled in the reign 
of Louis XIV for work accomplished in the West Indies at the beginning of 
French colonisation. From this colonial past, the future admiral, himself the 
son of one of the King’s naval officers, inherited a spirit of adventure, a great 
capacity for speaking without constraint and a total absence of prejudice. All 
his life, Latouche had a network of friendly relationships with people of all 
conditions, from the princes of royal blood to his village carpenter. He had 
a great love for his profession and his country, but no political convictions 
whatsoever. He served all the regimes with the same enthusiasm and, from 
being a good royalist, became a convinced Jacobin and then a devoted subject 
of the Emperor without the slightest remorse. He is one of the rare officers of 
the nobility who succeeded in retaining the confidence of his crews during 
the campaign, in the Mediterranean Sea, of the first squadron which sailed 
under the Republican flag (October 1792–March 1793). He had just been 
promoted to the rank of chef d’escadre (Rear Admiral) and, far from being 
offended by observing the growth of committees of seamen, he took advan-
tage of them to influence the morale of the crews. By giving loyal Republi-
can instructions, he used the committees to spread confidence in him, his 
ideas and his orders. On his flagship, Languedoc, Latouche overcame without 
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difficulty the crew’s attempt at rebellion by appealing to the patriotic feelings 
of the mutineers. 
Louis-René was one of those rare naval officers who knew how to exercise 
their uncontested authority while, at the same time, being adored by their 
crews and their officers. He showed in a brilliant fashion that a chief need not 
be harsh and unpleasant in order to be obeyed. His good humour, optimism 
and benevolence brought him results far superior to many of his peers who 
were satisfied with cold severity. Jurien de La Gravière, one of Latouche’s sub-
ordinate officers, relates in his memoirs how he became forever attached to this 
admiral. 195 In 1802, at Rochefort, Jurien commanded a frigate in the squadron 
sailing out to Saint-Domingue and, on the first day of his service, he made a 
grave error in manoeuvring under the eyes of the admiral, which he managed 
to correct brilliantly. He writes: 
‘Latouche was an accomplished seaman and the least movement of his 
squadron did not escape his observation. Far from blaming me, he had 
the kindness to congratulate me for the manoeuvre with which I had 
got back from a difficult situation. From that day onwards, my heart was 
his. I felt I had just met a man worthy of commanding French officers 
and sailors.’ 
Latouche’s benevolence extended even to his enemies. Louis-René was one of 
those eighteenth-century men who engaged in warfare without hatred, consid-
ered their adversaries as colleagues doing the same job, maintained courteous 
relationships with them during the conflict and, once peace was re- established, 
could become their friends. Twice in his career, Latouche was able to con-
gratulate himself for having adopted such an attitude. Taken prisoner, in the 
last months of the American War of Independence, by the Commodore Keith 
Elphinstone, after having scuttled his frigate on the American coast, Louis-
René became a friend of his gaoler, was received by him in England and ended 
up by asking him to get him a two-seat coach (pretty without being splendid) 
for which he did not want to spend more than 40 Guineas! Later, in the course 
of the terrible Campaign of Saint-Domingue (1802–3), Latouche owed his sur-
vival to the quality of the relationship he had established with Admiral Duck-
worth, the commander of the naval forces of neighbouring Jamaica. The two 
men, without ever having met each other, had exchanged letters and presents 
and had soon come to feel mutual appreciation and friendship. The war having 
begun again in March 1803, Duckworth, learning that Latouche was dying, 
gave him permission to go back to France on a treaty vessel. This very kind 
action reminds us of the favour of which Admiral Rodney was the beneficiary, 
imprisoned for debt in Paris at the beginning of the War of Independence and 
freed thanks to the generosity of his French friends who must therefore take the 
responsibility for our defeat at the Saintes! 
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Latouche-Tréville, who distinguished himself during the War of Independ-
ence as commander of several frigates, is the only French admiral who could 
boast that he kept Nelson at bay. In August 1803, while he was at the head of 
the Boulogne flotilla, he drove back on two occasions the attempts of the British 
hero to destroy or capture little landing ships moored off Boulogne. The second 
attempt, at night between 15 and 16 August, ended in a bloody failure. The des-
tinies of Nelson and Latouche crossed once again, a third time, on 16 June 1804 
off Toulon. On that day, Nelson, who had five ships and two frigates, decided 
to capture two French vessels moored at the north of Porquerolles. Latouche, 
who observed the manoeuvre from the Cape Cepet observatory, immediately 
ordered his squadron to get under way and left the port with his eight vessels 
at record speed. Nelson retired, followed by Latouche, till nightfall. This non-
event led to a report that pleased the First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte and 
was published in the official journal. It didn’t take long for Nelson to become 
aware of it and he flew into a towering rage. He wrote to the whole world to 
defend himself against the charge of fleeing before the enemy and used many 
insulting expressions against Latouche, to whom he swore he would make him 
eat his report after having imprisoned him. Did the great man sometimes lack 
humour and a sense of fair play? As for Latouche, he did not feel any hatred 
for his adversary and spoke in his letters of his great desire to ‘have another 
confrontation with his colleague, Nelson’ – a striking difference of character 
but also of mentality between the two men. Nelson had in his heart, from the 
time of his youth, a hatred of the French. This feeling was exacerbated by the 
ideological passions that inspired the admiral. Since the beginning of the revo-
lutionary wars, Nelson made war not only against his country’s enemies but 
also against regicidal and irreligious Republicans. 
The death of Latouche in August 1804 brought an end to the Homeric duel 
between the two champions. Louis-René, exhausted by his campaigns and 
the fervour to which he had had recourse in order to train his squadron in 
Toulon for combat, died of sickness in the harbour of Toulon on board his 
admiral flagship, Bucentaure, after having refused to be transported on land: ‘A 
sailor,’ he had said, ‘is only too happy to die under his flag.’ His demise deprived 
Napoleon of his finest asset for conquering Great Britain. Latouche, to whom 
the Emperor had confided the principal role in his great strategy of invasion, 
believed in his mission and had already succeeded in building up his squad-
ron’s morale and was preparing it for the decisive confrontation. The friendly 
and even affectionate relationship which Louis-René had developed in Brest in 
1800 with the Spanish Admiral Federico Gravina would have been a valuable 
asset during the manoeuvres of the campaign of 1804–5, in the course of which 
Franco-Spanish cooperation would become essential. 
Finding a substitute for Latouche at the head of the squadron of Toulon was a 
very difficult problem for the Emperor. The number of admirals capable of suc-
ceeding Nelson’s former ‘challenger’ was extremely limited. Bruix had  certainly 
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acquired a great reputation but bad health made it impossible for him to do ser-
vice at sea. Ganteaume, who had brought back Napoleon from Egypt and who, 
since then, had played the role of naval adviser to the head of state, was already 
appointed Commander of the squadron in Brest, that also had an important 
role to play in the Emperor’s plans. Decrès, the minister of the navy, excluded 
Missiessy, a man of great worth but whom he did not like, and proposed the 
name of Villeneuve, who, lacking ambition, was not a threat to his ministerial 
career. 
Villeneuve, 42 years old at that time, was from one of the oldest and most illus-
trious noble Provençal families. He entered the Company of the Naval Guards 
of Toulon in 1778 and fought throughout the American War of Independence, 
experiencing with Grasse the glory of the Battle of Chesapeake (5 September 
1781) and the setbacks at the Battle of the Saintes (12 April 1782). At the time 
of the Revolution, he held the rank of lieutenant. His family, well-established 
in High Provence, approved of the new ideas and did not emigrate. He, like 
Latouche-Tréville, managed to remain in service and had the advantage of a 
rapid promotion. Like all officers from the nobility, he was excluded from the 
navy for a short period (November 1793–May 1795) during and after the Ter-
ror. After the Reign of Terror, his rise was phenomenal, all the more so as the 
other contenders were weak and he was endowed with exceptional advantages: 
a remarkable intelligence and lucidity, great professional qualities, an affable and 
benevolent character, and an exemplary sense of duty. Promoted to the rank 
of Rear Admiral from September 1796, Villeneuve commanded the rearguard 
of the French squadron at the Battle of the Nile (1 August 1798). He was not 
attacked by Nelson and witnessed the destruction of the rest of the squadron 
without making any attempt to come to their aid. To justify this passivity, Vil-
leneuve attributed his action to contrary winds and the delays in making way. It 
was only on the following morning that he left the port and managed to take his 
division safe and sound to Malta. Far from being blamed, he was praised by the 
French government, the Directory, for having saved from disaster a section of 
the French fleet. As for Bonaparte, the event made him remember the fact that 
Villeneuve was a lucky man, which, to his mind, was a considerable advantage. 
The Admiral, however, was traumatised by what happened and continued to 
have a deep sense of inferiority when faced with Nelson’s genius. He had no wish 
to undergo another confrontation with this ‘colleague’. 
When, in Autumn 1804, the squadron trained by Latouche-Tréville was put 
under his command, Villeneuve felt there was an unbearable burden on his 
shoulders. He showed himself absolutely incapable of maintaining the activity, 
the confidence and the high state of morale that his predecessor had succeeded 
in developing.196 On the other hand, his solitary reflections permitted him to 
guess, with extraordinary foresight, what a confrontation with Nelson would be 
like. In the instructions he sent to his captains on the 21 December 1804, Vil-
leneuve wrote with exactitude what the Battle of Trafalgar would be: 
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‘The enemy will not stop at creating a battle line parallel to ours and 
at delivering an artillery battle [ ... ]. He will seek to surround our rear 
guard, to cross us and carry his own divisions upon those vessels of ours 
that he will have separated, in order to surround and reduce them.’ 
The tragic aspect of Villeneuve is that this rare lucidity was accompanied by a 
profound pessimism. He believed that the French and soon the Spanish ships 
he would have to deal with would be incapable of performing complicated 
manoeuvres and he would have to be satisfied with opposing the enemy with 
a line of vessels tightly closed up to one another. His first attempt to get under 
way from Toulon in January 1805 convinced him of the validity of this opin-
ion. The violent gust of the Mistral that he was subjected to as he got out of 
the port caused such a state of disorder in his squadron that he was obliged to 
return shamefully three days later. In despair, he wrote to Decrès, the minister 
of the navy, a profoundly defeatist letter in which there is this terrible sentence: 
‘The enemy will beat us even with forces inferior to ours by a third.’ Following 
the logical conclusion of this analysis, Villeneuve declared his resignation. The 
minister then committed an unforgivable mistake: he did not send the letter to 
the Emperor and asked his friend to remain at his post. Villeneuve, in the spirit 
of duty, but also as someone who was passive and resigned to his fate, agreed to 
pursue his mission. A man afflicted with two such serious faults as pessimism 
and passivity should never have been invested with a such a command. 
Without the space to explore all the events of the campaign that preceded 
Trafalgar, let us simply note a few episodes that illustrate Villeneuve’s style of 
command and his temperament. The French squadron left Toulon on 30 March 
1805. It sailed through the Strait of Gibraltar without opposition and arrived 
on 9 April in Cádiz where it was to be joined by a Spanish squadron. Only 
the Argonauta, the flagship of Admiral Federico Gravina, and the French ves-
sel L’Aigle were in the port and ready to leave. Villeneuve stayed only a few 
hours in the harbour and sailed away towards the West Indies without waiting 
any longer for the five Spanish vessels which were not ready to sail out. This 
haste has something indecent about it for it shows quite plainly the pathologi-
cal fear he had of a confrontation with the victor of Aboukir. It could only have 
been perceived as a negative quality by the French crews and even more by his 
 Spanish allies. Once he arrived in Martinique, Villeneuve, in conformity with 
the orders received, waited 40 days for the rallying of the squadrons of Brest and 
Rochefort. This useless waiting, during which he could take no major action 
against the enemy,197 brought upon him the lively reproaches of the Emperor. 
The Admiral was hurt by this profoundly unjust criticism and his morale was 
affected. After recrossing the Atlantic he met the squadron of Rear Admiral 
Sir Robert Calder off the western coast of Spain on 22 July 1805. An indecisive 
action followed. The day after this battle Villeneuve lost precious time putting 
his squadron into order instead of pursuing the enemy vigorously and retaking 
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the two Spanish vessels captured by Calder. This failure was another blow to 
his morale as indeed it was to the rather uncertain prestige he enjoyed among 
his Spanish allies. Finally, on 15 August, while he had succeeded in joining the 
Spanish squadron in Ferrol, Villeneuve, completely demoralised, abandoned 
his voyage towards Brest in order to take refuge in Cádiz. He believed, not 
without good reason, that the enemy had now been able to concentrate impor-
tant forces at the entry of the English Channel and that his own mission had 
become quite impossible. 
To sum up, the West Indian campaign was a long Calvary for Villeneuve. 
His morale, faltering from the beginning, sank further without the Admiral 
being able to find the necessary energy and optimism to train his men and 
prepare them for a decisive combat. The great accomplishments at Trafalgar 
by several French and Spanish vessels show, however, that there was, in the 
Franco- Spanish squadron, a potential that Villeneuve did not know either how 
to mobilise or to federate. Resignation, pessimism and passivity do not make 
great commanders! There certainly was too great a difference between the com-
bined fleet and its British adversary to hope for a victory. The precision and 
rapidity of firing, the monopoly of carronades, terribly efficient at short dis-
tances, but, above all, the formation and training of the crews gave the British 
an advantage that could not be equalled. But the terrible tragedy of Trafalgar, 
for which Napoleon was chiefly responsible, could have been avoided. Let us 
remember that on 19 October 1805, the united fleet sailed from Cádiz not in 
order to conquer England but to reach Toulon. Let us keep in mind the fact 
that if Villeneuve was still at the head of the fleet, it was because the Emperor 
had taken the demented decision of sending a substitute for Villeneuve without 
informing him, thinking that the Admiral, too faint-hearted, would not dare 
to attack the enemy. In fact, Villeneuve was a courageous man who believed 
he could redeem himself only by a brilliant performance or by dying worthily. 
In the end, his adversaries rendered him deep respect. Rather naively, the 
English officers who came across him during his captivity were surprised to 
meet not the slovenly and vociferous individual they expected but a very distin-
guished gentleman; Admiral Collingwood presents a fine portrait:198 ‘Admiral 
Villeneuve is well brought-up and, I believe, a very good officer; there is noth-
ing displeasing or boastful, such as we attribute too often to the French, in his 
behaviour.’ In short, in the eyes of the English, Villeneuve was someone very 
easy to associate with, who even possessed abundantly the quality of fair play. 
What better, in fact, than to be beaten while showing consistent resistance in 
order to assure the glory of one’s conqueror? 
The admirals of the Revolution and of the Empire had the unrewarding 
task of combating, in terribly unfavourable circumstances, an enemy who had 
attained great superiority. In the first years of the Revolution, they sailed out to 
combat with improvised captains, crews often on the verge of mutiny, and ships 
badly maintained and lacking armaments. Later, when order was restored on 
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board ship and in the naval dockyards, British supremacy was such that French 
squadrons, blocked in ports, had huge difficulties in acquiring a minimum of 
training, all the more as the seamen who had been well trained were in a state 
of exhaustion. Napoleon’s style of command did not improve the situation. 
Not having confidence in his admirals, the Emperor did not inform them of 
the objectives he had in mind but overwhelmed them with orders containing 
precise details and the threat of imposing sanctions in case of laxity or diso-
bedience, which, taking into account communication delays, no longer had 
anything to do with the present situation and became a source of trouble and 
confusion. 
In these circumstances, the talents that existed outside the noble corps of 
the Naval Guards had neither the time to blossom nor the possibility of doing 
so. Certain admirals, such as Villaret-Joyeuse and Allemand, former auxiliary 
officers, or Martin, former petty officer in the Royal Navy, showed real quali-
ties which could at other times, have produced great commanders. Latouche-
Tréville, who defied his colleague Nelson, and Villeneuve, who was tragically 
trapped while performing a role he knew himself incapable of assuming, still 
belonged to the great navy established in the time of Louis XVI. 
CHAPTER NINE
Admiral Antonio Barceló, 1716–97:  
A Self-Made Naval Leader
Agustín Ramón Rodríguez González
Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid 
The career of Antonio Barceló y Pont de la Terra has on many occasions 
attracted the attention of researchers and publishers of naval history. He was a 
modest mail-boat skipper, who, despite not being a nobleman and having very 
little academic training, managed to obtain the title of Admiral (Teniente Gen-
eral de la Armada) at a time when such an achievement was nigh on impos-
sible. It was solely due to his merits in action during times of war and other 
outstanding services.199 
Much less attention has been paid to the perhaps inevitable fact, given his 
character and career, that despite being an outstanding leader in the Spanish 
Royal Navy at that time, prejudices of all kinds, professional envy and the iner-
tia of the ‘establishment’ ensured that a large part of his efforts did not receive 
their due reward and his ideas were not applied, or at least not to the desired 
extent.
Perhaps one of the subtlest attacks on his career and legacy has been to trivi-
alise his actions, presenting them as typical of a hard, skilled ‘corsair’, within 
a very limited operational context, based on anecdotal evidence. This chapter 
aims to correct or, at least, considerably clarify this accepted opinion.
How to cite this book chapter: 
Rodríguez González, A R. 2017. Admiral Antonio Barceló, 1716–97: A Self-Made 
Naval Leader. In: Harding, R and Guimerá, A (eds.). Naval Leadership in 
the  Atlantic World. Pp. 107–115. London: University of Westminster Press. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.16997/book2.k. License: CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
108 Naval Leadership in the Atlantic World
Barceló’s career
A brief summary of the career of this great sailor would not be amiss, as he was 
a very well-known figure who, in our opinion, did not receive due credit. Born 
in Palma de Mallorca on 31 December 1716, in June 1735 he was appointed by 
Royal Order as master of the mail boat that connected Palma with Barcelona, 
giving him at the tender age of 18 a position he had already held whenever his 
father, from whom he inherited the boat and position, was absent or ill.
In November 1738, at 21 years old, he was rewarded with promotion to 
Lieutenant Junior Grade (Alfarez de Navio) for the bravery and skill with 
which he repelled an attack by two Algerian galiots during one of his cross-
ings. Another of his services was to supply Palma with bread and flour dur-
ing a severe ‘supplies crisis’, during which, to encourage his crew to work 
faster and to gain more cargo space on board, he got rid of the water tank. 
He rose to Sub-lieutenant (Teniente de Fragata) in May 1748. He also took 
command of a squadron of armed privateering xebecs, which had to act 
together with the navy ships against the Barbary corsairs, but the results 
were poor due to bureaucratic problems, indolence and a lack of coordina-
tion.
In June 1753 he was promoted to effective Lieutenant, as a result of repelling 
the attack of two Algerian galiots with his xebec, capturing one and damaging 
the other one until it fled. After 15 years, during which his bravery could have 
been put to much better use, our man entered the Spanish Royal Navy through 
well-earned references, at the unusually old age of 39 years old.
In August 1753 he was promoted to acting Lieutenant (Teniente de Navío) 
after providing another outstanding service which he combined with his postal 
duties: with his xebec and another under his command, he managed to capture 
an Algerian galiot and burn a Majorcan ship the Algerian privateers had just 
seized. 
There followed some years of relative obscurity for Barceló, in which we have 
not been able to find any relevant services or promotions. Perhaps this was due 
to the difficulty for such an unusual sailor in the Royal Navy to gain acceptance, 
not to mention his service in the xebec, which became an efficient antidote to 
the similar Barbary ships and galiots, rather than the more prestigious ships of 
the line or frigates in royal service.
Nevertheless, Barceló’s continuous successes between 1762 and 1769 con-
firmed that too much time had been lost in accepting the obvious: during those 
seven years, Barceló, at the helm of his xebec, accompanied by one or several 
others, captured or destroyed no fewer than 19 Barbary corsairs, of 6 to 30 
guns, with a total of 1,600 prisoners, and freeing almost 1,000 Christian cap-
tives of all nationalities.
In order to better understand this, we have to remember that these Barbary 
sailors were not armed merchants, who defended themselves more or less 
weakly, but corsairs who literally fought to the death because, among other 
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reasons, they knew there would be no exchange of prisoners for them and they 
could only hope for a short, difficult life of hard labour.
This series of successes was accompanied by the corresponding promotions 
for Barceló. He became Commander (Capitán de Fregata) in June 1762 and 
Post Captain (Capitán de Navío) in March 1769. The successes continued: such 
as on 22 October 1769, for instance, with a division of six xebecs, another 4-gun 
Algerian ship was conquered and captured near Melilla. That same year, on 24 
November, a pension of 12,000 reales annually for life was granted by Royal 
Order for his outstanding services. In February 1775, Barceló rose to Com-
modore [Brigadier].200 
His expertise in that style of naval warfare was more than proven, as was his 
personal courage, shown by several wounds, one of which was a very serious 
shot to his mouth that ripped out several teeth and became infected. He had 
a high temperature and could not eat or drink for almost three months, but 
he remained in charge of his xebec on a patrol mission. Whether due to the 
difficulty of his constant services or for other reasons, he was also said to be 
extremely deaf, yet despite this he remained in active service.
In the same year as he was promoted to Commodore, Barceló took part in 
the unfortunate expedition against Algiers. He was in command of a division of 
xebecs, with nine ships of between 20 and 32 guns, as well as the squadron and 
convoy, under the overall command of Teniente General don Pedro González 
Castejón for the naval part and Conde O’Reilly for the landing party. Barceló 
criticised the actions taken by these two commanders for landing on a beach 
near the corsairs’ port, but they did not pay any attention to him. However, 
when the situation for the landing party became critical, Barceló did not wait 
for orders and covered the threatened flank of troops by firing from his xebecs, 
whilst Jefe de Escuadra Juan Acton did the same on the opposing flank with 
other units, thus avoiding greater disaster.
Spanish public opinion severely criticised the commanders for their inepti-
tude, and praised Barceló, who shortly after was promoted to Rear Admiral 
(Jefe de Escuadra). But this reward, and the fact he received so much praise and 
had exposed the ineptitude of senior officers, made him many enemies, with 
unpleasant consequences, not so much for his career – although it had some 
effect –  but rather in terms of  the influence of his leadership. 
In spite of everything, he had risen to Rear Admiral by April 1779, in time to 
be involved in a new dispute against a very different type of enemy: the British 
Royal Navy.
His new mission was to take light blockade forces to Gibraltar, to oppose 
the British squadron there under the command of Rear Admiral Robert Duff. 
A blockade was always tedious, and more likely to highlight virtues such as 
patience and tenacity than brilliant acts of strategy and courage. On the other 
hand, completely closing the Strait, with its typical weather conditions, to any 
ship, whether an enemy or neutral, was an almost impossible task during the 
age of sail. The situation was made worse by the usual damage and operational 
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withdrawals in Barceló’s fleet, and above all the impatience and inexperience of 
the commanders and officers of the army entrenched at La Línea. Thus criti-
cism rained down on Barceló, aggravated by the failure of his attack with a fire-
ship, to such an extent that he was put under the inspection of another admiral, 
Rodríguez de Valcárce, a situation that was both embarrassing and wrong.
Such a harsh judgement was not meted out against other Spanish leaders 
who, for one reason or another, let three successive large convoys pass during 
the war and the siege. Each had been guarded by powerful squadrons and was 
much more important and decisive for the fortune of the besieged town than 
any small ship that managed to enter port, which is all that Barceló could be 
reproached with. However, the leaders who commanded squadrons were not 
reproached in any way; some were even promoted, such as Lángara, despite 
losing a large part of his own squadron in a battle against Admiral Rodney’s 
squadron on 16 January 1780.
Barceló’s difficult situation is corroborated in a letter sent from the Court 
to the new Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Crillón, informing him that 
Barceló, due to his advanced age, deafness and limited academic training, was 
not a trustworthy leader.201
But while they lost ships, money and men with the controversial ‘floating 
batteries’ designed by the French engineer D’Arçon, which had such an unfor-
tunate end, Barceló’s luck began to change. He had the idea of designing gun-
boats to bombard the town from the sea. These were large rowing boats armed 
with a 24-pounder cannon and reinforced, first with cork and later with iron, 
although it was soon discovered that this overloaded the boat unnecessarily. 
These gunboats were particularly useful in the night attacks against Gibraltar, 
probably being the weapon that most concerned and disturbed the besieged. 
However, there were never enough of them, partly due to focusing on the bat-
teries, and partly from pure indolence.
And so it was that, once the war ended, the King was satisfied with Barceló’s 
tireless service. He had been continuously in action, and he was promoted on 
16 February 1783 to Admiral Teniente General as part of a big promotion, justi-
fied because the war was deemed to be a victory, with the exception of Gibral-
tar. It must be said that of the four main promotions, the minister Floridablanca 
stated in a letter to Crillón that Barceló’s was the most deserving, and reminded 
the Duke of Crillón that, despite reports discrediting Barceló, Crillón himself 
had been the most interested in Barceló’s promotion.
Once the war with Great Britain had ended, interest was reignited in the con-
tinuing war with Barbary corsairs. Barceló’s system was so effective that both 
Tripoli and Tunisia decided to sign a peace treaty with Spain. Only Algiers 
continued the fight, despite the Arab commanders or corsair captains insisting 
that their mission was now almost impossible.
It was obvious that only a masterstroke could dissuade Algiers from con-
tinuing with its policy of confrontation, and Barceló was given command of 
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that mission. Believing that a new landing like that of 1775 was excessively 
expensive and dangerous, he planned a systematic bombardment of the town 
and port with his gunboats and newer types, such as bomb-ships armed with 
howitzers. They were trained in boarding to repel the counter-attack of the 
light enemy boats. All were guarded by ships of the line, frigates, the inevitable 
xebecs and many others.
The squadron of 85 vessels subjected Algiers to a series of nine heavy bom-
bardments in July 1783. Despite serious damage and very few Spanish losses, 
Algiers did not cede and the expedition had to be repeated the following year, 
on a larger scale and with support from galleys of the Knights of St John of Malta 
and vessels from the kingdoms of Naples and Portugal joining for the first time. 
Despite his age, Barceló was personally involved to such an extent, covering the 
line of fire aboard a felucca, that his ship was in serious danger of being hit by 
an enemy projectile and sinking, despite which the bombardments continued.
The tactics that he used were as severely criticised by some as they were cel-
ebrated by others who had not forgotten the disaster of 1775. He was com-
pletely successful: Algiers could not hold up against such a series of attacks 
indefinitely, which besides the damage they caused (always limited due to the 
artillery of the time), forced Algiers to focus all its efforts on defence, and not 
on privateering, which was its way of life. Thus, after preliminary talks, and 
faced with the threat of a third expedition, peace was signed in 1786, one of the 
Spanish envoys being none other than José Mazarredo, who had been under 
Barceló’s orders during the attacks.202
Although relations with Algerian corsairs in particular, and the Berbers in 
general, had some flare-ups over the following years, they were no longer the 
threat they had been to Spain since the sixteenth century. This enabled the 
repopulation of the east coast from Catalonia to Granada, and the significant 
economic boom of this region, which had previously been under threat of cor-
sairs. It was definitely the most important and decisive Spanish victory of the 
eighteenth century.
Despite this, Barceló was barely rewarded, except for the confirmation of 
his promotion to Admiral and the award of the Grand Cross of the Order of 
Charles III, as well as other minor rewards. No doubt the reason was that he 
could only rise further to become Admiral of the Navy, a title that many of the 
Courtiers deemed excessive for his humble origins.
The last few years of his life passed uneventfully, with the exception of being 
passed over for command of a similar expedition, although much smaller, 
against Morocco, which was given to Francisco Morales de los Ríos, an inept 
man, who had been previously disqualified due to his cowardice as second-in-
command of the frigate Hermione (26),  which was lost in battle with a Brit-
ish frigate in May 1762. Nevertheless, Morales was promoted and given the 
title of Count of Morales for his small bombardment of Tangiers, which was 
a skirmish compared with those in Algiers. Morales was to demonstrate this 
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 ineptitude again in the Battle of San Vicente in February 1797, but his career 
shows the significant difference in treatment that officers could experience. 
Barceló died from natural causes in his home in Palma on 30 January 1797, a 
fortnight before Morales’s failure in San Vicente that led to him being dismissed 
from the service and demoted.
Xebecs: a tough school for sailors
Nicholas Rodger reminded us some time ago that most eighteenth-century 
sailors on men-of-war had a strange profession as they only worked during 
wars. Once peace was achieved, all the navies stripped the ships of the rigging 
and sails, cannons and equipment, and anchored them in the dockyards, with 
very few small ones staying in active service, exclusively for scientific explora-
tion and surveillance tasks.
But that was not the case for the xebecs, at least until the Treaty of 1786: 
they continually patrolled in search of their slippery and dangerous enemies, 
the Barbary corsairs, staying in port only for essential work such as repairs or 
renewing supplies and ammunition. Therefore it was a formidable school for 
young officers who, instead of settling on land in more or less bureaucratic 
postings, had the chance to learn and grow in their profession.
To cite two well-known names, none other than Federico Gravina and 
 Antonio Escaño carried out many of their first battles and campaigns in xebecs, 
directly under Barceló’s command or under his inspiration and protection. 
Gravina, a modest ensign (alférez de fragata), sailed in Pilar and Gamo, dis-
tinguishing himself later in command of the San Luis, in which he began to 
stand out. He took part in the two bombardments of Algiers, commanding the 
Catalán and dealing with the intelligence for the expedition. Escaño, a simple 
midshipman (guardiamarina), was under the direct orders of Barceló on the 
Vigilante in several battles; then he passed on to the Atrevido and even com-
manded a division of xebecs under the flag of the frigate Casilda. 
Barceló’s relationship with these and other great sailors of the time was close, 
as is shown in a personal letter from Gravina to Barceló upon hearing about his 
rise to Admiral:
‘No one has more reasons than I to celebrate the satisfaction and advan-
tage for Spain… I am most pleased for the promotion you have just 
received, for which I send you my warmest congratulations.’203 
People of the calibre of Escaño, Grandallana and Alsedo, and many others, also 
wrote in similar terms.
Among these there may also have been the great Mazarredo, who was under 
Barceló’s orders in Algiers, and signed the peace treaty that Barceló won. 
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Mazarredo used his gunboats brilliantly to harass the ships blocking Cádiz in 
1797. But the many huge merits of this great Basque sailor did not include 
acknowledging debts to others who were not loyal subordinates.
What was for some a promotion and apprenticeship, was for others a pun-
ishment. An officer condemned for dishonourable conduct before the enemy 
was often offered the chance to ‘redeem’ himself by voluntarily boarding as an 
‘adventurer’ in the xebecs. Sometimes it was done with entire crews: on one occa-
sion, three Spanish galleons were shamefully beaten by a sole Algerian xebec that 
captured one and made the other two flee. It was considered that the best way 
to ‘retrain’ the crews and officers was to put them under Barceló’s command.204 
It must have greatly surprised these fellow officers to be faced with such a 
rough and uneducated man, with little culture, who shouted a lot and took off 
his wig at the slightest occasion. A man who was capable of joining a board-
ing, or of carrying out an order himself. On one occasion, upon capturing an 
Algerian ship, orders forbade taking anything from it on board, for fear of an 
epidemic. A sailor took a liking to a beautiful wide red belt and Barceló himself 
snatched it out of his hands and threw it into the sea, a gesture that shook his 
much primmer subordinates, who would have sent a petty officer to do it. 
But they soon realised they were with a real ‘sea dog’, a professional forged 
by long, hard service, resourceful and with common sense, friendly and mod-
est, who became a legend not just for his crews, but for the whole Spanish east 
coast, a fact proven by many folk songs and poems. There is no doubt he was 
the most popular and admired Spanish sailor of the eighteenth century.
Barceló was also a man who took care of his own and did not allow other 
authorities to interfere with his subordinates, something that is mentioned 
many times. He dealt with things as a ‘family affair’.
As might be expected, Barceló was strongly in favour of meritocracy in pro-
motions and mentions in despatches, in a navy where careers were based on 
seniority of service and the King’s favour. Thus, with his typical frankness, he 
wrote to Charles III in November 1784, while preparing his third expedition 
against Algiers:
‘But before leaving the Court I find a big obstacle that, no doubt, will 
make this venture difficult, this being that I will not find officers willing 
to serve under my orders as there will be no reward no matter how much 
they risk their life in action. Your Majesty knows better than I that no 
General among those that have been heroes would have achieved such 
successful actions if they had not had brave corporals and subordinates 
who, obeying their orders, earned their deserving rewards through hard 
work and sweat.’ …
‘Having seen men promoted who were not there (in the second expedi-
tion to Algiers) or, if they were, had only been promoted earlier, am I, 
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perhaps, to blame for many recent officers having been put under my 
command so that after having risked everything, they are not promoted 
due to a shorter length of service? And if length of service were the only 
deserving reason, what would be the point of fostering and stimulating 
young men to attempt glorious actions if they are not going to receive 
their due reward for a lack of it?’
He summarised: 
‘How am I to attempt glorious actions for the State when I can see from 
the start the hurdle of not duly rewarding Your Majesty’s vassals, who 
have tried hard to serve you?’
Finally, he argued that he was the person who best knew which subordinates 
were the most suitable for the job and which deserved to be rewarded, not the 
bureaucracy or the narrow regulations.205
What Barceló so insistently proposed to King Charles III was little short of 
revolutionary for the time, and very little or nothing could be done in that 
sense. However, there is no doubt we are in the presence of a true leader, a man 
who trained his subordinates, who demanded everything from them and who 
requested on their behalf the rewards that were their main motivation. And in 
light of the history of the Spanish navy, many more like Barceló were needed 
at that time, when efforts were not rewarded, and defeats, including the most 
shameful, often had little influence in sailors’ careers.
Barceló’s other activities
Barceló was not just the leading commander of a new kind of ship, the xebec, 
and expert in its suitable use, but he was also concerned with design changes: 
from the originals with around 20 cannons and lateen-rigged (aparejo latino), 
to the final ones with over 40 guns and with a pole-masted square rig (aparejo 
redondo de polacra). In this race the Algerians could not match the Span-
ish, although they tried. Barceló constantly experimented with changes and 
improvements. Some were carried out at his own expense, such as those called 
‘galleons’, lighter and more streamlined for hunting the enemy. He examined 
the best among the captured Algerian boats and proposed and obtained their 
incorporation into the navy.
He also developed the gunboats and their derivatives, creating a weapon that 
would give the navy many of the modest successes it achieved in the tragic years 
from 1797 to 1805, and which later on would be of great importance in the 
decisive defence of Cádiz from 1810 to 1812. For all of them he planned tactics 
that were deemed unorthodox, generally passing from boarding to pounding 
with artillery.
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However, he also had unusual sensibility and real concern for the service and 
for people. After the recovery of Menorca in 1783, which had been the Royal 
Navy’s base for many years since the War of Spanish Succession, with the logi-
cal benefits for its inhabitants, he was the driving force behind the creation of 
new buildings in Port Mahón. In a letter to the King he wrote:
‘With this, Sir, I promise not only to teach the Moors a lesson, but to 
favour the locals of Mahón who I see to be somewhat uprooted from 
that island, as they have not had their main trade and are lacking active 
business, thus managing to consolidate the serenity of these vassals and 
their families…’ 206
That was not all. Enriched by his many captures, he did not hesitate to invest 
part of his capital in shipping companies. However, not being interested in 
money, it is known that he handed out large amounts to the dockyards so they 
could finish building ships that had been stopped due to a lack of state funding, 
and he even refused to receive payment for expenses and statutory compensa-
tions. This wealth and generosity could well have been another reason for envy 
among many colleagues.207
Conclusion
The figure of Antonio Barceló, although well-known and popular, has been 
excessively trivialised, being seen as nothing more than a rough sea dog who 
beat the Algerian corsairs in epic combats between xebecs. Some of that can 
be seen in the Spanish navy which regularly gives his name to light units: from 
torpedo boats to patrol boats.
But as we have seen, Barceló’s achievements significantly surpass those 
achieved by his xebecs and gunboats, providing a much more complete pro-
fessional image of the man. And that a man with his limitations knew how to 
train and lead many of the best Spanish sailors of the eighteenth century, who 
fought to eradicate the damaging system of rewards and punishments of the 
age, despite which, and on his own merit, he managed to obtain the highest 
ranks combat after combat, is by no means the least of his contributions.
As the popular folk song says:
‘If the King of Spain had
Four like Barceló,
Gibraltar would be Spain.
And for the English, no.’
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‘This trinity [of war] is composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity ... 
of the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to 
roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which 
makes it subject to pure reason.’ (Clausewitz, On War, 1780–1831)
In his final book, entitled Nelson, the Admiral, Colin White explored the great 
British naval officer’s gift for leadership – his strong emotional ties to the pro-
fession, and his dedication to the service of his King and country, as well as 
his ability to build an outstanding team of officers with whom he shared these 
concerns and to whom he provided not only an example, but also affection 
and even friendship. Nelson’s great sensitivity to the harsh conditions endured 
by the crews of his ships and fleets won the admiration of even the least of his 
subordinates.208 
There can be no doubt that the quality of leadership in the three great 
 maritime powers of the period –  Great Britain, France and Spain – affected 
how international conflicts unfolded at sea between the years 1750 and 1850. 
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The present paper will compare two naval officers who faced each other at the 
culminating moment of their careers: the British admiral John Jervis (1735–
1823), commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, and the Spanish lieutenant 
general José de Mazarredo (1754–1812), commanding officer of the Escuadra 
del Océano and Spain’s premier naval officer in the eighteenth century. The 
arena for their confrontation was the close blockade of Cádiz by Jervis’s fleet 
between April 1797 and August 1799, during which Mazarredo was the archi-
tect of the port city’s defence. The former was a typical example of a great 
fleet commander in a highly efficient naval organisation such as the Royal 
Navy. The latter was a naval leader par excellence, whose career coincided 
with an acute economic and political crisis in Spain, when the navy was in 
rapid decline.
Andrew Lambert has reflected on the true ‘admiral’s art’, emphasising the 
importance of military command, management and leadership as key factors 
in the effective use of naval power in numerous spheres, such as diplomacy, 
deterrence and the projection of that power, among others.209 Modern leader-
ship theory also clearly distinguishes leadership from authority, administra-
tion, charisma and heroism. A military leader goes beyond these. It is not suf-
ficient to exercise control and wield great social influence, or to be effective in 
an organisational sense. To be effective in war, he must have a clear sense of 
what will bring victory and must wisely apply the values of his time to inspire 
collaborators, create a sense of teamwork and determination to win in the most 
unforgiving of competitive environments.210 
After situating the blockade of Cádiz in its strategic context within the 
Anglo-Spanish confrontation of 1796–1802, this paper will consider one 
aspect of the leader’s role: the choice of strategic pathways. That choice was 
between attritional warfare and a war of annihilation; between humanitarian-
ism and extreme violence. For Mazarredo, this was expressed in the protocols 
he observed in his interaction with his adversary John Jervis. 
Jervis and Mazarredo, parallel lives
Both Jervis and Mazarredo were effective fleet commanders within the mili-
tary context of their time. They were both good seamen and exhibited unre-
mitting concern for the training of their crews and the health and welfare of 
their subordinates. They had mastered all the areas of their profession: navi-
gation, strategy, tactics, logistics, organisational structure, naval intelligence, 
armaments and such like. They had also distinguished themselves in important 
campaigns throughout their careers. They even both participated in the Battle 
of Cape Spartel on 20 October 1782, during the American War of Independ-
ence. In their confrontation during 1797–9 they turned their respective fleets 
into   efficient machines – in Jervis’s case for destruction and for Mazarredo 
deterrence.211
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While Jervis was a magnificent fleet commander, he was not, in a sense, a 
true leader – he did not try to lead his subordinates, but to command them. 
His manner was harsh: he imposed a savage discipline on his crews, implac-
able towards mutineers and fierce in response to officers who voiced objections. 
According to Lambert, he was inflexible – always adopting a strategy of con-
frontation rather than cooperation. 
This can be seen clearly in his term as First Lord of the Admiralty (1801–04), 
which is generally considered to have been disastrous for the Royal Navy.212 
Some of his other defects had come to light earlier during his campaign in the 
Caribbean in 1794. Here, he revealed a rapaciousness for the booty of prize 
ships and a readiness to mistreat neutral ships in pursuit of this end. 
During his tenure as commander of the Mediterranean Fleet (1795–9), his 
inflexibility made it impossible to create a true team. He was highly critical of 
the divisional commanders who were under his orders and merciless towards 
those whom he considered to be ineffective captains. He was only able to 
connect with a small group of young and ambitious officers, such as Nelson, 
Troubridge, Collingwood, Fremantle, Miller and Hood. It is true that he was 
genuinely concerned about the health and welfare of his crews and that he was 
sometimes generous with the common sailor. However, these gestures were in 
stark contrast to the public mistreatment of his men, which exacerbated the 
social antagonism between his officers and sailors. 
Mazarredo was entirely different – displaying what might now be considered 
a true naval leadership. In the words of a contemporary, he was phenomenal, 
‘the Hercules from Biscay’, displaying boundless energy and capacity for work. 
A well-educated philanthropist, he was part of Spain’s enlightened military 
elite. He perfectly combined knowledge of science and maritime warfare. He 
was a sponsor and organiser of the most important scientific institutions and 
expeditions of his time. He was also a distinguished author of seven books on 
naval warfare, in addition to the famous naval ordinances, published in 1793. 
As ambassador to Algiers, he was responsible for the signing of the preliminary 
peace accords with the Regency in June 1785. He was also a good diplomat for 
naval affairs to First Consul Bonaparte in Paris, when the Escuadra del Océano 
was stationed in Brest from 1799 to 1801.
His gifts for leadership allowed him to put together teams that made the most 
of the abilities of some of his subordinates. The list of illustrious officers who 
served with him in the Escuadra del Océano (1797–1801) is impressive: offic-
ers such as Gravina, Álava, Churruca, Alcalá Galiano, Valdés, Vargas, Uriarte, 
Cisneros, Villavicencio, Nava and Espinosa were among many who were later 
to become heroes at Trafalgar.
Standing out above them all was the future lieutenant general Antonio de 
Escaño (1752–1814), who was for decades Mazarredo’s inseparable collabora-
tor. The pair operated perfectly together on many campaigns and left a deep 
impression on their fellow naval commanders. Together they built an innova-
tive team that exemplified the spirit of service to their country.
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However, there was a further difference between Jervis and Mazarredo  – 
Mazarredo lacked Jervis’s political sense. Jervis’s antipathy towards the nobil-
ity did not stop him from seeking their support in order to realise his profes-
sional and political ambitions. He made good use of his family and political 
connections, being a member of Parliament from 1783 until his death.213 
Mazarredo, on the other hand, followed a very different trajectory. In contexts 
that were favourable to the navy, he was able to work effectively with the politi-
cal leaders of the state. This was the case in his collaboration with Secretary 
of the Navy Antonio Valdés (1783–95) and Secretary of State Mariano Luis 
de Urquijo (1798–1800). However, Mazarredo’s character and professionalism 
were incompatible with bending to the sensibilities of powerful men where he 
felt the interests of the navy were at risk. He was incapable of submitting to his 
superiors when he believed that he was in the right, and his candour at times 
mingled with naivety. All of this created difficulties for him, including being 
politically outcast during some of the most crucial years of the Spanish-British 
War (1795–7 and 1804–8), the very times when the disastrous battles of Cape 
St Vincent (14 February 1797) and Trafalgar (21 October 1805) took place. 
This crisis for the Bourbon dynasty was a long and trying time for a leader like 
him, forced to watch the decline of a navy that on so many other occasions he 
had helped save from disaster.
Context of the Anglo-Spanish War (1796–1802)
When Spain declared war on Great Britain in October 1796, the country was 
pursuing political aims that were consistent with a huge shift in its diplomacy. 
Throughout the eighteenth century, the Spanish Empire was caught between 
two giants that were often at war with one other: France and Great Britain. 
With countless territories and interests spread all over the globe, long-term 
neutrality was an impossible policy for a nation as significant as Spain. In 1796, 
faced with limited options for manoeuvre on the international stage, the Sec-
retary of State, Manuel Godoy, chose the lesser of two evils, an alliance with 
France, through the instrument of the Treaty of San Ildefonso, a defensive pact 
signed in August of that year. It was an ‘unnatural’ agreement, between a Cath-
olic monarchy and a regicide, secular republic, but it arose out of the specific 
political situation of the moment. Through it, the Spanish monarchy sought to 
check French expansionism. For Spain it would have been suicide to remain at 
odds with such a powerful neighbour, which throughout much of the century 
had been restrained through the so-called ‘Family Pacts’. Another of Spain’s 
political objectives was to thwart British ‘ambition’ in European and colonial 
seas, which had led to over 100 years of friction, most recently evidenced in 
the Nootka Sound incident in 1790. Spain continued to have many grievances 
against Great Britain: the centuries-long English contraband trade with Spain’s 
American colonies, corsair activity in Corsica – to which Great Britain turned 
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a blind eye – and the restitution of Gibraltar. Moreover, the Spanish monarchy 
accused its erstwhile ally in the war against revolutionary France of disloyalty.214
In this war, Spain’s military objective was consistent with the  traditional idea of 
attritional warfare associated with the ancien régime.215 When the  Spanish mon-
archy declared war on Great Britain, it was a preventive move.  Spanish policy 
was not to seek out and destroy British power at sea, but rather by the  presence 
and cooperation of the allied fleets present a strong means of  deterrence – a 
‘fleet in being’ – to act as a restraint on the superiority of the Royal Navy. Dur-
ing the talks in Basel in 1795, the French had encouraged the Spanish to form 
a confederation of maritime powers of Northern Europe to further counteract 
British superiority at sea. It was essentially a defensive policy aimed at main-
taining the status quo in Europe and the Americas. 
Great Britain’s military objective in 1796 was very different from that of her 
opponents. Once war had been declared, Great Britain worked tenaciously to 
get Spain to end its alliance with France. Another of its political goals – a con-
stant theme in its foreign diplomacy – was opening Spanish colonial markets to 
British shipping and trade.
During the second half of the eighteenth century, Great Britain had increas-
ingly practised the war of destruction: ‘absolute war’ or ‘the absolute of war’, 
which Clausewitz would define years later. The wars of the French Revolu-
tion and their consequences accelerated this process. The defence of British 
national interests and the Napoleonic Wars would soon crystallise in a total war 
between nations. The ‘hostile intentions’ of a government towards the enemy 
would become ‘hostile sentiments’ among its people.216
During the period 1797–9 the Royal Navy once again pursued the destruc-
tion of Spanish fleets in decisive battles, in addition to inflicting great damage 
to her maritime trade, through privateering and the blockade of her princi-
pal ports. Special emphasis was put on the traditional policy of interrupting 
 Spanish colonial trade to the Americas, which, for two centuries, was a key 
source of financing for the Spanish monarchy. The ultimate goal of this strategy 
was to starve the Spanish economy of bullions thereby limiting the capacity of 
the monarch to finance the war and exerting pressure on public opinion so that 
the people would demand peace from their government. 
The strategies of Jervis and Mazarredo, 1797–9
With these different strategic objectives, the strategies deployed by the 
two antagonists were also very different.217 With Spain’s declaration of war 
in October 1796 and the advance of the French armies in Italy, Jervis was 
obliged to abandon his bases in the Mediterranean, including the important 
bases in Corsica and Elba. In December of that year, Jervis was in Lisbon, 
which would serve as the winter base of the Mediterranean Fleet for a time. 
This withdrawal served only to incite discontent among his crews and British 
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public opinion, which now supported war of annihilation with Spain more 
than ever.
Jervis was subsequently the architect of the close blockade of Spanish ports in 
1797, especially Cádiz, the key to colonial trade. With this blockade he contin-
ued the same strategy that he had employed in Toulon and Leghorn (Livorno) 
during the previous year. The blockade was intended to force Mazarredo to 
bring his squadron out of Cádiz and engage Jervis in battle. The British admiral 
had full confidence in his fleet of 23 ships of the line, after the victory over the 
Spanish fleet in Cape St Vincent in February 1797. 
The blockade of Cádiz began in April 1797 and continued after the end of 
Jervis’s command until 1808, when Britain started backing the Spanish rebellion 
against Napoleon. Jervis anchored a squadron very close to Cádiz, the Inshore 
Squadron, initially under the command of Rear Admiral Horatio  Nelson, with 
the bulk of the fleet continuously making long tacks out to sea, like a military 
parade of naval power, in sight of the Bay of Cádiz. On other occasions he 
anchored at Rota. During the winter season, Jervis took his fleet to Lisbon, 
leaving the surveillance squadron off Cádiz. Sometimes, bad weather forced 
him to draw near to the Bay of Tangiers. It was an enormous feat of navigation, 
logistics and naval intelligence. The blockade was so effective that 1797 was the 
worst year for Spanish-American trade in all of recent history.218
Moreover, Jervis had to carry out other missions. He had to prevent the allied 
squadrons at Toulon, Cartagena, Cádiz and Ferrol from rendezvousing; protect 
Portuguese trade and sovereignty; neutralise possible threats to Gibraltar; and 
carry out cruising missions in the Mediterranean to diminish French pressure 
on the Kingdom of Naples and the Two Sicilies. 
Jervis’s strategy was to compel the Spanish into a decisive battle, in order to 
diminish their operational capability. He tried to force Mazarredo to come out 
of the bay with his fleet and engage in battle by shelling Cádiz on the nights 
of 3 and 5 July 1797. Action against enemy trade was another facet of this war 
of annihilation. The abortive assault on Santa Cruz de Tenerife by a squadron 
under Nelson’s command at the end of July 1797 is the most significant example 
of this policy. 
For his part, Mazarredo recognised the weakness of his fleet at Cádiz. The 
Spanish navy in 1797 was a shadow of its former strength. The Cádiz squadron 
could effectively arm only 21 ships of the line and later had to lower this num-
ber to 19. Mazarredo’s response, therefore, had to be nuanced. In the first place, 
he accepted the inevitability of the Cádiz blockade by Jervis’s fleet. However, 
he sought unceasingly to wear down both its physical power and the combat 
morale of the enemy through a strategy of active defence. To protect the city 
and the fleet he developed what were called ‘subtle forces’, which followed the 
model of the flotille a la hollandaise and which had had so much success in 
the Great Siege of Gibraltar (1779–82). Within two months of having taken 
command, Mazarredo had more than 100 smaller vessels, armed with cannons 
and mortars, the most important being the gunboats.219 He was thus able to 
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 neutralise the shelling by the British in July 1797, and these units were a thorn 
in the side of the enemy throughout the blockade.
He also made the most of the few opportunities that arose in this war of 
attrition to prevent the total interruption of Spain’s trade with its colonies and 
to weaken the enemy’s naval power. With the help of Escaño and his team, 
he organised a fleet of 21 ships in Cádiz also within two months, although it 
was a ‘fleet in being’ only since there were severe shortages in terms of sea-
men and gunners. He never granted Jervis the opportunity of a decisive battle, 
but he did surprise his rival when he took his fleet out to sea on the night of 
6 February 1798. For a week it sailed towards Cape St Vincent in pursuit of 
the British surveillance squadron, and then returned to its base. This sortie 
raised the morale of the fleet and the people of Cádiz and was applauded by 
the government.
Leadership values
In the Anglo-Spanish conflicts between 1776 and 1815 there seems to have 
been a shift between two traditional conceptions of armed conflict; away from 
attritional warfare towards a war of annihilation and the concept of total war. 
Attritional warfare was the ancien régime’s customary form of armed conflict. 
It was dynastic and conventional in nature, waged between kings, and limited 
in duration. It was a ‘war of cabinets’, where strategic manoeuvring took prece-
dence over battle. It had concrete objectives, such as the defence or break-up of 
a commercial system, redrawing of borders or the conquest of territory. Once 
this objective was met (or could not be met), the parties promptly negotiated 
peace to limit their losses. The war of annihilation goes far further. It pursues 
the destruction of the enemy’s material and military resources through decisive 
battles, burning down dockyards and warehouses, dismantling fortifications, 
plundering settlements and harvests. The objectives or ambitions could be far 
wider, encompassing the collapse of the enemy as a political or economic entity. 
The eighteenth century saw both types of conflicts. Neither conflicted with the 
values of the Enlightenment, but the strategy of annihilation became more 
prominent as the French Revolution produced more implacable hostilities at a 
fundamental ideological level and mobilised societies which had the resources 
to prosecute wars more ferociously over time. 
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars thus mark the dawn of 
total warfare, which was to become an increasingly common form of armed 
conflict in centuries to come. These conflicts involved a country’s entire pop-
ulation, by way of universal and compulsory enlistment, and the use of all the 
resources belonging to a community, which had become united around the 
ideology of the nation. War was now a conflict between peoples. This shift 
coincided with the emergence in European society of new sentiments of a 
pre-Romantic variety.
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This evolution of violence was studied in detail by Clausewitz in the decades 
following the war. For this military theorist, ‘absolute war’ or ‘the absolute of 
war’ was the not the same as ‘real war’. The former gave primacy to the political 
realm while the latter was the day-to-day practice of war which tended towards 
pure violence, in which the political end was subordinate to the paroxysm of 
fighting. The annihilation of the enemy was a product of the reality of war itself. 
For Clausewitz, the effective conduct of war depended on establishing a bal-
ance between the components of the trinity of war mentioned above: violence, 
the game of chance and instrument of policy.
Depending on the duration and importance of a particular conflict, the tran-
sition from hostile intentions to hostile sentiment occurred with greater or 
lesser ease. Daily life had a direct influence on the emotional world of the fight-
ers. It was a context in which threat and uncertainty reigned. In battle – ‘the 
first-born son of war’ – this tension reached a climax. As the scene of survival, 
death and destruction, battle catalysed hostile sentiment among the protago-
nists, as well as their ambition and their eagerness for glory. The conduct dem-
onstrated by Jervis and Mazarredo during the Cádiz blockade of 1797–9 cor-
responds respectively to the conception of the war of annihilation, in the case 
of the British admiral, and that of attritional warfare in the case of his Spanish 
counterpart.220 This naval operation also allows us to examine the change in 
Jervis’s day-to-day conduct: that is, his transition from conducting ‘absolute 
war’ to ‘real war.’
Attitudes towards the enemy
Under the circumstances of the blockade, the British admiral alternated 
between two extremes. On the one hand, he was frustrated by having been 
expelled from the Mediterranean and by not being able to destroy Mazarredo’s 
fleet, which lay out of reach at anchor in Cádiz. On the other, he praised the 
virtues of the Spanish crews.
One of his protégés, Rear Admiral Nelson, epitomised the hostile sentiment. 
In November 1796, in spite of the allies’ superior numbers, he was confident 
that Jervis would defeat the enemy and make Spain pay dearly for its interfer-
ence in the Franco-British conflict. When Jervis’s fleet pulled out of the Medi-
terranean in January 1797, Nelson again demonstrated his rancour towards the 
Spanish – referring to them pejoratively as the Dons – for having declared war 
on Great Britain.221
Yet Nelson and Jervis admired their opponents’ courage. The former praised 
the valiant conduct of Jacob Stuart, the commander of a frigate captured in 
December 1796, and Miguel Tryason, the leader of a flotilla of gunboats, whose 
barge was taken by Nelson after a tough hand-to-hand struggle in the course 
of the famous night action that took place on 3 July 1797, in Cádiz Bay.222 In 
the spring of 1797 Jervis defended the magnificent performance of Moreno, a 
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division leader of the Spanish fleet during the Battle of Cape St Vincent, at his 
court martial in Cádiz.223 
For his part, Mazarredo also alternated between criticism and admiration of 
his enemy. In August 1795, at the time of the Peace of Basel and the end of the 
Spanish alliance with the United Kingdom, he criticised Great Britain’s zeal for 
overseas domination through the destruction of the Spanish and French navies:
‘England with its sea moat, England with its industry and its navy, 
will be master of the world for many years hence, and the stronger its 
dominion becomes the longer the calamities will continue on the con-
tinent of Europe. It will pay for these calamities with money, cementing 
her superiority.’224
But in the same letter he recognised the positive qualities of his adversary, the 
British virtue of fostering scientific study and technical advances in the service 
of naval warfare – in sum, the search for perfection: 
‘But beware, her Navy is formidable. It is what matters to her. It’s her 
great object of study… There is nothing that she will not put to the test. 
There is no new advance that she will not immediately adopt... Let us 
not deceive ourselves with flattering ideas about honour, pride, and 
goodwill. Will alone is not enough in the Navy. It is necessary to distil 
the means of making will fruitful, as the English do…’
War of destruction
All was fair in the conflicts at the end of the century of the Enlightenment. 
For example, the British used a false flag to take a Spanish merchant vessel by 
surprise at the beginning of the blockade.225 We also witness a change in Jervis’s 
attitude towards the war. In May 1797 he worried about the shots fired by his 
fleet at the gunboats and batteries in Rota doing harm to the civilian popula-
tion.226 But two months later, he gives a series of justifications for his decision 
to shell Cádiz.227
Among Jervis’s fleet there were crews that had participated in the general 
mutiny in England during April and May 1797. This was true of the ship The-
seus, whose command was handed over to Nelson when it arrived in Cádiz that 
spring. It was necessary to keep these sailors occupied and disciplined, and 
operations such as the bombing of Cádiz served this purpose. 
Jervis also attempted to sow panic in the civilian population through the 
destruction of property and the killing of some of the city’s inhabitants. This 
strategy was intended to influence public opinion to pressure Mazarredo into 
leaving the bay and engaging in battle.
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From the invention of the bombship in the 1680s, the threat of or the actual 
shelling of towns from the sea had been common practice in the eighteenth 
century, but this was the first time in living memory that the British had shelled 
a city in metropolitan Spain, attacking the property and the lives of civilians, 
and it was strongly denounced in Spain. It is symptomatic that there is an omi-
nous silence in the documentation of the two antagonists at this juncture: there 
was no correspondence at all between Jervis and Mazarredo during most of 
the month of July. A letter written by Nelson to his commander in the midst 
of the operation provides an accurate reflection of the hostile sentiment that 
motivated the British, who were frustrated at not being able to force the enemy 
fleet into a sortie:
‘News from Cádiz, by a Market-boat, that our Ships did much dam-
age; the Town was on fire in three places; a shell that fell in a Convent 
destroyed several priests (that no harm, they will never be missed); that 
plunder and robbery was going on – a glorious scene of confusion …’228
Although this news was false, it confirms that Nelson was a staunch advocate 
for war of annihilation. 
Everything said up to now contrasts with the view of war taken by Mazarredo. 
Nelson was powerfully influenced by his Christian faith, but also by his unmov-
able determination to win against those whom he saw as heretics and atheist 
regicides. Mazarredo, on the other hand, was guided by his Christian spirit 
in a different way. He sought to wear down his powerful and arrogant enemy 
through whatever damage could be done to his commerce and his navy. It was 
necessary to combine bravery and mercy. The object of war was not to kill one’s 
opponents but to defeat them in order to achieve peace. Unnecessary death was 
to be avoided and the defeated were to be treated with generosity.229 
Humanitarianism
War, whether it was of attrition or annihilation, should have its countervailing 
forces. The strong emotions that it aroused demanded the existence of a plan 
to harmonise them, according to Clausewitz. With respect to the blockade of 
Cádiz, this was manifest in two different aspects: the humanitarian treatment 
of the adversary and the observance of protocol.
The exchange of prisoners was dictated by practical considerations. The care 
for and surveillance of numerous enemies on board a ship already brimming 
with people was a difficult task. The return of prisoners also constituted an act 
of reciprocal generosity towards individuals who had suffered hardship and 
thus tempered the horrors of war.230
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This situation is reflected in Jervis and Mazarredo’s correspondence, which 
served to clarify misunderstandings and helped to facilitate coastal fishing, 
coastal trade and neutral commerce:
‘Your Excellency will understand perfectly that on both points I adhere 
closely to the tacit convention of nations, that proper mutual considera-
tion should not be disregarded by reason of being at war.’231
Once the close blockade of Cádiz was established in April 1797, Jervis moved 
quickly to permit neutral commerce, at Mazarredo’s request.232 The same was 
true of coastal fishing. Jervis also gave permission for fishermen to perform 
their labours in the bay and on the Cádiz coast. He reprimanded his captains 
when they were guilty of excesses towards the fishermen and punished a pri-
vateer from Gibraltar for his poor treatment of a fisherman. He also dictated 
terms for tuna fishing in Conil and sardine fishing in Ayamonte. Jarvis’s tone in 
these letters is highly significant:
‘I am engaged in hostilities, by the orders of my Sovereign, whose 
highest displeasure I should most certainly incur if I did not exercise 
every degree of humanity towards them in acrid military operations 
… nothing will give me greater satisfaction than to soften the scourge 
of war, between the people of two nations who are formed to live 
in the friendship and esteem of each other, by every means in my 
power.’233
In contrast, Mazarredo was very cautious in this matter and prohibited deep-
sea fishing, since some fishermen made deals with the enemy. For example, he 
arrested the owners of fishing boats who arranged to sell produce to Jervis’s 
fleet.234 The same happened with coastal trading in basic necessities. For exam-
ple, Jervis released two Moroccan ships that were carrying meat and grain to 
Cádiz and the Spanish fleet.235 
However, war should not only be licit but also appear to be so. In accordance 
with the tacit laws of belligerent nations, Mazarredo conformed to the princi-
ple of not using merchant ships to relay messages between belligerent parties. 
From the beginning of the blockade, he refused any communications from the 
British relayed through fishermen or neutral vessels, even if related to matters 
of the utmost importance. To exchange letters, he alerted Jervis to have a ship 
of truce drop anchor in the entry channel, two miles beyond the shoals at the 
mouth to the Bay of Cádiz. There it would wait for a Spanish messenger to col-
lect the document on board.236 
Despite this fact, a fishing boat availed itself of this polite treatment at the 
hands of the British fleet to venture beyond the fishing grounds near the coast. 
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Nelson then accused the fisherman of spying and threatened to sink any and all 
ships that surpassed the agreed-upon limits.237
Mazarredo intervened in this matter, alleging that it was a Portuguese fish-
erman, who was fishing without his authorisation. As proof of good faith, he 
pointed out that the prohibition against using private citizens to carry out naval 
intelligence missions had allowed a brigantine from America to be captured by 
the blockading fleet.238
Protocol
In this theatre of war, the two naval leaders staged a performance –  concerning 
honour and public image –  of the gallant conduct that two civilised enemies 
should show one another.
The blockade of Cádiz and the bombing of the city did not prevent Jervis 
from commending Mazarredo’s good judgement and shrewdness, or the latter 
from extolling the humanity of the former, in highly obsequious language.239 
The two exchanged gifts throughout the campaign. On one occasion, Jervis 
sent Mazarredo some boxes with illustrations of plants and birds from America 
addressed to Charles IV that had been found on the frigate Ninfa, which had 
been captured by the British.240 At another point, the British admiral presented 
him with a box of cigars, with his emblem and card.241 Mazarredo sent Jervis a 
barrel of wine. Jervis in turn sent Mazarredo 36 bottles of beer and a barrel of 
salted meat, along with a recipe for curing it.
For the two antagonists, this show of courtesy is compatible with the war that 
they were waging. Mazarredo expressed it thus, when presenting Jervis with a 
hunting gun for his wife: 
‘Since the Countess of St Vincent takes so much pleasure in her duties 
in the countryside, and in accompanying her, her husband the Admiral 
might find it expedient to divert himself with hunting quail, Don Joseph 
de Mazarredo ventures to present Your Excellency with a Spanish piece 
for such an occasion and to beg him to deign to accept it as a reminder 
of his friendship, wholly reconcilable with their respective obligations in 
any circumstances.’242
The courtesies between the two foes began at the outset of the blockade. For 
example, Nelson sent word to Mazarredo that on 4 June, 1797, the fleet would 
perform a salute in honour of the birthday of the King of Great Britain, at 8 pm, 
and adds:
‘…and has desired me to mention it to your Excellency, that the Ladies 
at Cádiz may not be alarmed at the firing.’
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In response to which, after praising the urbanity expressed in Nelson’s letter, 
Mazarredo replied in the same cordial tone:
‘The Ladies of Cádiz, accustomed to the noisy rounds of salutes of the 
vessels of war, will sit and will hear what Sir John Jervis means to regale 
them with, for the evening of the 4th current, in honour of his Britannic 
Majesty’s birthday; and the general wish of the Spanish nation cannot 
but interest itself in so august a motive.’243
Today it seems strange to us that two weeks before the shelling of Cádiz by 
Jervis’s fleet, the latter would have asked for permission for a British officer and 
his wife to visit Cádiz, as if it were a stop on the Grand Tour. The Spanish com-
mander refused, with utmost diplomacy, citing reasons that tell us much about 
the nature of conventional war:
‘… making me equally regretful that, due to the appearance of the par-
ticular situation, it is not at my discretion that Madame Manfield and 
this gentleman be satisfied in their curiosity to see Cádiz; since among 
the public, unacquainted with how the movements of individuals might 
be combined with the duties of arms, it would cause a sensation, char-
acteristic of this lack of acquaintance, for a lady to appear, especially 
one of her distinction, and in particular since the General would not be 
deprived of honouring her as would befit the occasion.’244
In August 1797, Mazarredo’s diplomacy was again on display, when he enquired 
after the health of Rear Admiral Nelson and Captain Fremantle, both wounded 
in the recent attack on Santa Cruz de Tenerife. Jervis in turn extolled the senti-
ments of honour and humanity in his opponent.245
Epilogue
In conclusion, Jervis excelled as a fleet commander and Mazarredo as a naval 
leader in the period of transition to total war. Jervis perfected the strategy of the 
close blockade, utilised by Great Britain during that period to such disastrous 
effect for her adversaries. He was also one of the promoters of the professionalisa-
tion of the Royal Navy. For his part, Mazarredo helped to save the Bourbon navy 
from further disasters. In spite of innumerable difficulties, the Spanish navy was 
able to fulfil its function as deterrent in contemporary international relations. 
What is more, Mazarredo inspired an entire naval ethos among his subordinates, 
a legacy that would remain part of the institution for many years to come.
Notwithstanding this, there remains much to be explored around the values 
of a leader. The war of annihilation, developed by the British during the Cádiz 
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blockade, reached its fullest expression in the shelling of the city in July 1797. 
Fortunately, it did not extend to its logical conclusion, the destruction of the 
city, but it represented a ratcheting up of hostile sentiment – a preliminary to 
total war during the Napoleonic period. Spain would have first-hand experi-
ence of this new state of affairs before long, during the Peninsular War.
Some historians argue that war of annihilation was an inevitable develop-
ment during the decades around the turn of the nineteenth century, since the 
survival of nations such as Great Britain depended on this new view of warfare 
and its strategy. The ruthless bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807, which was, 
curiously, criticised by Jervis, constitutes ample proof of this.246 
From this perspective, attritional warfare was becoming a thing of the past. 
Mazarredo and those who thought like him did not anticipate this new interna-
tional state of affairs. The violence wrought by incipient nationalism and total 
war, beginning with the French Revolution, demanded a new approach to wag-
ing war in which the end justified the means. Once again, as had been the case 
in the vicious religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, inflict-
ing terrible collateral damage on the civilian population was, once more, part 
of the game.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Luis María de Salazar, Ángel Laborde 
and the Defence of Cuba, 1825–9: A  
Study in Combined Leadership
Carlos Alfaro Zaforteza
King’s College London
On 9 December 1824 the last Royalist army in the American continent was 
defeated at the plateau of Ayacucho. The battle caused the fall of the Viceroy-
alty of Peru and is generally considered the end of the Spanish American wars 
of independence. It is generally less well known that hostilities went on in the 
Gulf-Caribbean area for a further five years. Once free from Royalist forces in 
the mainland, the Colombian government started preparations for a combined 
attack, together with Mexico, on Cuba and Puerto Rico. The objective was two-
fold: to eliminate a serious threat to the independence of both states, and to 
end Spanish rule in America. The critical military element in this enterprise 
was seapower. This paper analyses the actions of two men who led the  Spanish 
navy at that time; they succeeded in providing adequate defence for the island 
of Cuba in particularly difficult conditions. It is true that the United States, 
Britain and France opposed such an alteration of the Caribbean status quo. 
Yet it was not clear how far they were willing to go in this direction, nor if they 
would be able to act in time. The Colombian and Mexican governments, as well 
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as the Spanish, harboured serious doubts as to whether these powers could 
or would effectively deter patriot plans. The Spanish government, therefore, 
rightly assumed that it must rely on its own means.
Spanish historiography has largely ignored this achievement, even though it 
was arguably the most creditable performance put up by the navy during the 
Spanish AmericanWars of Independence. The two key personalities concerned 
were the Navy Minister, Luis María de Salazar, and the commander of the Apos-
tadero de la Habana (Havana Station), Ángel Laborde. This paper is made up of 
three sections: the nature of the threat, the situation and main actors, and the 
response. Success was the result of effective leadership and close cooperation, 
despite the obstacle of distance – 4,000 nautical miles between Madrid and 
Havana, and the appalling state of the navy and the country.
The threat
When Britain recognised Buenos Aires, Colombia and Mexico, the Spanish 
government was concerned that they would enjoy easier access to credit. This 
was essential to acquire and operate a sizeable naval force. Colombian Vice-
President Francisco de Paula Santander was especially sanguine about naval 
affairs. He planned to use the fleet to help Mexico take the fortress of San Juan 
de Ulúa and blockade or destroy the Spanish squadron in Havana. For this 
purpose, he purchased one ship of the line and one frigate from the Swed-
ish navy and ordered two powerful frigates to be built in the United States.247 
The  Mexican government, for its part, fortuitously came into possession of the 
Spanish ship of the line Asia. In June 1825 the crew mutinied and went over 
to the insurgents. By September, as the Asia started on its long journey from 
Monterrey to Veracruz, the only units of any consequence in the port of Verac-
ruz were a converted merchant frigate and two brigs, which had been acquired 
through a London firm. Mexico also had some minor vessels being built in the 
United States, and was in negotiations to buy a frigate and 84-gun ship from 
Sweden.248 These ships presented an imposing array, since it was assumed that 
they would soon be ready for combat. By comparison, the only major ships of 
the Havana squadron were two frigates.
Initially, difficulties in getting reliable intelligence caused confusion and 
alarm. In September the consul in New York reported on the ships being built 
locally for the patriots. The two Colombian 64-gun frigates were especially 
worrying; they were superior to anything the Spaniards had. A Swedish ship 
of the line had also arrived, to be converted into another large frigate. The 
Mexican government was erroneously reported to have another 64-gun frigate 
under construction and several minor vessels.249 Incoming information about 
the Patriots’ capabilities was also unsettling. A report received in August 1825 
stated that one of the big Colombian frigates would be ready in a month. Sala-
zar hoped to have three frigates ready by the end of the year. He had originally 
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planned to send two to Cuba, as escorts of a troop convoy, and leave one in 
metropolitan waters. Yet he could not afford to run the risk of an attack on the 
convoy; a Colombian squadron including the new ship was more than a match 
for the two frigates and a brig of the escort, so he chose to add a third frigate. 
The decision was difficult, as it meant leaving metropolitan waters with nothing 
larger than a sloop, but reinforcing Cuba was top priority.250 Almost simultane-
ously, another event raised the threat level. In September Laborde’s last attempt 
to relieve San Juan de Ulúa failed. His force of two frigates, one sloop and two 
transports ran into a storm. Laborde’s flagship, the Sabina, was dismasted and 
had to return to Havana. Although damaged, the rest carried on, but turned 
back without a fight when a Mexican squadron interposed itself between them 
and the fortress. The battered ships took more than a month to repair. During 
this time the Apostadero’s largest serviceable units were two brigs. Cuba and 
its commerce were practically defenceless against naval attack. Of course, no 
ships were available for another relief expedition to San Juan de Ulúa, which 
finally surrendered in November. This caused an invasion panic in Cuba, dealt 
a heavy blow to Spanish morale and increased the sense of urgency about Cuba’s 
defencelessness. In December Salazar received another piece of intelligence: the 
patriots expected to have a fleet of two ships of the line and seven frigates ready 
for action in a month’s time.251
The difficulties which precluded the materialisation of these plans were not 
yet apparent in March 1826, when Mexico and Colombia concluded a for-
mal treaty to constitute a combined fleet based at Veracruz. It was to be com-
manded by an American naval officer, David Porter, a hero of the War of 1812; 
operations were to start at the end of May. The main objective was to destroy 
the Havana squadron.252 Due to lack of resources, the whole plan started fall-
ing apart almost from the outset. Yet some time elapsed before the Spanish 
authorities realised it. The view from Madrid was gloomy; distance magnified 
the problem; the country had no effective allies and few resources to draw on.
The situation and the men
By 1825 Spain was an impoverished country, not yet recovered from the rav-
ages of the war against Napoleon (1808–14). The staggering foreign debt, the 
end of the American silver supply and recurrent political strife precluded 
reconstruction. The navy’s condition was no better. During the French inva-
sion most ships were disarmed and the crews fought ashore; the dockyards 
were despoiled of every single valuable item, and the ships were allowed to 
decay for lack of maintenance. After the war, no ships were available to fight 
the American insurgents. In 1817 the government had to resort to purchasing 
a squadron of five ships of the line and three frigates from Russia. By mid-1825 
not a single ship of the line was in commission, and the number of frigates 
was reduced to three. Only Cádiz Dockyard, the main naval base, was able to 
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support this meagre force; new construction was out of the question. Only the 
personnel remained. A small core of naval officers had preserved their skills 
through continuous service afloat and action against the insurgents. However, 
they were demoralised by the old, worn-out materiel, bleak career prospects 
and erratic pay. In those years, the navy got only a fraction of its official budget. 
The resulting malaise added to Salazar’s material difficulties.
Only the Apostadero de la Habana had a regular budget and punctually 
paid its personnel. It was financed by the Cuban treasury, but the war brought 
new commitments, such as the relief of the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, on 
the  Mexican coast. By 1825 the island’s income could barely meet ordinary 
expenses, let alone wartime obligations. Help from the worse-off metropolitan 
treasury was out of the question. The dockyard, which had built so many ships 
in the previous century, was capable of only limited repair work; it lacked a dry 
dock, had a poor supply of naval stores, and labour costs in Havana were much 
higher than in the Peninsula. Moreover, the Apostadero’s naval administration 
was notoriously wasteful. Additionally, the island’s naval budget was burdened 
with the salaries of many retired and half-pay officers, which left little for mate-
riel expenses. In order to protect Cuban commerce, the island’s trading com-
munity had contributed generous sums to make up for the deficit, but without 
noticeable results. 
Even if all of the station’s ships were kept fully operational, 11 ships were far 
from enough to defend Cuba and Puerto Rico against invasion, escort relief 
convoys to San Juan de Ulúa and protect Spanish trade in the Gulf-Caribbean 
area. The station’s commander, Brigadier Miguel Gastón, considered that an 
adequate force should be made up of 26 ships, which meant more than dou-
bling the cost (see table).
The man in charge of coping with this situation was the navy minister, Luis 
María de Salazar y Salazar (1758–1838). He started his career as a naval officer, 
but soon ill health forced him to abandon service afloat. Nevertheless, his 
work as a naval administrator was outstanding. In 1792 he was called to serve 
in the Navy Ministry, under his relative General Mazarredo, one of the most 
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Annual cost (pesos) 650,000 1,500,000
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 influential naval officers at the turn of the century. In 1803 he was appointed 
Intendant of Ferrol Dockyard, where he continued to hone his skills. Dur-
ing the War of Independence, he was already so highly regarded that he was 
appointed finance minister of the Regency and later governor of Seville.254 After 
the war, Salazar served his first term as navy minister (1814–16). In 1820 the 
Liberals offered him the post, which he declined, but he accepted it from the 
Absolutists three years later. During his second term (1823–32) he ably ran the 
service for almost ten years under extreme penury and complex political cir-
cumstances. He enjoyed the respect of his fellow cabinet members and most of 
the officer corps. Though Salazar was a conservative, but not a recalcitrant one, 
most of the latter were Liberals. He was thus one of the few who could liaise 
with practically everybody, which made his work much easier.
Ángel Laborde y Navarro (1772–1834) was the commander of the Aposta-
dero de la Habana. He arrived in the Caribbean in 1820, to take command 
of a squadron based at Puerto Cabello, until the town was evacuated in 1823. 
He was then based at Havana, as deputy commander of the Apostadero. Dur-
ing these years he earned a reputation as a proactive, successful leader among 
friends and foes. Once he was appointed commander of the Havana Station he 
reversed traditional practice: he spent most of the time afloat, while his deputy 
took care of the dockyard and logistic support. Laborde always made sure that 
his men were punctually paid and well cared for, but he also expected them 
always to do their duty. 
Two examples illustrate this attitude. He would select only the ablest men in 
critical posts. An officer who had served under Laborde, and was in half-pay, 
managed to get a commission as commander of one of his frigates through 
his political connections in Madrid; he hoped to get his full pay again, which 
would allow him to maintain adequately his nine-child family. Laborde, who 
knew him well, rejected the appointment for two reasons. The officer had some 
ailments that impaired his health; his professional skills and knowledge lagged 
behind those of his colleagues, because he had shown no interest in nurturing 
them.255 This behaviour does not mean that he was not humane. During the 
two heavy storms cited below, officers lost most of their personal belongings, 
including expensive items such as chronometers and other navigation instru-
ments. Presumably on Laborde’s advice, the Havana Intendant provided the 
money to buy replacements, and Salazar approved the measure.256 In the dis-
tance, Salazar had to rely on Laborde’s professional judgement and leadership 
skills; it seems that he never regretted it.
The solution
Salazar’s response to the threat was to appoint the right man to lead the 
Havana squadron, trust him and provide him with the necessary materiel. His 
choice of Laborde was not exempt from controversy. The latter’s capabilities 
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were evident, but, as a captain, he was too junior for the post. Salazar allayed 
this difficulty by lowering the required rank, ostensibly to save expenses. In 
doing this he alienated several officers who believed that they were entitled 
to the post. Further, Gastón had not finished his full term; he was dismissed 
because the other island authorities, notably the Captain General, were dissat-
isfied with him.257 What Salazar expected from Laborde was not only first-class 
operational command, but also the effective implementation of administrative 
reform. To optimise operational readiness, all non-essential expenses were to 
be cut. This included sending back redundant personnel who had taken ref-
uge there during the Liberal period (1820–3) to secure their pay.258 Laborde’s 
appointment met with wide approval in Cuba and boosted the morale of the 
Apostadero’s personnel. He had a rapport not only with Salazar, but with the 
other Cuban authorities, which made for smooth, close collaboration. 
Shortage of ships in the Peninsula posed larger difficulties. The Captain Gen-
eral and the Intendant, as well as Laborde, asked for naval reinforcements to be 
sent urgently; to start with, they needed one ship of the line and two frigates.259 
The few ships still worth repairing needed substantial work to make them ser-
viceable again. However, before this was possible the dockyards themselves 
had to be refurbished, supplied with stores and provided with skilled labour. 
There was neither money nor time to do this; only the bare essentials could 
be restored. The dry docks at Cádiz and the channel that linked them with the 
harbour were silted. To refit the two ships of the line they had to be dredged and 
their doors repaired.260 Cádiz was the main naval base of the fleet; Ferrol and 
Cartagena were simply abandoned. To have the ships repaired within time and 
cost, Salazar resorted to private contractors. They used the dockyards’ existing 
facilities, brought their own equipment, materials and personnel, and did the 
job.261 In this way Salazar obviated the need to restore the costly dockyard infra-
structure; he had only to care about paying for each individual task.
An unexpected circumstance produced the necessary funds: a failed crop 
threatened famine in Andalusia and the Mediterranean coastal areas. To pre-
vent this, the government temporarily lifted the ban on foreign grain. The 
duties levied on the import licences were allocated to the navy. Had he not 
benefited from this windfall, the resourceful Salazar would presumably have 
come up with a solution. Thanks to this fortuitous event, he was able to kick-
start the construction of the frigates Iberia and Lealtad, and begin refit work on 
the ships of the line Guerrero and Soberano.262 The first two had been laid down 
at Ferrol Dockyard in 1821, but construction had stopped for lack of money; 
Guerrero and Soberano were old eighteenth-century 74-gun ships which had 
been lying in utter neglect for years at Ferrol Dockyard.
Due to the extreme penury of the treasury, competition for money among 
the different government departments was intense; corruption was rife at all 
levels, and the state administrative machinery was in disarray. In these cir-
cumstances it was not unusual for sizeable amounts to be diverted from their 
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original purpose, or simply disappear. Salazar knew this only too well to trust 
the existing bureaucracy. Navy paymasters in the port towns were supposed to 
collect the proceeds of the said import licences and transfer them directly to the 
contractors. Salazar issued strict orders for the money to be transferred directly 
to Madrid instead. There it was to be kept by the Navy Paymaster General in a 
special safe with two keys (the second was to be kept by another trusted offi-
cial) in his office; Salazar was to be instantly informed of every movement in 
and out. To keep a permanent watch on the safe, the paymaster was instructed, 
as well, to stay overnight in the building, together with a naval infantry guard 
of hand-picked men.263 This episode illustrates the administrative chaos and 
the feeling of insecurity in Spain at the time. Salazar also had to cope with the 
resulting malaise. 
After 1808 the number of ships and the naval budget were greatly reduced, 
but the Navy List was still packed with officers. Although only a small propor-
tion could actually be employed, the rest were still entitled to their salaries. 
Salazar found out that the pay distribution was haphazard; some inactive offic-
ers were getting paid more regularly than their colleagues in active service. The 
latter were not getting more than six payments a year. Occasionally, some offic-
ers were reluctant to sail unless they were paid some of their arrears; unlike 
seamen, they had to buy their own food. Salazar dealt with this comparative 
injustice through a tighter control of the paymasters and a clear set of priorities. 
He made sure that personnel serving afloat were paid punctually. A compara-
tive grievance, and a major cause of low morale and lack of discipline, was thus 
removed.264 These reforms in the materiel and the personnel were indispensa-
ble to supply Laborde with the necessary means for action.
In December 1825 three frigates and a convoy arrived in Havana. Shortly 
after, the frigates Sabina and Casilda, from the Apostadero de La Habana, were 
repaired after the damage they sustained trying to relieve San Juan de Ulúa. 
Hence, by the beginning of 1826, Laborde was able to deploy a squadron of 
five frigates, soon reinforced by a ship of the line. At last he could conduct the 
offensive strategy that he was used to.265 As soon as the Guerrero (74) joined his 
squadron, in March 1826, he sailed to Cartagena (Colombia), where the enemy 
fleet lay. It was made up of one ship of the line, three frigates, two sloops and 
four minor warships, but the ship of the line and one frigate were not combat-
ready, and there were not enough personnel to man the rest.266 The Colom-
bian squadron, therefore, was unable to leave the harbour and meet Laborde’s 
challenge. The Spanish fleet was left free to sail along the Venezuelan coast, to 
encourage Royalist guerrillas and politically destabilise the country. This politi-
cal mission was of the utmost importance, both to keep the enemy busy and 
as part of a plan to restore Spanish rule. Four months later Laborde set sail 
again with the same objective. General Páez, the governor of Venezuela, had 
rebelled against the central government at Bogotá; these political dissensions 
made the country more vulnerable to Royalist action. Laborde was to collect a 
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battalion and money in Santiago de Cuba to support the Venezuelan Royalists. 
Yet the operation was aborted by an unexpected event. As the squadron sailed 
through the Bahama Channel, it ran into a hurricane. The ships were dispersed 
and heavily damaged; they limped back to Havana under jury rig.267 Due to the 
limited facilities of Havana Dockyard, the repairs took two months. The large 
number of masts and spars required were not available in Cuba, and had to be 
ordered from the United States. In the meantime, Commodore David Porter, in 
the service of the Mexican navy, seized the opportunity to harass Cuban com-
merce. He took advantage of the benevolent neutrality of the US government 
to base his squadron at Key West, but Spanish forces blockaded him there and 
captured his best ship.268
The next time that Laborde received demands to support Royalist guerril-
las in Venezuela, he waited until December, when the hurricane season was 
over. He cruised off the Venezuelan coast until February, but was unable to 
establish contact. This time his force was reduced to the Guerrero, Iberia and a 
brig. He did not expect substantial opposition now that the real capabilities of 
the enemy were known. By 1827 the shortage of officers, seamen and money 
had become so acute that the Colombian navy had had to disarm most of its 
ships; it was no longer a combat-worthy force. The Mexican navy experienced 
the same difficulties. After a long journey around Cape Horn, the ship of the 
line Congreso Mexicano (formerly the Spanish Asia) finally arrived in Veracruz, 
only to be decommissioned.269 On the other hand, the Apostadero de la Habana 
went from strength to strength. 
In 1828 Salazar sent the ship of the line Soberano and the frigate Restauración, 
and the Cuban treasury could now comfortably support its increasing naval 
strength. The naval superiority thus achieved enabled the setting up of regu-
larly scheduled convoys between Havana and Cádiz without unduly weakening 
the defence of Cuba. Additionally, a fully fledged expedition against Mexico 
was planned for the following year. The landing at Tampico in July 1829 was 
supported by just one ship of the line and two frigates, just a fraction of the 
station’s total strength. The enemy navies lay disarmed in port. With enough 
ships and soldiers in Cuba, and no opposition at sea, another attempt at the 
re-conquest of Mexico was planned for 1830. Salazar even sent a third ship of 
the line. However, the outbreak of revolution in France diverted the Spanish 
government’s attention away from America. Colombia and Mexico were also 
absorbed by internal troubles: they had neither the capability nor the intention 
to continue hostilities. For all practical purposes, the war was finished.
Conclusions
The successful leadership displayed by Salazar and Laborde was instrumental 
in preserving Spanish rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico for the rest of the cen-
tury. The former’s acumen in selecting the latter, trusting him, and providing 
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him with the ships and men to do the job, succeeded in the face of appar-
ently insurmountable difficulties. The legacies of Salazar and Laborde, in naval 
policy and operational command respectively, exerted considerable influence 
in  nineteenth-century naval policy. The new emphasis on merit and results 
introduced a new ethos. The excessive forbearance of the previous-century 
establishment towards an officer’s failings or misconduct was at an end. During 
the reign of Queen Isabel II (1833–68), able administrators created an effective 
steam navy, run by experienced, competent officers, which effectively contrib-
uted to the defence of Cuba. Admiral Castro Méndez Núñez (1824–69) was the 
outstanding officer of this period. A worthy successor of Laborde, he ably led 
his men to victory in Mindanao, Santo Domingo and Callao.

CHAPTER TWELVE
Napier, Palmerston and Palmella in 1833: 
The Unofficial Arm of British Diplomacy 
Andrew Lambert
King’s College London
Captain Charles Napier’s service in the Portuguese Civil War combined a bril-
liant individual performance in the service of the Portuguese Constitutional 
Party with a vital contribution to the furtherance of British policy. 
The British Problem
In the long eighteenth century, relations between Britain and Portugal were 
based on the interconnected interests of trade and strategy. Britain had long 
maintained a leading position in Portuguese commerce: exchanging wool-
lens for wine, and in return providing security guarantees. The relationship 
was essentially symbiotic, as occasional attempts to alter it invariably revealed. 
While Britain was the more powerful, her need for the trade of Portugal and 
her empire, and access to the vital strategic harbour of Lisbon, were of such 
importance that Portugal could expect help in times of crisis, even if her gov-
ernment did not require it. 
 This relationship became more complex in the 1820s and early 1830s, as the 
old consensus at the heart of Portuguese politics, a politics complicated and 
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compromised by the long years of war and the loss of Brazil, began to frac-
ture.270 Following the death of King Joao VI in 1826, his elder son Dom Pedro, 
the Emperor of Brazil, had renounced the throne in favour of his daughter 
Donna Maria, and issued a constitutional charter. Donna Maria was to marry 
Pedro’s younger brother Dom Miguel, the Regent, when she came of age. In 
the event Miguel, who had already attempted to assume power in his father’s 
lifetime, encouraged by his mother, reneged on the agreement. The charter was 
unpopular in Portugal, and alarmed the King of Spain, who had his own prob-
lems. In 1828, after Prime Minister Wellington had removed the British troops 
sent by Canning in 1825, Miguel returned to Portugal, and broke his oath to 
Dom Pedro by proclaiming himself King. Miguel had the support of the great 
mass of the people, the clergy and the aristocracy. Wellington was preparing to 
recognise Miguel, if only for the sake of Portuguese stability and British influ-
ence, but the Whigs, influenced by Portuguese liberals, loathed Miguel and 
attacked Wellington’s policy. 
 Before any decisions could be taken Wellington’s Ministry was defeated, and 
replaced by Earl Grey’s Whig/Liberal coalition in late 1830. The new foreign 
secretary, Lord Palmerston, was Canning’s political heir. While he was unable 
to act against Miguel, British resources being stretched by the Belgian Crisis 
and other concerns nearer to home, Palmerston declared that he would not give 
Miguel’s regime official recognition. Palmerston favoured the use of force, and 
lending support to the Constitutionalist movement led by Dom Pedro, since 
April 1831 the former Emperor of Brazil. However, Prime Minister Earl Grey 
was not prepared to go so far. Grey disliked Pedro as much as his brother.271 
Furthermore the majority in cabinet were opposed to any overt action, while 
the Tory opposition, led by Wellington, marshalled an impressive assault on the 
ministers over this issue. The impasse led to a marked reduction in British influ-
ence in Portugal and Spain, reopening concerns over the increasing penetration 
of French trade in the hitherto largely British-controlled Portuguese market. 
The domestic politics of the Reform Crisis would exert a powerful influence 
over policy towards Portugal, as would the concurrent crisis in Belgium, and a 
marked deterioration in Anglo-Russian relations after the Polish Revolt. Palm-
erston favoured a change of regime in Lisbon, but could not secure it by force, 
not least because of the complex relationship with the emerging Orléans regime 
in France. Consequently, he and Grey could only offer covert aid to the Pedroite 
invasion of the Azores, and then the landing at Oporto, which they were pre-
pared to disavow in Parliament. The key intermediary between Palmerston and 
the Constitutional Party was Marquis Palmella, who was often in London. He 
worked on Palmerston’s fears of another war across the Iberian peninsula, with 
the concomitant rise in French influence, to secure concessions, including the 
release of embargoed ships and men destined for the Constitutional forces. 
Unfortunately Palmella, among the most advanced members of the liberal 
coalition, was not trusted by Pedro. Consequently, while British policy-makers 
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favoured the liberals generally, they were almost equally anxious to promote 
the cause of Palmella. 
 In the spring of 1832 Grey agreed to increase the naval force stationed in 
the Tagus, ostensibly to deter Spanish intervention in support of Miguel. Still 
optimistic, Palmerston hoped this would secure the success of the Constitu-
tionalist attempt at Oporto. Instead Pedro and his troops were trapped in the 
city, besieged by a larger Miguelite army. Portugal had not risen to be liberated; 
if anything the war confirmed the popularity of Miguel, who, for all his per-
sonal failings, espoused many of the core values of a proud people. Attempts to 
resolve the problem by bringing Spain to support the Constitutional case were 
doomed by the equally troubled succession crisis then looming in Madrid, 
where the imminent death of King Ferdinand would place his infant daughter 
on the throne, while her uncle tried to establish a superior claim.272 
 By mid-1833 British government policy was in tatters, condemned in the 
House of Lords. Fortunately the House of Commons supported the ministers, 
but that was only a breathing space. Palmerston was close to despair. Anticipat-
ing that the final defeat of Dom Pedro was imminent, he instructed the Admi-
ralty to send additional ships into the Douro, to protect British lives in case 
Oporto fell to a Miguelite assault. The Miguelite foreign minister Santarem was 
advised that any interference with the British ships would be deemed casus 
belli.273 These were desperate times, and they called for desperate measures and 
desperate men to execute them. 
Charles Napier
The British problem would be solved by an unusual hero. Captain Charles 
Napier RN even looked unusual:
‘about 5 feet 8 inches in height, spare made, black hair and whiskers, 
straight nose, and sallow complexion, and fifty years of age. There was 
no regard to personal appearance, but he looked most intent on what he 
was about.’274 
Napier (1786–1860) had earned a brilliant reputation in the Napoleonic wars 
and the War of 1812. He combined seamanship, daring and initiative in the best 
Royal Navy tradition with a mastery of coastal and amphibious warfare. His 
quickness of perception and extensive study, allied to intuitive understanding 
and coolness under fire, revealed a true ‘genius’ for war. The coming of peace 
left little scope for such skills, and after marrying and conducting a ‘Grand 
Tour’ Napier had sought new challenges in cutting-edge technology and com-
mercial speculation. Between 1820 and 1827 he committed his prize fortune 
to creating a flotilla of iron steam vessels, providing a commercial service on 
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the River Seine. The financial failure of this venture forced him to return to the 
Royal Navy, and to seek another fortune. 
 In mid-1832 Napier had just paid off the frigate HMS Galatea, and was seek-
ing a new field of endeavour. He contested the Parliamentary seat of Ports-
mouth as a radical, knowing that success would give him a claim on the gov-
ernment for a post or some other preferment. In the event he was defeated by 
powerful vested interests, the local brewer and the leader of the Baring family. 
Defeat and consequent financial losses forced him to solicit rewards from his 
government.275 It also led him to offer his services to the Constitutional Party 
in Portugal. 
 Napier had little choice but to become a mercenary; there was simply no 
other career open to him. Not that the choice was an easy one; under the For-
eign Enlistment Act he risked losing his commission, and with that his naval 
career. The choice was eased by his own knowledge of, and sympathy for, the 
Constitutional cause. Napier had twice obtained personal experience of the 
political problems of Portugal while commanding HMS Galatea. In mid-1829 
he had been sent to Lisbon to demand redress for various offences committed 
by the Miguelite regime. In mid-1831 he was in the Azores to protect British 
interests during the Constitutionalist conquest of the islands. He conducted the 
latter task with a marked partiality towards the invaders. 
 In August 1832 Napier wrote to Marquis Palmella, then in London, offer-
ing to command a converted East Indiaman in the Constitutionalist fleet. Such 
extemporised warships, converted from the largest merchant ships, were often 
used when regular fighting ships could not be obtained. Palmella was delighted 
with the offer, having already decided to buy such a ship. If Napier would serve 
under Captain George Sartorius RN, the current Constitutional commander, 
he would be most welcome: ‘nothing could be more fortunate for the cause of 
Portugal than to secure your services, even for a short time’.276 From this point 
Napier was involved, initially assisting Palmella to equip the 800-ton Indiaman, 
Lord Wellington, renamed Dom Pedro. 
 While Napier had no desire to supplant Sartorius, an old friend, he was soon 
being invited to take over the chief command afloat. The fact that Sartorius was 
several years junior to Napier on the Navy List would have made their working 
relationship difficult had he remained. Sartorius was a brave and skilful sea-
man, but he lacked the touch of brilliance required, being too methodical and 
calculating for such fluid circumstances. Furthermore, Sartorius was having a 
hard time dealing with the complex factional politics of the Pedroite regime at 
Oporto, and mounting insubordination of his unpaid, unruly British sailors. 
Nor were his officers any help; at least one of them had been promised the com-
mand by elements at Pedro’s headquarters. Unequal to the stern task of impos-
ing discipline on officers he did not trust and seamen with whom he sympa-
thised, Sartorius was never going to win the war. While he had defeated the 
Absolutist fleet in two battles, these were mere tactical triumphs that produced 
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no strategic consequences. He needed to capture the entire fleet to secure any 
strategic benefit. Finally, when he failed to support a combined attack at Oporto 
in January 1833, due to bad weather, Dom Pedro lost all faith, and sent officers 
to arrest him at the fleet anchorage at Vigo. Forewarned by Napier, Sartorius 
turned the tables, calling on the crews of his ships to arrest the ministerial offic-
ers, and hold them as security for the back pay owed to the fleet. This confirmed 
his decision to resign.
However, Napier was not going to serve for honour, or glory. He was effec-
tively bankrupt, and his name was his last commercial asset. Consequently, he 
drove a hard bargain, and held out for his terms. In part his demands reflected 
the strictures of the Foreign Enlistment Act, but his personal financial needs 
overrode other concerns. The negotiations ran from late 1832 to 1 February 
1833, when the Chevalier Lima was authorised to offer him the command. 
Palmella had introduced Napier to Lima, the ‘Official’ representative of the 
Constitutional cause in London. Their negotiations resulted in the award of six 
months’ advance of pay, an insurance policy on his life for £10,000 and similar 
terms for his officers. Advised to bring his own officers, Napier took his step-
son and a handful of hand-picked junior officers and warrant officers to com-
mand the ships of his new fleet.277 
The overriding attraction of Napier to his new employers was the bold and 
immediate course of action he had proposed to Palmella some months before. 
He advocated staking the whole war on a single throw of the dice, embark-
ing part of the Constitutional army from Oporto for a bold attempt to capture 
Lisbon from the sea. With the Constitutional forces pinned down in Oporto, 
Napier’s proposal was attractive, and he was initially promised 12 steamships 
and 7,000 troops, typically unrealistic figures. Napier advised that if a smaller 
force were used it should be sent to attack coastal areas. The strategic basis of 
his thinking was clear: ‘the command of the sea is an enormous advantage, and 
it ought to be used’.278 
Throughout this period Napier was in close contact with Admiral Sir George 
Dundas, the second Naval Lord of the Admiralty, and an important politico-
military figure. Dundas was an old friend and close confidant; he was also 
the trusted political lieutenant of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir James 
 Graham.279 Graham had come into contact with Napier back in 1814, while serv-
ing in a diplomatic capacity with Lord William Bentinck in Italy, and formed a 
very high opinion of him.280 When Graham awarded Napier a Greenwich Out-
Pension in 1832 he did so on the express understanding it ‘should not deprive 
the country of the experience and talents of superior officers’.281 The two men 
had been corresponding on a range of issues. In addition, the First Naval Lord, 
Admiral Sir Thomas Hardy, knew Napier well, as did almost every officer in 
the service. Among Whigs and Liberals he was rated a great man; Tories were 
less complimentary. More significantly, Graham shared Palmerston’s opinion 
on the problems of the Iberian peninsula. Consequently it can be inferred that 
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Napier was neither unaware of the wishes of these two key ministers, nor acting 
against their privately conveyed opinion. Napier’s departure for Portugal with 
so many officers would have been impossible without the tacit complicity of the 
ministers, at the very least. He even had to ask Dundas to release his stepson 
from his studies on board HMS Excellent.282 
The bright hopes of February were soon dashed by lack of money, and it 
was only the use of Napier’s name that enabled the Constitutional financier 
Mendizábal to secure the £12,000 needed to raise fresh troops, seamen and 
steamships. By early April, Napier’s plans to take Lisbon had been reduced to 
a force of 1,000 men in three steamboats for an attempt on the Algarve. Even 
so, he would take the post only if Sartorius was satisfied, and the fleet was fit 
to sail.283 Napier was too professional an officer to take excessive risks, and too 
careful of his own name, his last asset, to hazard it without a good chance of 
success. 
Sartorius was only too pleased to give up his command to a man he knew 
had the ability and resolve to complete the task. After paying tribute to Napier’s 
‘strict and honourable character’, Sartorius informed him of the conspiracies 
that had ruined his command.284 He expected some of the British sailors would 
leave, but hoped enough would remain to man the ships, with the Portuguese 
sailors, who were good and more ‘tractable’ than the English. The Portuguese 
officers he condemned as ‘ignorant and spiritless’, save a few of the youngest. He 
would remain at Oporto only long enough to hand over the squadron. In the 
interval he prepared his men for the arrival of their new Admiral, ‘a Black look-
ing shabby fellow’. Napier was advised to bring out signal flags, battle lanterns 
and quill tubes.285 
To disguise himself from the prying eyes of his Tory opponents at home, 
Napier adopted the nom de guerre Dom Carlos de Ponza, in honour of an out-
standing amphibious operation he had conducted back in 1813. His officers 
were more pedestrian, picking alternative ‘British’ names.
On 22 May, Napier boarded the steamer City of Waterford at Spithead, only 
to find the newly raised sailors mutinous, having been misled by the crimps. A 
further mutinous outbreak at Falmouth resulted in several men being drowned 
when the boat in which they were attempting to desert capsized. It was hardly 
the most auspicious start. Recognising that he was now an Admiral, Napier 
left the imposition of order and discipline to Commander Wilkinson, his Cap-
tain of the Fleet. Wilkinson applied the lash with some severity, and quickly 
imposed control, although he could not achieve a willing or rapid execution 
of duty. Napier finally departed on 2 May, with five steamers, but only 137 sea-
men, rather than the 400 he needed to complete the crews of the fleet. He was 
also suffering from an agonising neuralgia that would plague him for the next 
month. He was accompanied by Palmella and Mendizábal.286 
After a brief stop at Vigo, where hopes of reinforcement were disappointed, 
Napier arrived off Oporto late on 2 June. After meeting Sartorius and then 
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going ashore to meet some of his acquaintances from the Azores in 1831, 
Napier was given a shabby reception by Dom Pedro. Pedro disliked Pal-
mella and had not been told of the expedition. His entourage even implied 
Palmella was coming to remove him! Disgusted at this treatment and pre-
varication among the Emperor’s advisors over the expedition, Napier threat-
ened to leave.287 His temper, never the best aspect of his complex character 
when on shore, was not improved by the neuralgia, or the fact that he had 
burnt his mouth so badly on a supposed remedy that he could not speak.288 
The threat quickly had an effect. Pedro improved his manner, and won over 
Napier, an easy man to flatter and given to admiring ‘great men’. The Emperor 
accepted that something had to be done soon, and this sparked a strategic 
debate at headquarters. On 11 June Pedro ordered that an army of 2,600 men 
be embarked on Napier’s fleet, under the Duke of Terceira.289 Palmella would 
accompany the expedition to govern any liberated territory. Mendizábal was 
also on board. No target was assigned; all would be left to the commanders on 
the spot. Marshal Solignac, the French general then commanding at Oporto, 
and the chief opponent of the expedition, finally resigned on 12 June. He had 
argued for a direct attack across the Douro, but had been opposed by Marshal 
Saldanha who preferred Napier’s move to the south. Even the removal of the 
French general did not end the prevarication; army headquarters held up the 
embarkation of the troops, prompting Napier to signal ashore that he would 
resign if the embarkation did not resume with immediate effect. He had to 
repeat himself the following day to get the fleet watered. Napier was particu-
larly anxious to move because he had intelligence that the enemy were about 
to send their fleet to sea. 
Napier’s arrival had an almost immediate impact on the Absolutists, who 
began to shift their heavy baggage towards Lisbon on 14 June.290 The ministers 
at Lisbon closed the Tagus to all ships at night the same evening.291 As Napier 
had observed, seapower, in the right hands, was a powerful force. In Lisbon 
Lord William Russell, the British envoy-in-waiting, saw in the arrival of Napier 
the resignation of Solignac and the impending movement of the Absolutist 
fleet, evidence that the crisis of the war had arrived.292 
The majority of British officials and individuals resident in Portugal, dip-
lomats, merchants and naval officers, were opposed to the Miguelite regime. 
Consequently, Napier received priceless intelligence from at least two sources. 
As Britain had not recognised the Miguelite regime, the Acting Consul Gen-
eral, Richard Belgrave Hoppner, was effectively the British diplomatic repre-
sentative in Lisbon.293 Known to be an ardent supporter of the Constitutional 
cause, Hoppner served from early 1831 until mid-August 1833, when Russell, 
who had been resident for some months, presented his dormant credentials as 
Special Envoy.294 Hoppner’s hatred of Miguel reflected a liberal revulsion at his 
overthrowing the constitution, his infamous personal conduct and arbitrary 
tyranny.295 
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Before leaving England, Napier had requested Hoppner provide him with 
detailed information on the sea defences on the Tagus, with a view to a naval 
attack. Hoppner was pleased to further ‘the cause of Right and Justice’, provid-
ing a very full description of the defences. He had witnessed the French attack 
in 1831, and reported trifling losses on both sides. He was also aware of a strong 
feeling in favour of the Constitutionalists among the troops manning the forts, 
while the Miguelite ships were miserably manned and would, he expected, sim-
ply be filled up with pressed watermen and other unfortunates when they had 
to go to sea.296 
Hoppner’s blatantly partisan behaviour had proved to be a thorn in the side of 
the altogether more discreet naval commander at Lisbon, Rear Admiral Sir Wil-
liam Parker. Parker’s small but powerful force had been sent to protect British 
commercial interests, and deter other powers from intervening, notably Spain. 
Although a Whig and disgusted by the conduct of the Absolutists, Parker was 
too professional to exceed his orders in public. Consequently, while his private 
feelings were all on the Constitutional side,297 he was criticised by Hoppner and 
the Pedroites. This criticism was wholly unwarranted. Parker was secretly sup-
plying his fellow countrymen in Dom Pedro’s fleet with intelligence. Parker had 
admired Sartorius’s conviction and commitment, but he recognised that Napier 
was his superior: ‘as courageous as he was shrewd’, Napier understood ‘more of 
the strategy of war’ than any man he had ever met.298 Parker provided Napier 
with details of the state and movements of the Absolutist fleet, whose arsenal 
was in clear view of his flagship.299 Nor was this his only intelligence source. 
He was also able to read most of the Miguelite telegraph messages coming into 
Lisbon. ‘We are masters of many of the secret keys,’ he told Graham, ‘and feel 
confidence, therefore, in the greater part of these communications.’300 As Lord 
William Russell explained, the telegraph cypher was constantly changed, ‘but 
always bought for a few crowns’.301 
 Throughout the tortuous business of bringing Pedro to take the risk of an expe-
dition, Napier kept Admiral Dundas informed of every step, and enjoined that 
his letters should be sent on to Lord Palmerston.302 The Admiralty building was, 
after all, only 100 yards from the Foreign Office. The overriding issue, as he con-
stantly reminded Dundas, was to secure British recognition of Donna Maria.303 
 Even with the troops on board, Napier had further problems: 100 of the 
British seamen who had been serving under Sartorius insisted on going home. 
Consequently, he had to rely on Portuguese seamen to man some of his squad-
ron, concentrating the British hands on the key ships, under his best officers. 
Further punishment was necessary before he could instil any order and energy 
into his crews. 
The squadron comprised:
Don Pedro: ex-Indiaman 50 guns (short 18-pounders & 32-pounder 
carronades), 317 men 
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Rainha frigate: Flagship (ex-Argentine, ex-Swedish af Chapman of 
1803) 42 guns (18-pounders), 300 men ‘including Portuguese’ 
Donna Maria: 40 guns (short 18-pounders), 254 men 
Villa Flor: 18 guns (18-pounders) 
Portuense: 20 guns (32-pounder carronades), 126 men, ‘half Portu-
guese’304
Three or four hired steam ships: City of Waterford, William IV, 
 Birmingham (Names uncertain)305
A transport/hospital ship
Total manpower on the sailing warships was no more than 1,000.306 
The first three ships were largely manned with British seamen.
Against this force, the intelligence Napier had received suggested the Miguelites 
would send two battleships, two frigates and a number of smaller craft. He 
knew one battleship was a rotten old tub, hardly fit to go to sea, and that many 
of the men had been pressed. 
On 20 June the expedition set off, with so few troops Napier decided that an 
attack on Lisbon was not possible. This was fortunate, for his plans had been 
widely discussed in the English newspapers.307 He would have been pleased 
to hear that his actual destination, the Algarve, was still a secret, to the best 
of Parker’s knowledge.308 It may be that the open discussion of a direct attack 
on Lisbon was a ruse. If so, it was highly effective. On the night of 22 June, the 
entire garrison of Lisbon was kept in arms, ready to respond to a landing, while 
the key position of Fort St Julian’s was reinforced.309 Risings at St Thomar and 
elsewhere on the Tagus added to the worries of the Lisbon ministers.310 Once at 
sea, the army was hidden from the Absolutists, and could land anywhere. They 
could not hope to be strong enough everywhere, and elected to reinforce the 
centre. In fact they had chosen the wrong place. 
Reaching the Algarve, the troops landed at Cacellas, close to the Guadiana 
River, late on 24 June, meeting hardly any resistance. The Constitutionalists 
occupied Faro on 27 June, and Lagos on 30 June, where they paused to estab-
lish local administration, recruit volunteers, add to their stores and prepare 
for the next move. Napier hurriedly wrote to inform Parker that he planned 
to sail to the Tagus, lash his steamships alongside and enter Lisbon at night: 
‘I wish you would give me your opinion of what I might expect from such an 
attempt’.311 
The Absolutist Fleet:
Dom Joao (74) Flagship Commodore Aboim
Rainha (74)
Princessa Real (52) frigate
Martim de Freitas (49) ex-east Indiaman
Cybele (26) large corvette 
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Princessa Real (24) large corvette
Isabel Maria (22) large corvette 
Tejo (20) brig
Audaz (20) brig 
One xebec 
Total: 3,400 men312 
When the Absolutist ships left the Tagus, Parker recognised the crisis was at 
hand. He knew Napier’s force was much weaker than the Absolutist squadron, 
not least from the wreck of a schooner at Peniche with 80 priceless British 
seamen on board, who were now prisoners at Peniche and in Lisbon. How-
ever, he was confident Napier would ‘achieve everything that is practicable’.313 
His main concern was to be ready to respond to the result of the battle that 
he and Russell agreed was ‘inevitable’.314 For the next fortnight, the British 
representatives in Lisbon followed the progress of the Constitutional forces 
from the Absolutist telegraph.315 When the Constitutional force landed in the 
Algarve, the Absolutist ministers finally roused themselves to act, sending 
their squadron to sea. However, Hoppner for one doubted that the squadron 
meant business: 
‘It is not supposed to be Commodore Aboim’s intention to engage the 
ships from Oporto, but merely to cruise and interrupt any other troops 
that may be sent from thence to reinforce and support the expedition of 
the Duke of Terceira; nor is it improbable that the object of the Govern-
ment in sending him to the Southward was only to keep their enemies 
in check by his appearance off the coast, and prevent their advance into 
the interior, until they could assemble a sufficient force to oppose their 
march upon the capital.’316 
Napier put to sea on 2 July with the six sailing ships, which now included a 
6-gun schooner that had joined the squadron at Faro, but she would play no 
part in the battle. He left the steamers to complete their fuel and follow them 
to Lisbon. At 8 am the following morning he caught sight of the Miguelite fleet 
off Cape St Vincent, and sent the Villa Flor back to Lagos for the steamers. 
He spent the rest of the day keeping between the enemy and Lagos Bay, to 
ensure the junction of his forces, which occurred at 5 pm. The Absolutist fleet 
was sailing in a tight formation, with the two battleships and two frigates in 
one line, the three corvettes and two brigs in line behind them. Such evidence 
of seamanship demonstrated that the enemy was not incompetent. The two 
squadrons remained within a few hundred yards of each other throughout 
the night, Napier looking for a favourable opportunity for battle, preferably 
under the land, where the sea would be calm. This manoeuvring for position 
 continued throughout the day, to the growing impatience of the British sailors, 
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used to simpler tactics, and simpler officers to conduct them. Napier explained 
to the men that he was looking for a favourable opportunity, and used the inter-
vening hours to improve gun drill, especially fighting both broadsides at once. 
Throughout the two days in contact the enemy: 
‘shewed no disposition to bring us to action: we dared risk nothing till 
the weather became sufficiently fine to make one desperate effort to save 
Portugal or lose the cause.’317 
Recognising he could not win an artillery duel, and would not obtain the nec-
essary political impact even if he did, Napier had always planned on boarding 
the enemy ships, either at anchor in the Tagus or on the open ocean. He was 
playing for the highest stakes; he had to capture the enemy fleet, not win a 
tactical victory. He recognised Sartorius had achieved nothing with his  battles. 
On the morning of 5 July, Napier’s experience led him to anticipate that the 
weather, which had hitherto been too boisterous for a boarding action, would 
improve. He called the steamship captains to confer on board the flagship at 10 
am, planning to use their ships to tow his warships into action. His plans were 
ruined by the refusal of the engineers to go under fire without a bonus of £2,000 
a man. Before he had time to lament the lost opportunity, he was saved by the 
timely intervention of nature. The beginnings of a breeze were stirring from the 
north, and Napier, who was to windward, immediately shifted his plan to attack 
under sail. He then mustered his men on the upper deck, and gave them one of 
his characteristic fighting speeches, full of prize money, home and sweethearts. 
The men were also fed, for Napier knew that British seamen cared more for a 
full stomach than anything else. 
The tactics of the battle were predetermined, and reflected Napier’s experi-
ence. He knew that his smaller and weaker ships would be able to close more 
safely from astern, as long as they were sufficiently well handled to avoid the 
broadsides of their opponents. He had intended to attack the enemy flagship, 
Dom Joao, with his own ship, but she was ahead of the other 74, the Rainha, 
which he now elected to attack with his own ship and the Dom Pedro. This left 
the Dom Joao without an opponent, although he hoped to capture her with 
his own ship once the first 74 had been taken. As they went into action he 
instructed Captain Peake of the frigate Donna Maria to employ the same tactics 
against the Princessa Real. The Portuense and Villa Flor would attack the Mar-
tim de Freitas. Napier left his two small Portuguese-manned ships to do what 
they could with other Absolutist vessels. He knew the key to success would be 
the British officers, and the experienced seamen who followed them, aboard his 
three largest units. He took care to explain his plans to his officers. 
When the anticipated breeze arose, around 2 pm, Napier led his fleet into 
action, heading directly for the 74-gun Rainha de Portugal. The Absolutists 
held their fire until the range came down to musket shot, about 100 yards, and 
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then opened a heavy and rapid, but largely inaccurate, barrage. Outstripping 
the rest of his force, Napier’s Rainha closed on the enemy stern, where few guns 
bore, and manoeuvred to yaw across her quarters, firing effective broadsides 
into her flimsy stern galleries. The skilful direction of the ship under heavy 
fire was no accident; Napier had done much the same in April 1809, working 
across the stern of a flying French battleship off Guadeloupe. His skill helped 
to minimise casualties, as did his ordering the men to lie down to avoid return 
fire. Even so, three gun crews and a Marine Lieutenant were cut down. 
Relying on his final raking broadside to confuse the enemy, Napier ran his 
ship alongside her higher opponent to board. As he did so, two men standing 
beside him were killed. The smart seamanship required to secure the ship along-
side, and board a battleship from the decks of a frigate, was only to be expected 
from the hand-picked officers and men involved. Almost the entire crew of the 
Rainha had been assigned to the three divisions of boarders; the first, led by 
Napier, went over the gangway; the second, under his stepson and Commander 
Wilkinson, went up and through the fore chains, while Captain MacDonough, 
a volunteer, led the third into the aftermost gun port of the enemy main deck. 
All three groups met stiff resistance. MacDonough cleared the way for his men 
to board, but was killed in the process. His division quickly drove the enemy 
up onto the quarter deck, where they met the other two divisions. The second 
division was held up by spirited opposition, with both officers badly wounded, 
but after a brief setback when the two ships drifted apart, Napier led his division 
over the gangway and stormed aft. He sought a quick victory by overpower-
ing the enemy officers on the poop. With most of his men on board, Napier 
quickly secured the upper deck of the Miguelite vessel; her Captain was killed 
and the remaining members of the crew were driven below deck, where they 
surrendered. Although five British officers and six seamen had been killed, and 
his stepson and his friend Wilkinson were severely wounded, Napier quickly 
restrained his men. Every British officer who boarded the Rainha had been 
wounded; three would die, while two more were badly hurt. This was hardly 
surprising, for as Napier observed, the men did well at the guns, but rather hung 
back in boarding, needing to be lead from the front. In view of their mutinous 
state only weeks before, it was a testament to his leadership and training that 
they did so well. 
From the poop Napier hailed Captain Goble on the Dom Pedro, directing 
him to make all sail after the Dom Joao but, just as he did so, Goble was fatally 
wounded by a musket ball from the lower deck of the ship Napier had just 
captured. Despite this, the Dom Pedro pressed on, engaging the enemy flag-
ship from the leeward. Napier, leaving a small party to secure his prize, hast-
ily reboarded his flagship, shifted the tattered remnants of two sails, patched 
up the rigging and joined the pursuit of the Don Joao. When Napier’s flagship 
ranged up towards his windward side, the Absolutist commander surrendered. 
Two frigates were also taken before the end of the day, the Princessa Real by 
the Donna Maria in a near copy of Napier’s attack on the Rainha, in which she 
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suffered several casualties before luffing up across the enemy stern, raking and 
boarding from the fore chains, led by five British officers. The Absolutists went 
below, but fired at anyone trying to follow them, until a pair of 18-pounder 
guns were shifted from the gunports, loaded with grape, and directed down the 
main hatch. At this point the Absolutist officers surrendered. The speed and 
efficiency of the action demonstrated the value of Napier’s pre-battle tactical 
conference.318 The American captain of the Martim de Freitas, his ship crippled 
aloft by her smaller opponents, finally surrendered to the Rainha, which had 
left the Dom Pedro to secure the second 74. The corvette Princessa Real surren-
dered the following morning.319 
The battle, fought seven miles SW of Cape St Vincent, was a triumph of skill, 
planning and determination over weight of metal and numbers of men. Napier 
recognised that his advantage lay in the professional core of his fleet, and would 
be most useful in dynamic circumstances. Throughout the battle he remained 
absolutely calm, responding to the shifting opportunities of the moment, and 
exploiting the weakness and errors of the enemy. 
For a man credited with such an excitable temperament when ashore, Napier 
was astonishingly ‘cool’ under fire. This was the secret of his success in battle: 
he was not a simple fighting man, but a complex, calculating leader who could 
control, as far as contemporary technology permitted, the direction and pace 
of the battle. Despite being under heavy fire, and then in the thick of the hand-
to-hand fighting, seeing his beloved stepson covered in wounds, Napier was 
always the Admiral, never abandoning his command responsibility to take up 
the simple task of individual combat. Nor did he allow the battle to end until he 
had no chance of taking the last enemy vessels. 
That night Napier secured his prizes and made sail for Lagos, where he cast 
anchor the following morning. Once the fleet was secure, he wrote to tell his 
wife he was safe. He concluded, with characteristic brio: ‘I think the prize money 
will be something handsome. You must give a dance on the green and think of 
me.’320 He provided Parker with two accounts, the first a breathless résumé, the 
second a more ‘professional’ appreciation. Napier reported 25 killed and 92 
wounded, with enemy casualties of 77 killed and 105 wounded.321 These were 
severe losses, which had occurred on only four ships. Later critics would carp at 
Napier’s triumph, claiming the enemy had been bought, or did not fight. Such 
slurs were unwarranted: Napier and his officers won the battle by a combina-
tion of skill, resolve and leadership. They also paid a high price for leading from 
the front: hardly a man among them was not wounded, while eight of the 25 
killed were officers.322 Their blood secured the Constitutional victory.
 In the hour of triumph, Napier did not forget the political purpose of battle. 
Nor did Russell: 
‘The morning after we heard of it Admiral Parker and myself called Vis-
count Santarem, and told him that, in our opinion the issue of the con-
test was decided by this blow.’
154 Naval Leadership in the Atlantic World
The two British officials then delivered the same message to the pro-Absolutist 
Spanish minister.323 Russell was so excited by what Parker termed a ‘brilliant 
achievement’ that, just for once, he forgot the proper decorum, referring to 
‘Admiral Napier’ in an official letter.324 
Napier’s letter to Admiral Dundas, intended for Palmerston’s eyes, also 
urged that the opportunity was now right for the ministers to recognise Donna 
Maria.325 The same day, the Admiralty removed his name from the Navy List, 
and cancelled his Greenwich pension following Lord Londonderry’s attack in 
the House of Lords, because he was ‘absent without leave’.326 They could do no 
less, under existing rules, but took care to do no more. 
In the interval between the battle and the arrival of news in London, Palm-
erston reflected on the importance of the Portuguese crisis: 
‘We really ought to take some line upon this business. The failure of 
Pedro would be a great blow to our Power both at home and abroad, but 
more especially would it affect us in all our foreign relations.’327
On 14 July his mood changed when Chevalier de Lima showed him Napier’s 
letter of the 6th. Palmerston hurried to inform the Prime Minister and pass 
the news to the First Lord of the Admiralty.328 Political problems at home and 
abroad would be greatly simplified by this timely triumph. Recognising that 
Napier had won a great victory in the struggle between the autocratic east-
ern powers and the western liberals, Palmerston quickly sent the news to his 
ambassador in Vienna, to ensure that the reactionary leader Prince Metter-
nich, who had long sponsored Miguel, was made aware of his defeat. ‘Carlos de 
Ponza forever! Was there ever a more gallant exploit in the annals of seaman-
ship?’ he declared.329 Even so, hesitation in the cabinet, and Earl Grey’s continu-
ing hostility to Pedro, delayed British recognition of Donna Maria.
Napier’s success was particularly welcome at the Admiralty, which was under 
severe pressure to find the ships to support British foreign policy, without hav-
ing to go back to Parliament for more money. Graham was delighted:
‘I have just seen Lima’s account of the success of de Ponza: the moral 
effect of the victory will be great, I should think almost decisive and I 
sincerely & warmly congratulate you.’330 
The Absolutists evacuated Lisbon on 24 July, after Terceira had marched to the 
Tagus and defeated the Miguelite army in a battle that was decided when their 
general was killed. 
 Napier had sent the Donna Maria to blockade the Tagus as soon as she was 
ready, prompting some concern in Britain, and began beating his way north 
with Palmella and the bulk of the combined squadrons. However, the fleet was 
delayed by an outbreak of cholera, and then becalmed in Cascaes Bay on 22 July. 
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Nevertheless, his impending arrival and a liberal rising in the city completed 
the collapse of Miguelite morale. Parker, by now able to show his true feelings 
rather more openly, signalled the news that the city had declared for the Queen 
to Napier as he was trying to beat his way up river.331 The fleet arrived off Black 
Horse Square on 25 July.
For Palmerston, and William IV, the occupation of Lisbon by the Queen’s 
forces, and the fact that ‘the whole of the naval force of Portugal is now serv-
ing under her flag’, were the key reasons for renewing diplomatic relations, 
suspended by the usurpation of Dom Miguel. As long as nothing unexpected 
had occurred in the interval, Russell was to activate his dormant commission, 
and recognise the Queen. He was then to read the Constitutional ministers 
a lecture on the need for conciliation of the defeated, and the avoidance of 
problems with Spain. In exchange, he could inform them that a powerful force 
of British troops and ships had been assembled at Cork, to be despatched to 
Lisbon if any foreign power attempted to support the usurper.332 In the hour 
of triumph Palmerston had not forgotten the commercial purpose of British 
policy, the particular relationship that existed between the two countries, or 
his fear that Dom Pedro’s ministers were either corrupt or pro-French, or more 
likely both. He still favoured a government led by Palmella, which was exactly 
what Pedro did not desire. As soon as he had reached Lisbon, Pedro had dis-
missed Palmella. 
With the Constitutional Party occupying the city, Russell consulted Parker, 
who agreed the time was right to extend British recognition.333 Once Spain 
changed sides, removing all support from Miguel, the war in Portugal was 
effectively over.334 
 With Lisbon in Constitutional hands and Napier dominant at sea, Parker’s 
force of three battleships would be perfectly adequate.335 The British govern-
ment would not need to ask Parliament for additional naval estimates. The Bel-
gian crisis was already settled, so the resolution of Portugal essentially settled 
the liberal character of western Europe, and would place Britain ‘in a condition 
to talk boldly to Russia’ over her treatment of Poland.336 Napier, having contrib-
uted so much to this result, was now a name to be reckoned with. He would be 
used to frighten the reactionaries for the next two decades. 
Two months later, Sir James Graham had occasion to reflect on this new real-
ity, and on the man behind the triumph: 
‘The whole letter breathes the character of the man, daring, intelli-
gent and dauntless; but he is not to be trusted implicitly, except in 
the hour of danger, and then he performs prodigies far beyond all 
calculation.’337 
One of his fellow mercenaries showed a deeper insight into this most complex 
of warriors.
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‘Napier was a slovenly-looking man; his trousers, for instance, had 
evidently once been white, but were now the worse for wear, and had 
become a brown yellow. He was fond of saying eccentric things, and 
of pretending to be in a great passion; while it was evident he was 
merely affecting it in words and manner, and had all his wits about him. 
Although he wished to be thought impelled by romantic feelings to help 
a young Queen to her throne, still it was not difficult to see that no man 
ever entered on an enterprise with more cool calculation than he did 
before agreeing to lead this expedition, or more resolved to be well paid, 
alive or dead, by prize money or insurance.’338 
Another eyewitness at Oporto recorded: 
‘Napier was the most egotistical, selfish man I ever knew, but clever and 
brave. He never wrote or spoke well of any one with whom he served.’339 
For all that these criticisms contained more than a grain of truth, it is doubtful 
if anyone else could have achieved so much in such a short space of time. The 
seamless manner in which Napier had dovetailed the needs of his new masters 
with the wider ambitions of the British ministers was a work of genius. That he 
discussed the whole process with ministerial, diplomatic and naval confidantes 
throughout demonstrates a strategic vision of the highest order. Sir William 
Parker was right; he really did understand more of war than any man alive. In 
the space of a single month Napier had transformed the course of a war that 
had been running for years. 
 Napier was careful to secure the prize money for the ships taken in his battle, 
reckoned at £130,000, for himself and his followers. In addition, he was given 
two Portuguese titles, an estate, a pension and back pay. The Portuguese war 
transformed his prospects: he began it as one of any number of penniless naval 
captains; when he returned home he was the most famous naval officer alive, 
and had the money to buy a fine estate. These were the tangible rewards of a job 
well done. His success captured the imagination of a nation, and the attention 
of key statesmen, most notably Lord Palmerston. He was returned to the Navy 
List in 1837, and went on to gather further glory. Nor had he finished with Por-
tugal, but that, as they say, is another story. 
Afterword
Richard Harding
The 150 years between 1700 and 1850 saw a remarkable transformation in 
global history. The impact of European maritime activity on the rest of the 
world, which had been steadily growing since the 1480s, took an enormous 
leap forward. In 1700 European maritime commerce and power was firmly 
established along the Atlantic coasts of the Americas, but elsewhere neither was 
particularly influential. Even in Europe, the impact of oceanic commerce and 
naval power was limited. Exotic luxury goods from east and west were becom-
ing more commonplace and the legendary silver mines of Spanish America 
had long attracted the ambitions of statesmen, entrepreneurs and brigands. Yet 
almost the whole of Europe remained traditional (even feudal), agrarian and 
insular in its social and economic relationships. European diplomacy, while 
influenced by maritime events, was seldom decisively affected by them. In 1850 
the prospects looked very different. Industrial and technological revolution 
dramatically affected supply and demand in societies serviced by maritime 
commerce. Intellectual and political revolution, fed by the wealth, the knowl-
edge and the fears generated in global exchange, had reshaped Europe and its 
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relationships with the rest of the world. Europe, and by then the United States, 
stood on the verge of an imperialist explosion of energy that started ebbing 
away only in the middle decades of the twentieth century. The ‘Age of Vasco 
da Gama’ may have started in the 1480s and reached its apogee in the early 
twentieth century, but that last great imperial surge was possible only because 
of the maturing of the maritime infrastructure that occurred largely between 
1700 and 1850.340
The period was one of intense and almost constant naval conflict between 
European powers that extended across the globe. During this time, the broad 
expectation of what it meant to be a professional naval officer was honed in 
conflicts that covered the whole range of duties from escort and blockade 
work to control of piracy and large-scale fleet action. By 1700 squadrons were 
ranging widely from their metropolitan heartlands. Individual captains and 
squadron commanders were finding more autonomy and responsibility as they 
operated far beyond the control of their political masters.341 The wars of the 
 eighteenth century developed both capability and confidence in this independ-
ence. The papers in this collection suggest that this phenomenon requires far 
more examination. This degree of independence of action probably occurred 
earlier in Britain, stemming from experiences in the 1670s and validated by the 
general level of success that the Royal Navy achieved between 1688 and 1714. 
The British system, with its more diffuse and interdependent organisational 
power networks created a very different relationship between navy and crown 
than existed in the Bourbon monarchies. It may also have created a political 
context in which senior naval officers were able (even compelled) to use their 
initiative to ensure naval success, as they could not be protected from public 
condemnation by royal favour or instructions. The execution of Vice-Admiral 
John Byng in March 1757 was only the most dramatic case of how domestic 
political conditions interacted with operational events at sea. Throughout the 
eighteenth century British admirals had to be prepared to be as combative in 
the political arena at home as they were at sea. In France and Spain it was very 
different. The disappointment over the failure of d’Orvilliers’s invasion attempt 
in 1779 inevitably had repercussions for the unfortunate admiral, but, as Olivier 
Chaline has shown, his fate was determined far more by relations at court than 
with any other element in French society. The result was that d’Orvilliers was 
compelled to retreat from command without public debate over the effective-
ness of his performance and the responsibility of others. Napoleon tolerated 
public scrutiny of military or naval decisions even less than the Bourbons. His 
judgement was final and an appeal to other parts of society for a different or 
more sympathetic view was pointless. In 1805 the result was Villeneuve’s tragic 
attempt to salvage his reputation that led to the disaster at Trafalgar and, ulti-
mately, his suicide the following year. 
Clearly, the relative absence of public scrutiny did not give French and  Spanish 
naval leaders immunity from disgrace if they transgressed  expectations, but 
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those expectations were different. As Michael Duffy has pointed out, from 
the very beginning of an aspirant officer’s career, both the content and pro-
cess of their training or education differed from their British counterparts. The 
structure of the French navy, with its formal geographical division between 
the three major arsenals, and social division between les rouges and les bleus 
(not to mention the earlier division between the galley squadrons and the sail-
ing squadrons), created significant internal political and professional barriers, 
which could not fail to have operational consequences. The contempt for the 
gros manoeuvres of practical seamanship within the French naval officer corps 
put them at a distinct disadvantage, not just because it prevented the develop-
ment of an instinctive understanding of the possibilities in the heat of naval 
engagements, but because it created a permanent division within the officer 
corps and between it and the experienced seamen. Officers could impose their 
will in some situations, but the tense, complex and unpredictable conditions of 
manoeuvring a squadron into battle required a long preparation by command-
ers and crews to develop their understanding and commitment to what was 
about to happen, which could not be generated by formal signals or articles of 
war. Despite his other qualities, Suffren was to discover this painfully at Porto 
La Praya in April 1781. 
Navies depend on success at sea and ashore. They had to be understood if they 
were to be effectively resourced by the political systems they served. Achieving 
this was an essential prerequisite for putting well-found and expertly trained 
navies to sea. It might be expected that a reputation earned at sea would be an 
important indicator of influence ashore, but it is remarkable how seldom this 
was the case in the period under review. The clearest case of these social and 
institutional barriers were those that prevented a fighting officer such as Anto-
nio Barceló from reaching the very highest level of command. Of the offic-
ers in this study, perhaps only George Anson and Edward Hawke managed 
to bridge the wet and dry dimensions of their profession entirely successfully. 
Why success at sea did not translate into success at the highest political level 
is a phenomenon that still needs to be more fully investigated. Undoubtedly, 
the social structures were part of the situation. Also, the skills necessary for the 
successful negotiation of naval interests at the highest level were not naturally 
learned by spending years on a heaving deck in foul weather. In Britain, as 
in France, there was ingrained a disdain for those officers whose career took 
them down a path of engagement with the administration and politics of naval 
power. Interestingly, this juxtaposed with a grudging regard for the few, like 
Sir Charles Middleton, Lord Barham (1726–1813), who played a central role 
in the American War of Independence and the French Wars.342 Naval history 
is most often written with a view to impressing on the reader how events at sea 
influenced events ashore. Far less is written to explain or explore how events 
ashore translated into power at sea. Without doing both, we will not under-
stand seapower in its whole context. 
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An important question that arises from this is how far these social and profes-
sional barriers played a role in shaping the expectations of the officers corps? 
Simon Surreaux has shown that in reaching the highest ranks of the French 
navy under Louis XV, a citation for successful, sustained and aggressive fighting 
was not pre-eminent. It was, of course, there, expressed in many different ways, 
but it did not stand out from among all the other qualities that were considered 
appropriate for a senior naval commander. We should be careful not to presume 
too great a distinction between these apparent criteria for senior leadership in 
France and those that were employed in other nations. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, patronage and promotion were complex social processes, not driven by a 
nineteenth-century utilitarian rationalism that was itself never applied as con-
sistently as its theorists desired. Throughout the eighteenth century, the relative 
importance of criteria shifted in all countries. These need to be examined in 
detail for a fuller understanding of how the social expectations and consequently 
the ambition of officers worked in different navies. For example, long periods of 
peace, such as between 1714 and 1739 (and for Spain between 1748 and 1779), 
limited the amount and type of combat experience that could be drawn upon to 
justify promotion. Patrons rose and fell; state policy shifted; practical experience 
gleaned in the heat of battle, in hard weather and even in the administrative 
functions of the navy, decayed as the years passed. What filled the gaps when 
combat experience was limited needs exploration. It was a phenomenon that 
repeated itself between 1870 and 1914 and has again since 1945. 
In sum, we still need to know far more about what states and societies 
expected of their officers. Surreaux and Duffy have shown that differences 
clearly existed between states. This can also be deduced from other aspects of 
naval activity. The design of warships which emphasised different characteris-
tics suggests the naval intentions of states were not identical. In the first half of 
the eighteenth century there was a clear difference between the heavily armed, 
weatherly British warships, intended for long cruises and battle, and the faster, 
more lightly-armed French ships whose principal purpose was not to seek bat-
tle but to carry out specific missions and return to port. This was reflected in 
the instructions given to officers. The readiness of the political leadership of 
the state to dictate the operational behaviour of the fleet was evident in France 
and Spain. D’Orvilliers’s instructions hindered his tactical options. Napoleon’s 
plan of the naval campaign gave Villeneuve very little room for initiative and 
manoeuvre. Catherine Scheybeler has shown that Ferdinand VI’s policy of 
armed neutrality imposed a restraint in action that had a distinctly detrimental 
impact on officer behaviour and performance, but that restraint was effectively 
demanded by the state. Agustín Guimerá’s explanation of the tactics adopted by 
Mazarredo between 1797 and 1802 shows how firmly his behaviour was driven 
by the defensive nature of Spanish naval policy. 
The social and political conditions within European states permit some broad 
generalisations. For example, on the whole, the Royal Navy had an  offensive 
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ideology consistently endorsed by the main political actors within the British 
system. They demanded success, and thus the development of skills and com-
petence within the officer corps was honed by time at sea that its European 
counterparts did not experience. However, no state in Western Europe thought 
in terms of investment for the long-term capability of senior naval officers. 
Who got to command, what they brought to the situation, how they exercised 
their command and how they related to their political masters were the prod-
uct of unique circumstances. Ultimately, therefore, understanding the role of 
command in campaigns is a matter of understanding detail not generalisations. 
However, changes in expectations that did occur over the period are also 
evident from these essays. Carlos Alfaro Zaforteza shows that the task facing 
Salazar during his second term as minister of the navy between 1823 and 1832 
was so different from his eighteenth-century predecessors that a metropolitan 
‘fleet in being’ defensive strategy was no longer credible. Salazar had to give 
operational autonomy to his commander on the spot in Cuba, Ángel Laborde 
y Navarro. With Salazar giving support from Spain and Navarro left to make 
his own decisions in the West Indies, Spain’s position in the Americas finally 
stabilised after two decades of chaos and disaster. 
Navarro was not alone in the independence of action he enjoyed. By 1815 
a generation of naval officers had become used to the freedom, responsibil-
ity and challenges of distant stations. They had also become used to a degree 
of public recognition that had very seldom been enjoyed by previous genera-
tions. However, outside of Spain, even as the French Wars ended, governments 
were taking advantage of the dramatic reduction in the size of the fleet to claw 
back control of these officers. It was a long and disjointed process that was 
never completed. It continues to the present day as technology and operational 
conditions put new demands on commanders and the political authorities.343 
Naval officers lost to the fleet through retrenchment and paying off were not 
necessarily lost to the state. Andrew Lambert’s study of Captain Charles Napier 
shows the value of allowing capable, independent officers to use (and continue 
to hone) their skills in the service of other powers. The Constitutional Party in 
Portugal was provided with an officer who brought a decisive edge to the naval 
war, leading to the occupation of Lisbon and the ending of the civil war in 1833. 
Britain found its foreign policy objectives cheaply and effectively served as well 
as having an improved officer return to her own naval service in 1837.344
What impact did all this change have on the naval officer? Perhaps the most 
significant was the emergence of a popular ideal of a naval officer, understood 
not just within the profession but by the wider public. Britain was undoubtedly 
one of the great winners in the wars of 1793–1815. She was richer; her empire 
was more extensive and her economy demonstrably moving beyond that of her 
neighbours. Much of this could be attributed to the great industrial changes 
that were going on, but behind them it was clear to contemporaries that this 
depended on national independence and the free flow of raw materials and 
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 finished products across the world. In turn, this depended on the Royal Navy. 
The sea power that the Royal Navy wielded was deep and complex, but it was 
easily comprehended by the public by the simple fact of victory in battle. The 
Royal Navy won battles and it did so because its men and materiel were supe-
rior to that of its enemies. Naval leaders were an essential part of this. Nelson 
has a place of his own in public and professional recognition of his qualities, but 
by 1815 the pantheon of naval heroes was full and their names were to endure 
in the public mind in histories, monuments, art works and literature. 
There is no doubt that the period between 1700 and 1850 saw major social, 
political and economic changes. There is equally no doubt that naval leader-
ship penetrated far more deeply into the public consciousness by the end of the 
period, principally as a result of the wars of 1793–1815. However, what is far 
less clear is how far the practice of officership actually changed in the period. 
Compared to the dramatic tactical and operational changes in land warfare 
brought about by the ‘levée en masse’ and Napoleonic organisation, the war 
at sea seems to have retained its essential character from the ancien régime.345 
The totality of land warfare, with societies engaged more fully in all aspects 
of conflict from large-scale conventional armies to guerrilla wars and intense 
economic engagement, seemed to be of a different character from the wars that 
had dominated the previous 100 years. From it there seemed to emerge a more 
professional approach to war and a desire to establish a universal theory of 
war which developed during the nineteenth century.346 Social background and 
courage in the field were still vital attributes, but there were the faltering first 
steps towards a more professionally educated army officer and a more ‘scien-
tifically’ organised military force; the latter eventually being exemplified by the 
Prussian Great General Staff.347
Navies appear to have been untouched by this military revolution. The tech-
nologies remained largely unchanged. The organisation of navies, their opera-
tional imperatives and tactical concepts were very similar to those that had 
been inherited from previous generations. The idea of a universal theory of 
naval warfare only really attracted interest in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century. This needs far more investigation across a range of navies, and it is 
probably wise to be cautious at this stage about drawing too large a distinc-
tion between the higher education of naval and army officers in this period. 
Progress in military education was slow and varied greatly between states. 
Officers in both armies and navies had to master the essentials of their profes-
sions. Surviving at sea required a far more demanding and formally tested ini-
tial education than that required on land. This understanding applied to both 
naval officers and the common seaman. Both services relied on the ability of 
officers to command a disciplined performance from soldiers and sailors. Both 
services were strongly influenced by a geometric approach to movement and 
manoeuvre. There was always a fundamental difference in the demands placed 
upon army and naval officers, however. Armies are essentially people who have 
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weapons, and in the chaos of combat people have options. Maintaining control 
in a crisis was an important role for an army officer. Conversely, ships are weap-
ons that have people. The weapon only works when the people are carrying 
out their function exactly as demanded. Individual options in combat are very 
limited and the nature of control in a crisis consequently differed. While this is 
a highly simplistic distinction, it points to the fact that from daily routines of 
existence to the ultimate crisis of battle, armies and navies were different. How 
important this was in the way they and their officer corps performed has yet to 
be examined in any detail. Add to this the different contracts for service in an 
army and a navy, and the different social milieux from which they recruited, 
and the current lack of clarity in our understanding of officership in the period 
1700–1850 becomes more obvious.
Clearly these essays leave many questions unanswered and, indeed, raise 
more questions. There are also other areas of study that need to be added. For 
example, the United States navy is missing from this collection. This was the 
formative period for a new navy and a new republic. America had plenty of 
skilled seamen employed along the Atlantic seaboard, but improvising a navy 
was even more challenging than creating an army. The Americans had at least a 
well-established militia system and experience of raising provincial expedition-
ary forces. They had little to guide them in raising naval forces. A new weapon 
had to be forged and the role of the officers chosen for this task was going 
to be critical. In 1776 Congress found itself with many more applicants than 
commands to fill. A navy had to emerge from competing demands for ships, 
for funding and for political authority.348 Victory in that war did not resolve 
some fundamental tensions within American society about the role of a navy. A 
navy was revived in 1794, largely to protect trade from North African corsairs, 
but also to protect United States interests under threat from the belligerents in 
the great war that had broken out in Europe.349 The years that followed, with a 
quasi-war against France (1798–1801), continued action against the Barbary 
states and increasing conflict with Great Britain, which led to war in 1812, 
forged the United States navy as an instrument of policy.350 The naval successes 
against Britain and the North Africans created a founding legend that became 
important in the development of the US navy, but did not resolve the debate in 
Congress about how the navy should be structured and led. American schol-
ars have taken a great interest in the emergence of a distinctive officer corps, 
reflecting republican values that were debated in Congress.351 The experience 
of the United States naval officer corps is an important feature of the period 
1794–1850 that needs to be explored in far greater depth in relation to its dis-
tinctiveness from the European norm. 
Finally, there are the other naval powers that were developing in this period. 
Russia became a naval power in the Baltic as a result of the Great Northern War 
(1700–21) and was an expanding naval power in the Black Sea in the 1770s and 
1780s. Throughout, Russia turned to foreign expertise to help build her naval 
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power. While some important work has been done on the foreign officers who 
influenced the Russian fleet, there is a great deal more that is needed to fully 
understand how the Russian and foreign officers worked together in establish-
ing Russian naval power in the Baltic and Black Sea.352 Another state whose 
naval power was undergoing major change at the end of the eighteenth century 
was the Ottoman Empire. After the devastating defeat of the Turkish fleet by 
a Russian squadron at Çeşme in July 1770, the Ottomans began a major tech-
nological and design shift in their naval construction. With the help of foreign 
expertise, principally from France, the Turks created a new fleet that success-
fully constrained Russian ambitions in the Black Sea between 1787 and 1791.353 
How far Ottoman naval leadership changed in this period, and how much it 
was linked to foreign navies in this process, is still something that needs to be 
discovered. Less dramatic, but equally important if a full picture of professional 
development in this period is to be understood, are the navies of the United 
Provinces, Denmark-Norway, Sweden and Venice. 
Collectively, the authors of these essays have tried to create a focus on the 
performance of various officers or officer corps at a critical period in European 
and world history. They have highlighted contrasts and comparisons that can 
help explain the differential performances of navies during a period of intense 
naval competition. What they have also done is emphasise that despite the 
masses of work carried out upon navies in this period, and the equally vast 
energy that has been put into understanding the concept of leadership over the 
past four decades, important questions about naval leadership still remain to 
be answered. 
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